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Welcome to the May issue of the Combating Terrorism Exchange. !is issue 
is unusual not for its length—although it is by far the longest issue we’ve yet 
produced—but because in it we o"er you two main articles that describe 
in exceptional detail the “Anbar Awakening” in Iraq (2004–6), from very 
di"erent points of view. !e backstory for both accounts begins when Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi’s violent jihadi group al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) had infested 
the Al Qaim district of Anbar after 'eeing Fallujah. Having presented them-
selves as freedom (ghters, the militants were now beginning to show their true 
intent, using killings and coercion to keep the locals in line with their radical 
al Qaeda agenda. Although most of the Anbar tribes opposed the U.S.-led  
occupation, once the sheikhs realized that AQI was working to undermine their 
authority, they had a change of heart, and the Sahawa (Awakening) was born.
Dr. William Knarr and his team of researchers at the U.S. Institute for Defense 
Analysis concentrate on the U.S. Marine battalions deployed to the Al Qaim 
district to (ght AQI. !rough extensive archival research and (rst-person inter-
views with a signi(cant number of Iraqi and American participants, Knarr 
and his team describe how the Marines, initially wary and suspicious after a 
year of hard (ghting, came to embrace the Awakening and, working with the 
sheikhs and their people, pushed back against AQI to free the Al Qaim district 
from the jihadis’ grip. We are urged to see the events in Al Qaim as the earliest 
manifestation of a wave of counterterrorist revolt that culminated in the battle 
for Ramadi and the decimation of AQI in western Iraq.
MAJ Brent Lindeman, U.S. Army Special Forces, then takes us through these 
events from the quite di"erent perspective of two Special Forces team ser-
geants, whom he calls William and Robert. Lindeman’s is a (rsthand account 
of the slow, painstaking work these men put into understanding the complex, 
sensitive, and perpetually shifting relationships among local power 
brokers, and what they did to leverage their understanding into achieving 
cooperation and then success. !rough Lindeman’s eyes we get an unusually 
clear picture of the many personalities involved on all sides of the table. He 
describes with sharp insight and occasional ironic humor the negotiations and 
machinations that brought the tribes and the teams together to beat back their 
deadly mutual enemy.
!e Indian government, by contrast, has made less conclusive progress against 
an indigenous insurgency that has festered for decades. How do you solve 
a problem like the Maoists? Group Captain Srinivas Ganapathiraju of the 
Indian Air Force o"ers us some CT solutions that, perhaps unsurprisingly, are 
not too di"erent from those described by Knarr and Lindeman. Foremost is 
the need for the central government to actually follow through on its promises 
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to improve the lives of its long-neglected rural population. !en, the author advises, New Delhi must develop a broad-
based strategy to both exploit the Maoists’ structural vulnerabilities at the political level, and target their hardcore 
leadership via dedicated Special Operations Forces.
From the present situation on the Indian subcontinent, we move to Yemen in 2001, when MAJ Mohammed Garallah, 
a newly minted young army o*cer, was among the (rst cadre of Yemeni soldiers to be trained by American SOF in 
counterterrorism. Unfortunately, mutual cross-cultural misunderstandings doomed that initial e"ort to, if not failure, 
then a very quali(ed success. !e best intentions of the American trainers and the willingness of their Yemeni pupils, 
Garallah explains with keen irony, could not make up for each side’s misguided expectations of the other. 
We are pleased to introduce a new feature in this issue. Global ECCO’s Combating Terrorism Archive Project (CTAP) 
is devoted to collecting interviews with CTFP alumni from around the world, who share their experiences, knowledge, 
and insights for the bene(t of their peers and successors in the CT community. !is issue’s excerpt is from an interview 
with Canadian Army Engineer MAJ Nils N. French. In it he describes how his two years as an instructor at the U.S. 
Army Engineering School, Fort Leonard Wood, prepared him to work e"ectively with his American EOD counterparts 
in Afghanistan in 2009. English may have been a common language, French explains, but, he found he had to trans-
late “a whole bunch of U.S. terms … into Canadian.” Even between close neighbors, cross-cultural misunderstandings 
can raise problems.
Prof. Rebecca Johnson of the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Sta" College writes our Ethics and Insights column. 
Asked by the (eld grade o*cers who are her students what they can do to maintain an ethical command climate when 
deployments take their units far from base, Dr. Johnson emphasizes the importance of setting and maintaining high 
expectations. A good leader embodies commitment to the mission, demonstrates the ability and willingness to control 
his or her actions, and accepts adversity as a challenge, not an impediment, to personal and group development.
In his State of the Art column, LT Edval ;oto, Albanian Army, casts a discerning eye on the gap between what author 
Max Boot told an NPS audience during a presentation about his ambitious new book, Invisible Armies: An Epic History 
of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present (New York: Liveright, 2013), and what the painting that is on 
the cover of his book actually represents. Boot thinks one thing, Soto another. What the disparity boils down to, Soto 
concludes, is the need to articulate a clear de(nition of guerrilla warfare, something Boot, in Soto’s opinion, doesn’t do.
Finally, we welcome back the sharp pen of Dr. Kalev Sepp, who takes on the Hollywood blockbuster Zero Dark "irty 
in this issue’s movie review. !e (lm purports to tell the story of the hunt for Osama bin Laden, but Sepp warns, 
don’t imagine what you see bears any resemblance to the truth. In the end, Zero Dark "irty, with its profanity-laden 
dialogue and absurd depictions of CIA tradecraft, insults just about every real-life person who had a hand in the 
destruction of bin Laden.
Now I’m calling on you, the CTX community, to write to me at CTXEditor@GlobalECCO.org and tell me what you 
think about this and past issues of CTX. Did you serve in Anbar during the Awakening? Do you have yet a di"erent 
point of view to o"er? Or maybe you liked Zero Dark "irty …. We are going to start publishing some of your feed-
back in a Letters to the Editor section, so write to me and get the discussion going!
ELIZABETH SKINNER
Managing Editor
!is issue was in production on 15 April, when terrorist bombs struck the Boston Marathon, killing three. On that 
same day, dozens of people died from car and roadside bombs across Iraq. Our thoughts are with all of terrorism’s vic-
tims, their families and friends, and with responders, including you. !anks for the work you do to combat terrorism.
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Shiite and Sunni members of the Joint Security Committee (JSC) 
attend the First Anbar-Kabala JSC Meeting in Ramadi, Iraq, Oct. 20, 
2007.  Members attend the gathering in honor of newly appointed 
Anbar Awakening Council Chief, Sheikh Ahmed Abu Reesha. (U.S. 
Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Sarah Furrer/Released)
DISCLAIMER
!is journal is not an o*cial DoD publication. !e views expressed or implied 
within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily re'ect the views of 
any governmental or non-governmental organization or agency of the United 
States of America or any other country.
TERMS OF COPYRIGHT
Copyright © 2013 by the author(s), except where otherwise noted. !e Combating Terrorism Exchange journal CTX is a peer-reviewed, quarterly journal available 
free of charge to individuals and institutions. Copies of this journal and the articles contained herein may be printed or downloaded and redistributed for personal, 
research, or educational purposes free of charge and without permission, except if otherwise noted. Any commercial use of CTX or the articles published herein is 
expressly prohibited without the written consent of the copyright holder. !e copyright of all articles published herein rests with the author(s) of the article, unless 
otherwise noted.
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MAJ Nils French, Canadian Army, is completing a MS 
degree in Defense Analysis (DA) at the U.S. Naval Post-
graduate School (NPS). He has a MA in Military Studies 
from the American Military University, and a certi(cate 
from the Institute of Counter-Terrorism in Herzliya, 
Israel. He has completed one tour to Afghanistan and has 
commanded at the platoon and company level.
Gp Capt Srinivas Ganapathiraju is an Indian Air Force 
(ghter pilot. He is a quali(ed 'ight instructor and has 
earned a MS in Defense and Strategic studies at the 
Defense Services Sta" College in India. He was selected 
for promotion to Group Captain (equivalent to Colonel), 
and following graduation was assigned as the Chief 
Operations O*cer for one of India’s premier air bases.
MAJ Mohammed A. Garallah serves as a senior opera-
tions o*cer in the Yemeni SOF command. He currently is 
completing a MS in the DA Dept. at NPS. MAJ Garallah 
has commanded at the platoon and company levels, and 
served a two-and-a-half year tour in Darfur, Sudan as part 
of UNAMID (African Union-United Nations Mission in 
Darfur).
Dr. Rebecca J. Johnson is Associate Professor of Na-
tional Security A"airs at the Command and Sta" Col-
lege, Marine Corps University. Her chapter, “!e Moral 
Formation of the Strategic Corporal” appears in P. Tripodi 
and J. Wolfendale, eds., New Wars and New Soldiers: Mili-
tary Ethics in the Contemporary World (Ashgate, 2012). She 
also has contributed to B.J. Strawser and Je" McMahon, 
eds., Killing By Remote Control (Oxford University Press, 
forthcoming 2013). 
Dr. William (Bill) Knarr is a resident Senior Fellow at 
the Joint Special Operations University. He was working 
as a project leader at the Institute for Defense Analyses 
when this article for CTX was written. Co-author Ms. 
Mary Hawkins is an analyst at IDA. !e rest of the IDA 
Project Team are:  Col Dale Alford, USMC, LtCol David 
Graves, USMC, MajGen Tom Jones, USMC (Ret.), Jennifer 
Goodman, Chris Ploszaj, Col Tracy King, USMC, John 
Frost, Munther Saiegh, Carolyn Leonard, Alan Leonard, 
and Matt Coursey.
Major Brent Lindeman is a United States Army Special 
Forces o*cer and graduate of NPS, with a MS degree from 
the DA Dept. His undergraduate degree is in political 
science from Texas Christian University. He has four 
deployments to Iraq with the 5th Special Forces Group 
(Airborne) and is currently assigned to 5th Special Forces 
Group (Airborne) as a company commander.
LT Edval Zoto, Albanian Army, is enrolled in the Special 
Operations curriculum, DA Dept. at NPS. He graduated 
in 2009 from the University of Turin in Strategic, Political 
and Organizational Sciences, and earned a MA degree in 
International Relations from the University of Business 
and International Studies, Geneva and the ISSAT Insti-
tute, Tirana in 2011. 
About the Contributors
On 2 May 2005, Chief of Police Major Ahmed Adiya Asaf was walk-
ing along Main Street in the market area of Husaybah, a town in the Al Qaim 
district of northwestern Iraq, when seven men attacked, shot, and beheaded 
him.2 For the people of the Albu-Mahal tribe, the beheading of MAJ Ahmed 
was the last straw. !e Albu-Mahal became the (rst tribe to stage a signi(cant 
uprising against AQI.
More than a year later, on 14 September 2006, Sheikh Abdul Sattar Albu-
Risha announced the Sahawa—the Awakening.3 On that day, Sheikh Sattar 
and 40 other sheikhs from the Ramadi area signed an Emergency Council 
proclamation to work with the Multi-National Force–Iraq (hereafter the 
Coalition forces) to drive al Qaeda from Al Anbar province.
Most people associate the Anbar Awakening movement with Sheikh Abdul 
Sattar Albu-Risha’s 14 September 2006 announcement, because on that day 
he coined the term Sahawa. !e historical association of that event with the 
Awakening was made even more dramatic by the fact that three days before 
the announcement, a secret military assessment leaked to the press had 
proclaimed Al Anbar to be “militarily unwinnable.” More importantly, the 
subsequent Ramadi awakening happened quickly. One year after Sheikh Sat-
tar’s announcement, U.S. President George W. Bush met with him, the tribal 
leaders of Al Anbar, and the leadership of Iraq to congratulate them on their 
successes. On 1 September 2008, conditions were stable enough to hand over 
the province to the Iraqis.
Few people, however, connect events and relationships between the events in 
Al Qaim in 2005 and the Ramadi uprising in 2006.4 Although historians rec-
ognize Al Qaim’s Albu-Mahal tribe as one of the (rst to rise against AQI, they 
tend to portray the events in Al Qaim as unrelated to, and greatly overshad-
owed by, later events in Ramadi.5 To the contrary, Al Qaim’s revolt against AQI 
was part of a continuous story line, precursory to events in Ramadi, and one 
of the critical enablers of the Anbar Awakening movement.6 What is more, 
Al Qaim’s Sahawa was one of the (rst examples of successful COIN operations 
in Al Anbar and Iraq—long before FM 3-24 was lauded as revolutionary new 
COIN doctrine.7 Although the term Sahawa, the Anbar Awakening move-
ment, would not be coined until 16 months later, some would say it came 
into being on 2 May 2005, in Al Qaim.
Background
!e Al Qaim district in Al Anbar province became increasingly important to 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s group al Qaeda in Iraq after November 2004, when 
AQI lost its sanctuary to the Coalition forces’ onslaught in the second battle 
Al-Sahawa: An Awakening in Al Qaim
Dr. William Knarr, Joint Special 
Operations University1 
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of Fallujah, called Operation Al Fajr. !e Al Qaim district is located on Iraq’s 
border with Syria. Although the district’s population of 150,000–200,000 
represents only 10 percent of the province’s population, the area is strategically 
important due to its location on the border and along the Euphrates River.8 
Al Qaim is along a lucrative smuggling route for black market goods, and was 
AQI’s lifeline to Baghdad as foreign (ghters, money, and other resources that 
fueled the insurgency in(ltrated Iraq. With the loss of Fallujah, Al Qaim also 
became AQI’s newfound sanctuary, its proclaimed caliphate.
AQI arrived in Al Qaim with o"ers to partner with the district’s tribes to defeat 
the U.S.-led Coalition forces. Its leaders promised money and other resources, 
while declaring that as Muslims and Arabs, Al Qaim residents were obligated 
to conduct jihad, to (ght the “crusaders.” !e Coalition, ignorant of tribal 
customs, religion, and traditions, had, many local people felt, disrespected and 
dishonored the people of Al Qaim, and a patriotic resistance movement had 
already formed there. Initially, the tribes of Al Qaim saw the al Qaeda move-
ment as the “complete jihad.”9 For many residents, it was time to rid the area 
of the occupiers. !ey believed that together, they—AQI, the tribes, and their 
militias—could do that.
!e tribes of the region varied in size and available resources, and were inca-
pable of defeating the U.S. occupiers on their own. Some, like the Albu-
Mahal tribe, the strongest tribe in the area, organized and gave resources 
to the Hamza Battalion speci(cally to (ght the Coalition.10 Even with the 
support of the tribal militia, however, the Albu-Mahals lacked the weaponry, 
ammunition, and other equipment to win such a (ght. AQI’s o"er of support 
was tempting, and most of the tribes accepted.
But AQI’s o"er was deceptive; it was not a partnership they proposed. AQI 
provided weaponry and funding, but it also demanded to lead the jihad 
with the intent of (rst destroying and then transforming the social fabric of 
Al Qaim. AQI started by taking over the smuggling routes, skimming pro(ts, 
and killing those who resisted. It then imposed a radical form of Islamic law, 
or shari’a, in the district with fanatical punishments for transgressors. AQI 
used religion to justify such actions, which included forced marriages of local 
women to its (ghters.11 !e most common intimidation tactic was to behead 
those who resisted and to leave the head on the chest of the body in the street 
for all to see. Sometimes only the head was left and the body was disposed of 
in the river or in the jazeera—the desert. Despite the risk of brutal retribution, 
there were dissenters among the tribes, particularly within the Albu-Mahal in 
Husaybah, the small Iraqi border town that served as Al Qaim’s main market 
and port of entry. AQI needed to show it was in charge; it could not a"ord 
dissenters or challengers. !e most visible challenge to its authority was the 
Coalition’s Camp Gannon, located in the northwest corner of Husaybah.12
The Attack on Camp Gannon
!is is going to be a great attack against the Americans. !is will 
be a victory for Allah. !is will be a victory against the coalition, 
and this will be a victory in which we free Iraq from the American 
oppressors.13
With the loss of Fallujah, 
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Camp Gannon, constructed adjacent to the old border station between Syria 
and Iraq, had become a reviled icon of the occupation. AQI needed a victory 
against such an icon for psychological as well as practical reasons. First, AQI 
needed to show the tribes of the area that it was in charge of the region, and 
Camp Gannon was a constant reminder of the Coalition’s permanent presence. 
Second, although Camp Gannon’s reach along the border was limited, it 
severely restricted the insurgents’ ability to move foreign (ghters and other 
support into Iraq. Finally, as Camp Gannon restricted the 'ow of goods and re-
sources from Syria, it accounted for a loss of monthly revenue to the insurgents.
In the early morning on 11 April 2005, its enemies greeted Camp Gannon 
with two rounds of mortar (re. !at was normal. India Company, 3rd Bat-
talion, 2nd Marines (3/2), had been receiving a daily fare of mortar rounds 
at Camp Gannon since it arrived in February, as had its predecessor, Baker 
Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (1/7). What was not normal was the 
sophistication of the follow-on attack—a trademark of AQI.14
!ree suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIED), preceded 
by a breaching vehicle and followed by a (lm crew/media van, penetrated 
Camp Gannon’s defensive barriers and targeted its inner sanctum, the com-
mand post. Captain Frank Diorio, company commander, India Company, 
who had been knocked down by successive blasts, heard someone yell, “Fire 
truck!” !e (re truck was the last and largest of the three SVBIEDs.15 “My 
heart sank,” Capt Diorio later recalled. “I heard the explosion. I thought it 
was a direct hit on my CP [command post]. …I thought I’d lost about 150 
Marines” (see Figure 1). Immediately after the last blast, Capt Diorio heard 
incoming (re—small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, and machine guns—
from houses adjacent to Camp Gannon. Foreign (ghters had in(ltrated the 
area the night before, vacated the residents, and staged for the assault and 
exploitation of the SVBIED attack. Within minutes of the incoming (re, Capt 
Diorio heard outgoing (re and saw lieutenants and noncommissioned o*cers 
moving to positions and supplying Marines at their posts. Miraculously, as 
each platoon accounted for its Marines, Diorio realized that none had been 
lost; they had repelled the attack.
Within 24 hours, the insurgents posted the video announcing the attack as “a 
victory for Allah … a victory against the coalition … a victory in which we 
free Iraq from the American oppressors.”17 !e townspeople quickly learned, 
however, that the Coalition had lost no forces. To save face, the foreign 
(ghters announced over the mosque loudspeakers that the “Americans didn’t 
die because you [the townspeople of Husaybah] are bad Muslims … or else we 
would have had victory.”18
!e people of Husaybah didn’t buy the propaganda. One night soon after 
the attack, the Marines heard gunshots coming from the Market Place. !ey 
called a local source, dubbed the “City Lady,” who resided in or around 
Husaybah, and asked her what was happening. “Well, there was a (ght in the 
Market Place between the foreign (ghters and a local. !e local is making 
fun of them for not killing any of you guys. And the foreign (ghters shot and 
killed him,” she told them. !is was Capt Diorio’s (rst indication that some-
thing was going on that the Marines might be able to in'uence. He explained, 
“!ere was no inclination that they [locals] liked us … but they were making 







Although this may have been the Marines’ (rst sense of a rift between the 
tribes and AQI, trouble had been building for months. To protect their equi-
ties and control the population, AQI had not been allowing the tribes to arm 
and protect themselves. Security in Al Qaim, and in particular, in Husaybah, 
had become untenable. !e Albu-Mahal appointed one of their own, Major 
Ahmed Adiya Asaf, as the new chief of police.20
On 2 May 2005, MAJ Ahmed was walking along Main Street in the market 
area of Husaybah when seven men attacked, shot, and beheaded him.21 AQI 
was publically reinforcing its earlier declaration that AQI—not the tribes 
of Al Qaim—would be in charge of security, and that it would not tolerate 
competition of any sort. !e beheading of MAJ Ahmed proved to be the last 
straw. !e Albu-Mahal became the (rst tribe to openly revolt against AQI. 
Some would say the Sahawa began that day.22
The Albu-Mahal Reject Al Qaeda in Iraq
!e change was swift. On the same day MAJ Ahmed was killed, the Albu-
Mahal’s Hamza Battalion turned on AQI and AQI’s local supporters, tribes 
such as the Karbuli and the Salmani. !e militia that was created to (ght 
Coalition forces changed course and led the Albu-Mahals into their (rst major 
battle against foreign and local insurgents.23
!e ferocity of AQI’s reaction to the Albu-Mahal’s challenge, and the tribe’s 
realization of the magnitude of the consequences should they fail, prompted 
Albu-Mahal members to call upon the Coalition for help. Former Governor 
of Al Anbar province Fasal al-Gaoud contacted Americans at Camp Fallujah 
on behalf of the Albu-Mahals.24 Al Gaoud was a member of the Albu-Nimr 
tribe, a tribe that shares ancestry as well as history with the Albu-Mahal.25 
!e Albu-Nimrs are the dominant tribe in Hit, a town northwest of Ramadi. 
In addition to Al Gaoud’s call for help, Albu-Mahal leadership called Bruska 
Nouri Shaways, Iraqi deputy minister of defense, requesting the Coalition 
forces’ support.26 !ese early contacts were promising, but the potential would 
become lost in the chaos of what seemed to the Coalition to be a case of a 
“red-on-red” struggle for power.
On 10 May, AQI kidnapped Al Anbar Governor Nawaf Farhan, a member of 
the Albu-Mahal tribe and cousin of Sheikh Sabah, the Albu-Mahal’s para-
mount sheikh. Governor Nawaf had attempted to reconcile the con'ict in 
Al Qaim, but found himself a pawn in AQI’s campaign to intimidate the tribes 
into compliance. By kidnapping him, AQI had again gone too far. !is act 
only further infuriated the Mahalawis27 and strengthened their resolve against 
AQI.
In the midst of the con'ict between AQI and the Albu-Mahal, Regimental 
Combat Team (RCT)-2 launched Operation Matador on 7 May. !e opera-
tion, planned before the (ghting broke out between AQI and the Albu-Mahal, 
was designed to disrupt terrorist activities in the Al Qaim region.28 !e twin 
o"ensives against AQI, the Albu-Mahal’s Hamza Battalion’s and RCT-2’s, were 
separate and uncoordinated. !ey both targeted the same enemy, but in dif-
ferent areas: the Albu-Mahal attack came primarily in Husaybah to the west 
and south of the river, and RCT-2’s in the east near Ubaydi and north of the 
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Residents who had 'ed during Operation Matador returned to (nd destroyed 
homes and fellow tribesmen, some of whom had remained to support the 
Coalition, dead. Fasal al-Gaoud complained that the Coalition forces did 
not discriminate between AQI (ghters and the growing number of anti-AQI 
tribesmen.29 On-the-ground Coalition forces, still unaware of any request by 
the Albu-Mahal for help and unable to discriminate among what they consid-
ered to be all red forces, claimed success in clearing insurgent areas. While the 
Coalition acknowledged that locals had provided intelligence information to 
support the assault, they remained dubious of local e"orts to work with the 
Coalition in the (ght.30
Despite the confusion, the Albu-Mahal’s Hamza Battalion cleared Husaybah 
and pushed AQI to the east into Karabilah, a town south of the Euphrates 
populated by the Karbuli tribe, an AQI supporter.31 With Husaybah cleared, 
the Albu-Mahals began reconstructing damaged sections of the city and 
established tribal security around critical infrastructure such as government 
buildings and services. According to COL Ahmad Jelayan Khalaf, future 
leader of the Desert Protectors, remaining pockets of AQI seemed to dissipate 
throughout June and July from areas around Husaybah, as the jihadist group 
moved east toward Rawah.32 
RCT-2 and, in particular, 3/2 Marines recognized insurgent forces who were 
seeking sanctuary in the Karabilah area. Speci(cally, during Operation 
Matador, insurgent forces north of the Euphrates 'ed southwest across 
the “Golden Gate” bridge to (nd sanctuary in Karabilah. Additionally, the 
Karbuli tribe that resided in Karabilah joined forces with AQI against the 
Albu-Mahal and the Coalition. On 15 June, RCT-2 executed Operation Spear, 
which aimed to root out AQI and disrupt its support systems.33 According to 
Colonel Timothy Mundy, commander, 3/2, the (ghting against insurgents 




north toward the Euphrates. !e signi(cance of the operation was in the 
intelligence (nd:
We found papers, a computer with a big database of people that 
had come through, passports of all sorts from di"erent coun-
tries, weapons stockpiles, and a school room with a chalkboard 
drawing out how to build IEDs. It was a class for IED building. . . .  
[W]e found what we referred to as the torture house . . . and several 
guys in there still in handcu"s. !ey had scars all over their bodies. 
!ere was one room in the house [with] . . . a big hook in the 
ceiling and they would obviously run these guys up, hang them 
upside down over a bucket of water. !ey would dip them in the 
water and then pull them up. !ey had a frayed electrical cord 
plugged into the wall that they would sit there and shock them. 
!ey had burns and marks all over their bodies. !ere was very 
obvious foreign (ghter involvement there in terms of the types of 
weapons . . . all sorts of di"erent makes of RPGs [rocket-propelled 
grenades] and ri'es.34
Al Qaeda Returns with a Vengeance
!e Albu-Mahal’s struggle with AQI was far from over. During June and most 
of July, under the guise of negotiations, AQI gathered thousands of (ghters 
from Mosul, Diyala, Baghdad, and Salah ad-Din into the Al Qaim area. On 
25 July 2005, after nearly two months of building its forces, AQI returned 
with a vengeance. Injured in earlier (ghting in the Al Qaim district, Zarqawi, 
the leader of AQI, took a personal interest in this operation. Within four days, 
thousands of AQI (ghters, heavily outnumbering the 300–400 Albu-Mahal 
(ghters, attacked and killed 60 tribal members. !ey also destroyed 41 
family homes by detonating each house’s propane tank, including that of 
Sheikh Sabah.35
AQI attacked from three directions: from the Syrian border area in the west, 
from across the Euphrates River in the north, and from the east; the only 
route of escape open to the Albu-Mahal (ghters was to the south. !e 
Mahalawis, outnumbered and out of ammunition, 'ed for their lives. Most 
sought refuge with other tribal members in Akashat, 100 miles to the south of 
Al Qaim. Some travelled to Su(a, east of Ramadi, to stay with tribal brethren. 
!ose who could a"ord to 'ed to Syria or Jordan.36
Afraid for his tribe, Sheikh Sabah, from his refuge in Jordan, contacted Iraqi 
Minister of Defense Dr. Sadun Dulaymi and, according to Sadun, told him, 
“We need help, because our children, our women, old men, are all surrounded 
and … the terrorists are going to kill them all.” Upon learning this, Coali-
tion Commander General George Casey dispatched an airplane to transport 
Sheikh Sabah from Amman to Baghdad. According to Sadun, a small group 
then “met together in my o*ce and put together a plan to help the people of 
Al Qaim, not just the Albu-Mahal tribe, but all the people of Al Qaim.”37
In Al Qaim, prospects were grim for those who remained. !e Mahalawis 
were no longer worried about AQI skimming pro(ts or imposing a harsh social 
code. It was now a question of surviving. As predicted by Sheikh Sabah, AQI 
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who could not 'ee. On the ground, Capt Diorio was getting regular updates 
from contacts in Husaybah. He recalled, “Foreign (ghters gathered to come 
kill my contact [Ali], my source, his family, and his immediate tribe [Albu-
Mahal].”38 He also received a phone call from the City Lady, another contact, 
who told him that about 250 insurgents were at the palace in Husaybah.39 “At 
the same time,” Capt Diorio said, “there [was] a lot of rhetoric that Zarqawi 
himself was coming to lead this, because he was annoyed by this Sunni tribe 
rising up against another Sunni tribe.”
!e information, corroborated through other sources, started to gain traction, 
and Capt Diorio received approval for an air strike on the palace; at least 100 
were killed. !is angered AQI and prompted it to bring in more (ghters to 
complete the assault on the Albu-Mahal. !e (ghters moved into the largest 
hotel in Husaybah, the yellow hotel with 50–60 rooms. Capt Diorio received 
another call from the City Lady, and he recalled her saying, “!e guys who 
survived that other strike and a lot of guys who came in from out of town… . 
[T]here are hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of these guys in the hotel.”40
Again, other sources veri(ed the information. In the meantime, the Albu-
Mahal were split between the northern part and southeastern part of the city. 
Now minute-by-minute updates were coming in from contacts in the area; 
according to Capt Diorio:
We were getting frantic phone calls: “We’re getting run over.” 
And then perhaps the most surreal moments … we saw in the 
hundreds, Iraqis come out of the north end of the city towards 
our OP [outpost] … with their hands up. !ey are now coming 
in full daylight out of the city towards our OP with their hands 
up. Ali, our contact, was calling us saying, “!ese are my people; 
please help them. We’re getting killed.”
!is was a true turning point as the Albu-Mahal turned to the Marines for 
help. Capt Diorio continued: “To watch them openly see us as their help, 
as their rescuers, in broad daylight with their hands up, was amazing. To me, 
that was the point where the entire city, the foreign (ghters, [and] AQI saw the 
Albu-Mahals say, the Marines are our help. And they came in droves.”
At this point, the Marines understood exactly what was happening. !ey 
knew this was a signi(cant moment and, as Capt Diorio described, were ready 
to support it: “And again, talk about discipline. I had Marines now who at 
this point had fought over 300 (re (ghts and had faced the largest attack 
against a Coalition base. !ey’d been through a lot, and they withheld their 
(re in a real display of discipline. !ey read the people.”
But the Marines also understood that there was a high probability that some 
bad guys were hiding within this group of Mahalawis, so they were cautious 
and responded accordingly. Until they could sort things out, they told the 
approaching people, “We’re going to treat you like we would treat any other 
prisoner right now.” One of the people approaching the Marine outpost said, 
“I understand, and they [motioning to the others in the group] know it.” 
So, the Marines handcu"ed and blindfolded the Mahalawis to sort them out 






At this point, the Marines were processing approximately 60 Mahalawis as 
detainees. Capt Diorio began worrying that the situation was worsening when 
he continued to receive troubled phone calls from Ali’s family. At one point, 
one of them said, “We’re going to die. We’re getting crushed.” Capt Diorio 
thought, “Hey, it was great that it worked for a while, but is this going bad 
now?”
But again, Capt Diorio’s Marines understood and responded. !ey perceived 
the Mahalawis’ cries for help as positive, and they were anxious to defend the 
tribe. At that point, Capt Diorio described the situation as “bigger than us 
[himself and his Marines].” He explained: 
[T]here was buy-in from the Marines … Colonel Mundy was 
involved. Colonel Davis was involved. !e division was involved. 
!ey were all read into what was going on. !ey were sending up 
the request for airstrikes.
A Coalition airstrike destroyed the hotel, saving Ali and his family. Surviving 
members of Ali’s tribe evacuated south to Akashat. But Husaybah was lost. 
AQI came in with the Salmani, another local pro-AQI tribe, and took over the 
town, making life unbearable for those who remained. !is happened at the 
same time that 3/2 Marines conducted a relief in place with 3/6 Marines. Capt 
Diorio later recalled his parting thoughts:
I think what we were left with was an initial thought that this failed. 
!en as we continued to think about it, we thought that this is 
the tipping point that every counterinsurgency needs. !is is the 
tipping point that you now have a Sunni tribe, Albu-Mahal, who 
to the point of their very own lives, sided with Coalition forces, 
sided with India Company, sided with the Marine Corps.
Capt Diorio may have identified the tipping point with the benefit of 
hindsight, but when asked what he would have done had he remained, 
he responded, “I honestly think that we probably couldn’t have seen what 
we needed to see because of what we had gone through.” It was time for a 
turnover, time for a fresh set of eyes to work the problem.
Psychologically, the Albu-Mahal may have tipped, but physically, they no 
longer resided in Al Qaim. By 5 September, Zarqawi reportedly controlled 
the region and posted signs to that e"ect.41 Despite the long list of Coalition 
transgressions and a deep mistrust of the Government of Iraq (GOI),42 AQI’s 
savage and uncompromising trajectory toward fanaticism convinced the Albu-
Mahals that siding with the Coalition and GOI was a more palatable alterna-
tive to misery and death. AQI gave the Coalition and GOI an opportunity to 
change the balance in their favor and under their terms.
Changing the Balance
In February 2005, RCT-2 took responsibility for Area of Operation (AO) 
Denver, which included Al Qaim and four adjacent districts. RCT-2 had 
an economy of force mission to “conduct counterinsurgency operations in 
order to disrupt and interdict anti-Iraq elements.”43 Its objective, in line 
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national referendum in October and national elections in December 2005. 
RCT-2’s approach was to conduct one or two major operations a month in 
the Western Euphrates River Valley (WERV), and to “disrupt and interdict 
anti-Iraqi elements,” both of which were tall orders for a small force. RCT-2 
had 3,200 Marines and Sailors deployed in a 30,000–square-mile battlespace, 
to confront an enemy in(ltrating from a porous border to the west and 'eeing 
from a lost sanctuary in Fallujah to the east. !ey were the “little RCT with 
a division mission and a MEF [Marine Expeditionary Force] battle space.”44 
By any objective measure, RCT-2’s goal to “establish combined, permanent, 
persistent presence in major population centers in the WERV” could not be 
accomplished with its assigned force structure.45
But what started as 3,200 Marines and Sailors on an economy of force mis-
sion in February 2005, grew to 14,000 U.S. Marine, U.S. Army, and Iraqi 
Security Forces personnel by September 2005.46 Army Special Forces teams 
also redeployed into the area, with the primary mission of foreign internal 
defense: to work with indigenous Iraqis to help them secure their own areas.47 
Major Martin Adams, Special Forces company commander, deployed an 
ODB (Operational Detachment Bravo) to Al Asad to work with RCT-2 and 
to support the recently deployed Special Forces’ outlying operational detach-
ments: Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) 582 in Al Qaim, ODA 555 in 
Hadithah, and ODA 545 in Hit.
Captain Jim Calvert, commanding ODA 582,48 arrived in Al Qaim in Au-
gust 2005, about the same time that the Mahalawis were 'eeing AQI. CPT 
Calvert’s mission was broad and nebulous: Make life better for the Iraqis. 
Calvert recalled the conditions on his arrival at Camp Gannon as far from 
optimal: “We got hit with about everything the insurgents had—small arms, 
machine gun, rocket-propelled grenades, mortar (re—it was not a contested 
area, the insurgents owned it.”49
The Desert Protectors
Reaching out and engaging the Sunnis in the area was critical to driving a 
wedge between the insurgents and the Iraqis and to changing the balance of 
popular support.50 If the Coalition and GOI helped, they would have to deal 
with the perception that they were supporting a tribal militia that might be 
seen as anathema to Iraq’s central government’s legitimacy. To di"use this 
perception, potential recruits needed to be vetted and drafted into govern-
ment service.
Just as the Coalition and GOI viewed militias as a threat to government 
legitimacy, the Sunni tribesmen, for the most part, found the stigma of being 
associated with the Ministry of Defense or Ministry of the Interior just as 
repugnant. !erefore, this new organization, explained the former defense 
minister, Dr. Sadun Dulaymi, would be known as the Desert Protectors and 
would be neither “(sh nor fowl”—neither part of the Iraqi Army under the 
Ministry of Defense, nor part of the Iraqi Police under the Ministry of the 
Interior.51
At a safe house in the vicinity of Camp Gannon, Calvert discussed local 
security force recruitment with representatives of the Albu-Mahal tribe. At 













themselves by attacking AQI and were marked 
men. The remaining tribes were either too 
intimidated or had already sided with AQI. In late 
August 2005, a team representing the GOI and 
the Coalition arrived by helicopter in Akashat to 
vet several hundred Albu-Mahal tribesmen for 
enlistment into government service. According to 
COL Ahmad Jelayan Khalaf, commander, Desert 
Protectors, 279 of the men were deemed (t and 
inducted. Of those 279, 89 were transported to 
the East Fallujah Iraqi Compound for training 
by Special Forces.
While the Desert Protectors were being trained 
and equipped, 3/6 replaced the 3/2 Marines in 
Al Qaim on 10 September 2005, and occupied 
their sites at Camp Al Qaim, Camp Gannon, 
and the communications retransmission site at 
Khe Sanh (Figure 3). Lieutenant Colonel Dale 
Alford, commander, 3/6 Marines, arrived with an experienced unit, an aggres-
sive plan, and a new approach to liberate the district from the grip of AQI.
Eighty percent of 3/6—including the battalion commander, company com-
manders, (rst sergeants, and non-commissioned o*cers—had fought together 
eight months earlier in eastern Afghanistan. Although there were di"erences 
between the type of (ghting they had done in Afghanistan and what they 
faced in Iraq, the similarities helped shape the unit’s concept of operations.
One such similarity between Iraq and Afghanistan was that the population, 
not the enemy, was the center of gravity. LtCol Alford explained, 
You need to understand your enemy before you can protect 
the population. You’ve got to (gure out who needs killing and 
who doesn’t. !e problem is we [the average Coalition Soldier or 
Marine] wanted to shoot at all of them. Hell, we were making 
insurgents!53 
Alford commented that the number one group that his Marines needed to 
deal with was “POI—Pissed-o" Iraqis!”54 !ey had to believe that their inter-
ests were better served by siding with the Coalition and GOI than with AQI.
A second similarity was the need for persistent presence. It made little sense 
to clear an area if there weren’t enough forces to remain and hold it. Although 
3/6, unlike its predecessor, arrived with its full contingent of Marines, it 
wasn’t enough to do the whole job.55 Finally, the men of 3/6 also brought an 
understanding from Afghanistan that they must integrate with the indigenous 
forces. In late September, 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade, 1st Iraqi Army Division 
(1/1/1 IAD) was deployed to Al Qaim to work with 3/6 and designated Com-
bined Task Force (CTF) 3/6. With the addition of the Iraqis, LtCol Alford 
now had the resources to establish a combined, persistent presence within 
the population centers—the key terrain. As he told it,
14




People ask [how I] came up with this con-
cept. I don’t really know. I can go back in 
books that I read as a young Lieutenant 
and Captain, like First to Fight, General 
Krulak talks about this. !e Marines 
were doing this back in Vietnam in ’67 
or ’68 before we really started doing it in 
’69, ’70, ’71 under General Abrams. !is 
was before the COIN Manual came out 
in the Fall of 2006. What I’m saying is, 
this is nothing new. It is just protecting 
the population, in order to do that you’ve 
got to live where the population is, and 
that’s what we were trying to accomplish. 
[Operation] Iron Fist was nothing more 
than an operation to get into the people, 
to kick the bad guys out, establish our-
selves, and stay. Once we moved into the 
city we weren’t leaving.56
CTF 3/6 executed Operation Iron Fist during 1–7 October 2005, attacking 
from east to west through the town of Sadah and eastern Karabilah, and stop-
ping at the Emerald Wadi (the tip of the arrow on Figure 4 that reads Line 
of Attack). !ey built four positions—Chosin, Iwo Jima, Belleau Wood, and 
Khe Sahn—and left a platoon of Marines and Iraqis in each.
Although focused in Al Qaim, Operation Iron Fist wasn’t conducted in 
isolation. CTF 3/6’s higher headquarters, RCT-2, was simultaneously con-
ducting a regimental operation 
dubbed River Gate in the area 
of Hadithah. CTF 3/6 and Iron 
Fist created a diversion away 
from the regimental main 
e"ort. With the addition of 
more Coalition and Iraqi forces, 
and the newly formed Desert 
Protectors, RCT-2 (nally had 
the force structure necessary to 
execute its strategy: combined, 
permanent, persistent presence. 
!e resulting task organization, 
re'ected in Figure 5, was much 
more robust than those forces 
available to RCT-2 earlier that 
year.
Operation Steel Curtain
CTF 3/6 had positioned forces 
on the east side of the Emerald 
Wadi at the conclusion of Iron 





the enemy in Karabilah on the west side of the wadi. !e enemy expected the 
Coalition to continue the assault from the east.59 Instead, CTF 3/6, supported 
by Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 2/1, each with elements from 1st Brigade, 
1st Iraqi Army Division (1/1 IAD) and the Desert Protectors, repositioned from 
Camp Al Qaim to the Iraqi/Syrian border, from where they would assault 
eastward through Husaybah and Karabilah.60 !e RCT mission statement read,
At 0500 5 November, RCT-2 conducts Joint/Combined COIN 
operations to isolate and clear Husaybah, Karabilah, Ubaydi, 
& Ramana IOT defeat AQI forces, establish persistent presence, 
disrupt insurgent activities, facilitate Iraqi restoration of the 
border and set conditions for national elections in the Al Qaim 
region.61 
On 5 November, CTF 3/6 and BLT 2/1 assaulted into Husaybah and the area 
known as the “440 District” southwest of Husaybah, respectively. Simultane-
ously, elements of 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (3-504 
Inf ) inserted by helicopter into the Ramana area to the north of the river, a 
known insurgent sanctuary.
Despite the tactical surprise, it took CTF 3/6 and BLT 2/1 the next seven days 
to clear the Husaybah–Karabilah–Sadah area of this sophisticated enemy. 
Insurgents wore Kevlar helmets and body armor, and fought with a degree of 
discipline that re'ected military or advanced terrorist training. All main roads 
and avenues of approach were laced with IEDs. Residential buildings were 
mined to target the Coalition forces as they breached and cleared rooms. If 
the insurgents encountered superior (repower after engaging Coalition forces, 
they generally broke contact and conducted coordinated withdrawals to the 
east, or they discarded evidence of their actions and attempted to blend in 
with the population (see Figure 6). !e enemy clearly knew what it was doing 
and how to do it.62
Immediately upon clearing the areas, CTF 3/6 started constructing (rm 
bases—one in Husaybah, followed by one in Karabilah. On 14 November 
2005, 3-504 Inf and BLT 2/1 attacked into Old and New Ubaydi, respectively. 
On 16 November, Weapons Company, 
3/6 Marines started construction on a 
(rm base in New Ubaydi. From 18 to 
21 November, a task force consisting of 
4th Squadron, 14th Cavalry Regiment 
(4-14 Stryker) and 3rd Battalion, 1st 
Brigade, 1st Iraqi Army Division (3/1/1 
IAD) cleared the Ramana area north of 
the river.
Operation Steel Curtain ended on 22 
November 2005. An important but often 
overlooked accomplishment of that 
operation was that the Desert Protectors 
proved critical to the mission. !eir 
mission had three primary objectives:
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1. General military intelligence. As MAJ Mukhlis Shadhan 
Ibrahim al-Mahalawi, commander of the Desert Protec-
tors, explained, “During the (rst stage, we gathered a lot 
of intelligence like where the terrorists were staging, where 
their operations center was, where did they plant IEDs.”64
2. Fighting. During the second stage, the Desert Protectors 
fought side by side with the Marines.
3. Human intelligence. During the third stage, the Desert Pro-
tectors were used to identify insurgents. As MAJ Mukhlis 
explained, “We were the only ones who could identify 
people captured by the U.S. forces. Somebody could be a 
prince or an emir [among the bad guys] … we knew who 
was the prince, the emir, and who were the assistants. It 
was our job to identify them.” (Figure 7 depicts the Desert 
Protectors’ post-mission celebration.)
CPT Calvert recalled that the Desert Protectors were employed primarily as 
scouts. As such, they were broken down into small elements and embedded 
with regular Iraqi Army and Marine units. In this role, they were invaluable 
to the operation. According to Calvert, however, there were some negative 
aspects associated with using such a local unit:
!e Albu-Mahals were massacred. If you have people who lost 
family members and they know that somebody else from another 
tribe was responsible for it, you have to keep a close eye to make 
sure there aren’t any reprisals for past actions.
You also want to make sure that there’s no perception that these 
guys are the new ones in charge and you guys [the other tribe] are 
going to be squeezed out. A lot of times in dealing with tribes, there 
is a zero sum game. [!ey think] that the Albu-Mahals are doing 
well at the expense of the Karbulis and Salmanis. It’s de(nitely a 
matter of appearing to be doing the right thing, and not just doing 
the right thing. Perceptions go a long way.66
By late November, CTF 3/6 had constructed 16 
battle positions in the area from Husaybah to 
Ubaydi. Each position included Marines and 
Iraqis—normally a Marine platoon and an 
Iraqi platoon or company. !ose positions were 
located in such a way that they would re'ect 
combined, permanent, persistent presence (see 
Figure 8). In other words, the Coalition and Iraqi 
forces were positioned to live among the people. 
!e next step was for the forces to engage the 
people.
Mission analysis led LtCol Alford to assign 
company areas based on the tribal distribution—
to link a company with a tribe. !is was not an 
exact science because the tribes were geographi-
cally intermingled. !e intent was to locate 







resided. As an example, India Company 3/6 dealt mostly with the Karbulis 
(see the tribal areas in Figure 9). Additionally, the Marines attempted to treat 
all of the tribes the same and would not hold a meeting unless all of the tribes 
were represented. According to LtCol Alford,
When only three of the (ve tribes showed up, I gathered my crap, 
and told my guys, we’re leaving. I told Mayor Farhan that when he 
got all (ve [tribes, he could] call me… . About a week later one of 
the company commanders told [me] Mayor Farhan had them all. 
I showed up, and he had four of the (ve. !e Salmani tribe was 
the one that didn’t show that time. I did the same thing. I picked 
my stu" up and I left. A few days later he had all (ve, and then 
we started dealing.68
In practice, treating the tribes equally wasn’t always easy. !e Albu-Mahal had 
taken the greatest risks and LtCol Alford had worked very closely with Sheikh 
Kurdi, who was now acting head of the tribe, so it was di*cult not to favor 
them over tribes that had until recently sided with AQI. !e Marines had to 
constantly remind themselves to maintain balance. As such, during the drive 
to recruit tribesmen into the police force, the Coalition solicited help from all 
of the sheikhs to nominate men from their tribes to create that balance. !ey 
also started developing police stations near the battle positions. !is process 
gave the Coalition and Iraq Army forces the opportunity to partner with the 
police forces in those areas.
Day-to-day engagement with the population occurred at the lower levels—
company, platoon, and squad. At the company level, Captain Brendan 
Heatherman, commander, Kilo Company, 3/6 Marines, used the same 
technique for locating and assigning his platoons as LtCol Alford had used for 
assigning companies. He assigned platoons to di"erent tribal areas, and he di-
rected that the platoon commanders “be part of that tribe:” to be an advocate 
for their tribe in requesting funds, developing projects, and obtaining other 
resources.
Capt Heatherman became a trusted arbiter. !ese 
close engagements helped the Coalition and Iraqi 
forces separate the insurgents from the populace. 
As Capt Heatherman recalled,
We knew we really needed to make a 
connection with the locals to root out 
the insurgents. To do that, we needed 
to (nd out who the players were on the 
battle(eld other than the locals. First 
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With this goal in mind, Heatherman identi(ed four types of insurgent: 
!e (rst was al Qaeda in Iraq, former JTJ (Jama’at al-Tawid wal-
Jihad). We had plenty of foreign (ghters, and we knew they were 
coming in through Syria. !e second group was local homegrown, 
yet still hardline al Qaeda. Once we really connected with the 
people, it was not very hard to (gure out who they were, mainly 
because when we came in and actually stayed, they and their 
families did not come back. !e third were what we called “part-
timers.” !ey were locals who for whatever reason decided to 
attack us and then go back to their store or farm. !ere were also 
local, pseudo-Hamza groups who considered it their duty to oust 
anyone that came into their area. It was mainly the folks from 
Sadah that joined that.
Based on this analysis, Heatherman gave his platoons decidedly unconven-
tional guidance:
I really wanted the platoon commanders to get down to that local 
level and become neighbors. I told them to be nosey neighbors. We 
wanted to know exactly what was going on. And we wanted them 
[the locals] to tell you [the Marines], because they are comfort-
able with you. So we patrolled meal-to-meal. You go out in the 
morning, and you have breakfast. Sometimes you bring food, and 
sometimes they would.
!is guidance was reinforced at the battalion level. One of the metrics that 
CTF 3/6 used was known as “eats on streets.” Units would report the number 
of times they shared a meal with an Iraqi or ate a meal in a local café. Addi-
tionally, as units entered the community, they always had a speci(ed mission; 
CTF 3/6 did not conduct so-called “presence” patrols. As LtCol Alford de-
scribed it,
You did not do presence patrols. When Marines do presence 
patrols, they’ll walk out and they’ll kick rocks because they have 
no focus. !at’s why ASCOPE [Areas, Structures, Capabilities, 
Organizations, People, and Events] is so good.71 You can take one 
of the six letters of ASCOPE and always put a patrol to it. Okay, you 
know, S, Structures, you’re going to go into this sector and you’re 
going to document every structure in that sector, every structure 
on that street, and how it can be used by the enemy, how it can be 
used by us, and how it can be used by the people. You do ASCOPE 
through three lenses: the enemy, yourself, and the population.72
Despite information collected during ASCOPE, understanding the civil 
structure within a given area wasn’t always easy. According to Heatherman, 
the community leaders in his areas were the sheikhs, imams, and muktars. !e 
lead sheikhs were not always present. For example, the paramount sheikh of 
the Albu-Mahal, Sheikh Sabah, 'ed to Jordan in August 2005, leaving Sheikh 
Kurdi in charge.73 Imams dealt very little with the civil side of things. How-
ever, they were still in'uential because they spoke to the entire community at 
the mosque. “We did not mess too much with the imams, because they did 







the muktar. Muktar is an Arabic word meaning chosen. In common usage, it 
describes someone who is in charge of a village or town. In some areas, the 
muktars were easy to locate, but you had to be careful. Heatherman explained:
When we went to Karabilah … I spoke with a guy who said he 
was muktar, but what I did not know at the time was that muktar 
could be the muktar of three houses or it could be the whole town. 
I spent two or three weeks with this guy thinking he represented 
the town of Karabilah, when he really didn’t. But by the end of the 
three weeks he sure did, because we had empowered him with that 
area of the Karbulis in Karabilah. It was a big mistake. It caused 
some problems that we later overcame as we met other muktars 
and we started putting it [the civil structure] together.75
When asked who pulled all of this information together, Heatherman 
responded, “Me [at the company level], but it was at every level. !ey [pla-
toons and squads] had their own bank of knowledge about the area … this 
really caught on down to the lowest level. !ey (gured out the importance of 
connecting with the local populace. It kept them safe, and it made them win; 
they liked it.”
Combined, Permanent, Persistent Presence
In January 2006, Colonel Ismael Sha Hamid Dulaymi deployed 3rd Brigade, 
7th Iraqi Army Division (3rd Bde/7th IAD) to Al Qaim. His unit would 
replace 1st Bde/1st IAD, which had deployed the previous October to sup-
port Operation Steel Curtain. COL Ismael grew up in the Al Qaim region 
and was the cousin of Sheikh Sabah, paramount sheikh of the Albu-Mahal 
tribe. COL Ismael continued to command 3rd Bde/7th IAD until March 
2008.76 He helped integrate the Desert Protectors into his brigade, with 
COL Ahmad becoming the battalion commander for 3rd Battalion and 
MAJ Mukhlis becoming his intelligence o*cer. 3rd Bde/7th IAD’s location in 
Al Qaim provided the combined, permanent, persistent presence so im-
portant to stabilizing the region. COL Ismael worked with (ve consecutive 
Marine battalions as each rotated into the area. In each case, Ismael asked 
the incoming Marine commander how he was going to help him improve 
the area (see Table 1 for a full list of the units responsible for the Al Qaim 
district). For example, when Lieutenant 
Colonel Nick Marano, commander, 1/7 
Marines arrived in March 2006, COL 
Ismael told him, “Colonel Alford estab-
lished a lot of military bases throughout 
the area, so what are you going to do to 
support us?” LtCol Marano responded 
that they could do (eld reconnaissance 
to select a new battle position. COL 
Ismael, agreeing with LtCol Marano’s 
response, said that they “chose the Al 
Madi [phonetic transliteration] area. !e 
(eld engineers established that area as Vera 
Cruz Battle Position and we manned it 
with a platoon from the Marines and a 










































By May 2006, Coalition and Iraqi forces had extended their presence along 
the Euphrates from the Syrian/Iraqi border to Al Amaari. !is was almost 
twice the area that had been covered in February. By September, according to 
Ismael, they once again doubled that distance and extended their presence to 
the Rawah/Anah area, 57 miles east of the Syrian/Iraqi border. !at concept 
of combined, permanent, persistent presence, introduced by Col Davis 
and LtCol Alford to the Al Qaim area in October 2005, was continued and 
institutionalized by the Iraqis with each subsequent Marine battalion rota-
tion, each of which improved the security of the area. In many cases, those 
battle positions were partnered with a developing Iraqi police station. Later, 
when the local police could handle local security on their own, many of those 
battle positions were dismantled. With the security posture 
improving, LtCol Marano and COL Ismael were able 
to increase their e"orts to improve the situation in other 
areas, such as governance and economics, by supporting 
the development of the judicial system, civic infrastructure, 
phosphate and cement plants, agriculture, and other areas.
Integral to all of those e"orts was the continuous engage-
ment with the Iraqis in what LtCol Marano described as 
the “Circle of Trust” (Figure 10). In this case, it included 
the mayor of Al Qaim, the paramount sheikh and sheikh-
on-the-ground for the Albu-Mahal tribe, the Iraqi division 
and brigade commanders, and the S2 (intelligence o*cer) 
of the brigade, MAJ Mukhlis, also the leader of the Desert 
Protectors during Operation Steel Curtain.
It is important to note that at the center of the “Circle of 
Trust” was not a Marine or an Iraqi government o*cial, 
but Sheikh Kurdi. Sheikh Kurdi was there at the begin-
ning and was clearly the key leader of the Albu-Mahal 
tribe throughout the Awakening process. He was a large man, with a no-
nonsense but respectful and frank demeanor. He was clear about the original 
motivation for the development and organization of the Hamza battalion: to 
(ght the Coalition, and, as he exclaimed with some residual pride, “!at’s 
a fact!” But as the situation deteriorated, and simply being Mahalawi was 
reason enough for beheading by al Qaeda, Sheikh Kurdi recalled, there was 
a period from August to October 2005 when things started to change for 
the better: “When Colonel Alford and his Marines came, I said, ‘!e sun of 
freedom rises in the west.’ ”79 LtCol Alford, in turn, gave credit to his Marines 
and all those he worked with—the Desert Protectors, the Iraqi Security 
Forces, Col Davis, and those units that followed 3/6 into Al Qaim—for con-
tinuing to improve the situation. !ings started to change for the better when 
the right people, team, strategy, and resources coalesced at the right time to 
stop al Qaeda’s savagery.
The Rest of the Story
!e story of Al Qaim’s evolution from an AQI supporter to an AQI opponent 
is compelling. !at story becomes more important, however, when placed 
in the context of the overall Anbar Awakening. Contrary to popular belief, 
Al Qaim’s revolt against AQI was not a localized, unrelated event, but part of a 
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continuous story line that had a signi(cant impact on, and set the conditions 
for, the better known Ramadi awakening.
The Awakening—Ramadi 2006
As mentioned previously, the term Awakening, or Al Sahawa, as it applied to 
events in Iraq, was coined in Ramadi by Sheikh Sattar. Sheikh Sattar was the 
leader of what some Iraqis considered a lower-tier tribe in Ramadi. He had a 
checkered past and was described in the media as “a warlord and a highway 
bandit, an oil smuggler and an opportunist.”80 Colonel Sean MacFarland, 
commander, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, also known as 
the Ready First Combat Team, was willing to risk a partnership with Sheikh 
Sattar despite his history, because MacFarland saw potential in the sheikh’s 
ability to recruit Iraqis to side against AQI. Like Iraqis in Al Qaim, Ramadi’s 
populace was all too familiar with AQI’s sweeping murder and intimidation 
campaign. In much the same way that the Albu-Mahals partnered with the 
Coalition to (ght AQI in 2005, tribes in Ramadi partnered with the Coalition 
to (ght the insurgents in 2006. According to COL MacFarland, Sheikh Sattar 
described the movement thus: “We awakened when we realized that the true 
enemy was the tak!ris, the extremists [al Qaeda], and that the Coalition was 
our friend.”81
That description left out one group: the GOI. Although Sheikh Sattar’s 
Awakening Council was deeply suspicious of the new local and central gov-
ernments, COL MacFarland and other Coalition members worked to bring 
the GOI into the partnership. Security stations manned by Coalition and 
Iraqi forces were created in neighborhoods throughout Ramadi. A Coalition-
in'uenced characterization of Sheikh Sattar’s Awakening re'ected a triad 
strategy—the Iraqi people, the Coalition, and the GOI—similar to the one 
implemented in Al Qaim. In order to demonstrate how events in Al Qaim 
and Ramadi were connected, it is necessary to understand the signi(cance of 
Al Qaim’s awakening to later events.
7KH6LJQLÀFDQFHRI6HFXULQJ$O4DLP'LVWULFWWRWKH2YHUDOO
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!e WERV has served as a route for merchants, smugglers, and soldiers since 
early history. !e Euphrates connects Baghdad and other Iraqi cities with 
economic and population centers in Syria to the north and with the Persian 
Gulf to the south. Much of the insurgents’ and Coalition forces’ movement 
occurred along the WERV, and not within the open spaces of desert. Control 
of this relatively narrow band was integral to security, but control of what 
Brigadier General David Reist, former deputy commanding general of the 
MEF (FWD), called the commercial battlespace was just as important. He coined 
the term to emphasize the importance of economics and the WERV to the 
con'ict.82 !e Awakening, Reist contended, logically moved from west to 
east, “a wave coming ashore, not a singular event in any way, shape or form.” 
!e wave, in this case, started in Al Qaim in the summer and fall of 2005. In 
early 2006, it followed the WERV to the area around the town of Baghdadi.83 
!e chief of police in Baghdadi, Colonel Shaban Barzan Abdul Himrin 
al-Ubaydi, also known as the Lion of Baghdadi, led the (ght against AQI. By 
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Sheikh Kurdi summarized the strategic importance of Al Qaim to AQI—not 
only to AQI’s (ght in Al Anbar, but throughout Iraq:
[B]y controlling this [Al Qaim] area … they would have sup-
plies, (nance, and weapons; everything they needed to support 
operations. When they lost this strategic location, they lost every-
thing: all the logistics support that came from outside Iraq was 
cut o". No more support of any kind! !at’s why when they lost 
the battle here, they lost everything inside Iraq because everything 
was coming through the border. Also, it was not just supplies from 
Al Qaim to Al Anbar province, but supplies to all Iraqi provinces.84
!e signi(cance of this terrain was not lost on the Coalition. Blocking the 
Syrian/Iraqi border along the Euphrates at the Husaybah port of entry and 
securing Al Qaim was part of the Coalition’s larger strategy to restrict the 
movement of foreign (ghters and resources—including suicide bombers and 
IED materials—from Syria down the Euphrates to Baghdad. !is was particu-
larly important as the Coalition and the GOI prepared for the constitutional 
referendum in October 2005 and for the elections in December 2005.85 CTF 
3/6’s ability to implement a combined, permanent, persistent presence in the 
Al Qaim district, starting in September 2005, was critical to the start of the 
Awakening in all of Al Anbar, and, as a result, security continued to improve. 
By September 2006, as LtCol Marano, commander, 1/7 Marines, prepared for 
transfer of authority with LtCol Schuster and 3/4 Marines, the Coalition and 
Iraqis had developed a fairly sophisticated operation to control the physical 
terrain with prepared obstacles on the border, and the human terrain with 
Iraqi Army and police stations strategically placed throughout the AO. Some 
of those stations had already been turned over to full Iraqi control. COL 
Ismael, commander, 3rd Iraqi Brigade, indicated that security was so e"ective 
in the Al Qaim district that AQI had 'ed to Rawah, a city along the Euphrates 
River, approximately 57 miles to the east of Husaybah. !is did not mean that 
there were not pockets of AQI in Al Qaim, but by late 2006, Iraqi Security 
Forces and the Coalition dominated the area.
In addition to security, a local government had existed since December 2005 
when Farhan De Hal Farhan was elected as district mayor.86 Mayor Farhan 
was a resident of Fallujah through most of 2004, but 'ed with his family 
to Al Qaim in September 2004 just before the Coalition and Iraqi Security 
Forces assault. As a result of his experiences in Fallujah, he was well aware of 
AQI’s methods of operation.
Increasing the Pressure on AQI
At the beginning of this story, in late 2004, AQI and a*liated insurgent 
forces were seeking sanctuary in Al Qaim and other communities along the 
Euphrates as they 'ed Fallujah during Al Fajr, the second battle for Fallujah. 
!e Coalition’s success in Al Fajr both eliminated an insurgent sanctuary and 
provided a window of opportunity for the January 2005 elections to succeed, 
while the Iraqi and Coalition occupation of Fallujah started to restrict AQI’s 
freedom of movement to the east into the Baghdad area.87 By restricting the 
'ow of foreign (ghters and their resources from the west across the Iraqi/
Syrian border, success in Al Qaim bookended AQI in Al Anbar along the 








and Fallujah in the east. With anti-AQI resistance emerging in Baghdadi and 
Hadithah in early 2006, AQI was running out of places to operate and hide, 
and it exploited Coalition/Iraqi security gaps in the Ramadi area and to 
the east toward Fallujah. By early 2006, Ramadi was known as the worst 
city in Iraq.
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In August 2005, when the leader of the Albu-Mahal, Sheikh Sabah, asked Dr. 
Sadun Dulaymi, Iraq’s minister of defense, for assistance, Sadun turned to 
GEN Casey for help. GEN Casey responded with funding, equipment, and 
training to develop the Desert Protectors. Additionally, ODA 582 was assigned 
advisory responsibility for the development of those tribal forces. While most 
of the Albu-Mahal tribesmen 'ed to Akashat, some 'ed to the Ramadi area, 
and Mahalawis were later found working with Sheikh Sattar and Sheikh Mu-
hammad Salih al-Suwaydawi in the Ramadi area, supporting the awakening 
movement there.
In addition to the refugees, there were other ties between the Albu-Mahal and 
Albu-Risha tribes. Sadun, the principal GOI coordinator for the Desert Protec-
tors, was Sheikh Sattar’s uncle, and had grown up next to Sheikh Sattar’s 
family’s compound in Ramadi. !ere was also a connection between Sheikh 
Sabah and Sheikh Sattar. According to Sheikh Sabah, Sheikh Sattar met him 
in Jordan to discuss the Albu-Mahal’s success against AQI. Sheikh Sattar was 
increasingly concerned about AQI’s grip on the Ramadi area and was looking 
for ideas on how to counter them.88
During his trip to Jordan, Sheikh Sattar also met with other prominent 
sheikhs to gain their approval and support for his upcoming (ght. Notably, 
Sheikh Majed Abd al-Razzaq Ali al-Sulayman, co-regent to the Dulaymi 
Tribal Confederation,89 supported the Albu-Mahal tribe’s revolt against AQI 
in 2005.90 He, along with other notable sheikhs in Jordan, approved Sheikh 
Sattar’s request. !is support convinced Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki 
to back the Awakening. Maliki reportedly said that there would be “no 
Awakening unless Majed and the sheikhs agree to it.”91
!e types of people participating in the Awakening went beyond traditional 
tribal leaders. Among those attending the meeting with Sheikh Sattar and 
Sheikh Majed was Numan Abdul Mahsen al-Gaoud, a businessman and 
owner of the Doha Group in Baghdad.92 !e Al Gaouds are a prominent 
family in the Hit area and belong to the Albu-Nimr tribe. !e Albu-Nimr and 
Albu-Mahal tribes are closely related and share ancestry.93 Recall that, during 
the early stages of the Albu-Mahal’s (ght with AQI, it was Fasal al-Gaoud, a 
member of the Albu-Nimr tribe and former governor of Al Anbar province, 
who initially contacted the Americans at Camp Fallujah on behalf of the 
Albu-Mahal. Additionally, Fasal al-Gaoud attended the announcement of 
the Awakening by Sheikh Sattar on 14 September 2006 and was an original 
member of the Awakening Council. Also in attendance, and one of the 
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!ose connections and relationships were further strengthened by the return 
of Special Forces teams to the area in 2005 after a short hiatus. As indicated 
previously, an ODB was deployed to Al Asad with ODAs 582, 555, and 545 
deployed to Al Qaim, Hadithah, and Hit, respectively, to work with the tribes 
and develop those relationships from the bottom up. In fact, Major General 
James Mattis, 1st Marine Division commander from August 2002 to August 
2004, credits Major Adam Such, Special Forces, with making initial contact 
with the Albu-Nimr tribe as early as mid-2004; Such, per Mattis’s account, 
“actually began what eventually morphed into the Anbar Awakening.”94
'LVFRQQHFWHG3HUVSHFWLYHV5DWKHUWKDQ'LVFRQQHFWHG(YHQWV
Although some Americans acknowledge the Albu-Mahal tribe’s actions in 
Al Qaim during 2005–2006 as the (rst tribal uprising against Al Qaeda, most 
characterize the two movements—in Al Qaim and Ramadi—as isolated and 
unrelated. Additionally, Al Qaim’s awakening is acknowledged more as a 
footnote than as a major contributor and enabler to the larger movement. In 
the Coalition’s eyes, it might seem that way, but the Iraqis were aware of the 
tribal communications, coordination, and a*liations. So why do so many 
Americans view the Al Qaim awakening in such a limited way?
Colonel Michael Walker, commander, 3rd Civil A"airs Group in Iraq from 
February to September 2004, o"ered one explanation for this disconnect. 
COL Walker pointed to the Al Gaoud family as a key factor in understanding 
the relationship between events in Al Qaim and Ramadi. He cited the revolt 
of the Albu-Mahal against AQI in 2005 as the (rst of several tipping points, 
and attributed the start of the Awakening to the relationships that the MEF 
established with the Iraqis in 2004 and, in particular, with members of the 
Al Gaoud family of the Albu-Nimr tribe. COL Walker attributed much of the 
Coalition’s inability to recognize the relationships to a “Coalition time versus 
Arab time” mind-set.95 Members of the Coalition, on the one hand, perceived 
events in Iraq based upon the length of their deployments; Marines, for 
example, saw the sequence of events in seven-month rotational increments. 
!e Iraqis, on the other hand, visualized and connected events during the 
entire time frame, which in turn related to their collective memories of events 
predating the 2003 invasion. !ey could bridge these events and see conti-
nuity where the Coalition could only perceive incremental and disconnected 
episodes.96
Another reason why many fail to recognize the connections can be traced 
to a classi(ed intelligence report that was leaked to the press in September 
2006, two weeks before Sheikh Sattar announced the Awakening in Ramadi. 
!e classi(ed report concluded that the Multi-National Forces and Iraqi 
Security Forces were “no longer capable of militarily defeating the insurgency 
in Al Anbar.”97 It went on to report that the tribal system “wholly failed in AO 
Raleigh and Topeka and has only limited e*cacy in AO Denver.”98 !e only 
exception noted in the report was Fallujah, where the tribes still functioned 
despite “local politics in Al Anbar [being] anemic or dysfunctional due to 
insurgent intimidation… .”99 While a number of Coalition senior leaders 
in Al Anbar characterized the report as basically accurate when read in its 














were headlined in the media. !e report led many to conclude that there 
was no success on the ground. !is perception, however, con'icted with the 
growing reality, which was that tribes were increasingly siding against AQI in 
the cities and towns of Al Anbar. 
Iraqis awoke to AQI’s intentions in 2004 in Fallujah, partnered with the 
Coalition and GOI to defeat AQI in Al Qaim, and challenged AQI’s power 
along the Western Euphrates in such areas as Baghdadi. By early to mid-2006, 
the movement had already begun in Ramadi. Colonel Tony Deane, Task 
Force 1-35 Armor, had been conducting police recruiting drives with Sheikh 
Sattar and the Albu-Risha tribe in Ramadi since 4 July 2006.100 Several weeks 
later, on 14 July, COL MacFarland announced on a televised Department 
of Defense news brie(ng that “I think we have turned a corner here in 
Ramadi.”101
!e Al Qaim events and their relation to the overall Awakening might have 
retained their signi(cance if the media had not chosen to highlight the 
elements of the leaked report that so authoritatively and adamantly denied 
any successes in the Anbar area, with the exception of Fallujah. Much of the 
U.S. audience was left with the impression that success did not start in Al 
Anbar until the Army’s Ready First Combat Team arrived in Ramadi in June 
2006.102 As more detailed research makes clear, however, the Iraqis were well 
aware of the connections, relationships, and signi(cance of Al Qaim, and they 
would count it as the physical starting point of the Awakening.
When Sheikh Sattar’s successor, Sheikh Ahmed Albu-Risha, was asked about 
the (rst instance of an Iraqi tribe turning on AQI, he responded matter-of-
factly, “Albu-Mahal in Al Qaim.”103 He spoke of contacting Sheikh Sabah 
of the Albu-Mahal in 2005 and o"ering to help. Sheikh Sabah asked that 
they contact Dr. Dulaymi, the minister of defense and a member of the 
Albu-Risha tribe, to solicit GOI support. Sheikh Ahmed’s brother Khamis 
travelled to Baghdad and met with Sadun—and now “you know the rest of 
the story.”
Conclusion
Al Qaim’s awakening was one of the (rst signi(cant examples of a successful 
counterinsurgency operation in Iraq. But the battalion commander refused 
credit for the strategy, citing operations in Vietnam in 1968 and 1969: “[T]his 
is nothing new, it is just protecting the population. In order to do that you’ve 
got to live where the population is.”104
Conditions in Al Qaim—security, governance, and economics—continued to 
mature and stabilize. In addition to restricting the 'ow of foreign (ghters and 
their resources into Al Anbar and Iraq, success in Al Qaim had other critical, 
far-reaching e"ects: !e word was out that AQI could be beaten. Events in 
Al Qaim provided a glimmer of hope to other Iraqis, saying to them, “We 
can do this; we can beat AQI.” Subsequently, developments in Al Qaim set a 
precedent for other towns and cities in Al Anbar, providing them with psy-







CTX | Vol. 3, No. 2
8LIE[EOIRMRKSVsahawa, 
became the Sahawa, a collective 
IJJSVXF]GSQQYRMXMIW
EPSRKXLI)YTLVEXIW
AO Area of Operations 
AQI Al Qaeda in Iraq 
BLT Battalion Landing Team 
Capt Captain, U.S. Marine Corps or U.S. Air Force 
COIN Counterinsurgency 
COL Colonel, U.S. Army 
Col Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps or U.S. Air Force 
CP Command Post 
CPT Captain, U.S. Army 
CTF Combined Task Force 
FM Field Manual 
GEN General, U.S. Army 
Gen General, U.S. Marine Corps or U.S. Air Force
GOI Government of Iraq 
IAD Iraqi Army Division 
LTC Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army 
LtCol Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps 
MAJ Major, U.S. Army 
Maj Major, U.S. Marine Corps or U.S. Air Force 
MEF Marine Expeditionary Force 
ODA Operational Detachment Alpha 
ODB Operational Detachment Bravo 
RCT Regimental Combat Team 
SVBIED Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised 
 Explosive Device 
WERV Western Euphrates River Valley
%44)2(-<%&&6):-%8-327
%&3988,)%98,36
Dr. William (Bill) Knarr, Resident Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Opera-
tions University, was a project leader at the Institute for Defense Analyses 
(IDA) when this article was written. Ms. Mary Hawkins is an analyst at IDA.
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!e IDA project team would like to thank all the interviewees, Coalition and 
Iraqi, who gave their time and e"ort, sometimes at personal risk, to tell us 
their parts of the Awakening. We are committed to getting your stories out.
networks and relationships. !e awakening, or sahawa, became the Sahawa, 
a collective e"ort by communities along the Euphrates, driven to its peak 
in Ramadi as the insurgents ran out of room to hide.105 !is collaboration, 
grounded in Iraqi culture and societal networks, albeit unrecognized by most 
outsiders, provides a deeper, more coherent, and continuous story line of the 
Awakening movement.  
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This article is about the counterinsurgency experiences of two 
United States Special Forces Soldiers, William and Robert, and their op-
erational detachments, which fought in al Anbar during the period from 
February 2004 to April 2007. It is a condensed version of several chapters of a 
thesis I wrote four years ago while attending the Naval Postgraduate School.1 
A lot of other people have written about the American counterinsurgency 
experience in al Anbar: academics, journalists, Soldiers, and Marines in 
monographs, theses, articles, and books. !ese accounts devote considerable 
attention to the Awakening, an event that has taken on mythical proportions, 
a lot like the Surge. I think readers will notice that the stories recounted in the 
following pages o"er a distinctly di"erent 'avor. 
William’s War2
Well versed in American history and conversant in Arabic, William has per-
fected the art of selling himself as “just a dumb hillbilly.” He is anything but. 
When William returned to Iraq in 2004 for Operation Iraqi Freedom II 
(OIF II), he was beginning his 14th consecutive year in the 5th Special Forces 
Group and had already chalked up four previous combat missions—to the 
Gulf (in the (rst Gulf War), Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq in 2003. All told, 
William had over seven years’ time on the ground in the Middle East, South-
west Asia, and Africa. 
William’s (rst mission on his return to Iraq in 2004 was not counterinsur-
gency. It was to identify and exploit opportunities to split al Qaeda elements 
from nationalist strands of the insurgency or, as it was called, the resistance. 
Early on, the 5th Special Forces Group headquarters had theorized that this 
should be possible in Sunni-dominated al Anbar. !e thinking was that by 
exposing and encouraging such a rift, irreconcilables could be unmasked and 
targeted. Second Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group tasked William and his 
Operational Detachment–Alpha, ODA 555, to look for and exploit just such 
opportunities. Or, as William described it, his ODA was “looking for guys to 
gun up against al Qaeda in Iraq.” What is important to note is the vagueness 
of ODA 555’s initial mission. !e command acknowledged that it did not have 
a complete enough picture of the situation on the ground.
OIF II
ODA 555 operated from al Asad Airbase. Al Asad was centrally located in the 
ODA’s area of operations (AO), which extended along the Euphrates River 
Valley (ERV) for approximately 150 miles, from Rawah southeast to the 
Highway 10/12 split near Mohammedi, and included vast swaths of desert on 
either side of the river corridor. !ird Armored Cavalry Regiment (3rd ACR) 
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the team arrived in January 2004; Marine Regimental Combat Team (RCT) 7 
replaced 3rd ACR in February.
First Contact
American commanders in Anbar initially worked through police forces and 
city councils. However, few American units had vetted the local police and 
city councils in the immediate aftermath of the invasion. Instead, police and 
council members were assumed to be legitimate. In other words, Americans 
assumed that armed men wearing blue shirts were police just because they 
were armed men wearing blue shirts.
William and ODA 555 were skeptical. As William put it:
We [the coalition] just completely changed out a whole govern-
ment! Who’s to say who’s a good cop, or who’s a bad cop? We did 
not know what or who was considered legitimate by the people 
in Anbar at that point, although we made an assumption that the 
tribes were still a legitimate source of power that held in'uence. 
Saddam, after all, had had to manage the tribes, not police forces 
and city councils. 
William knew, based on experience in the Middle East and a basic under-
standing of tribalism in Anbar, that legitimacy emanated from power and 
prestige, not titles and uniforms. !erefore, in his assessment, power and pres-
tige lay with the tribes.3 William also assumed that he would be competing 
with al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and other insurgent groups for the support of 
the tribes and their inherent ability to self-mobilize. !e ODA’s plan was thus 
simple: identify the most powerful tribe in the AO and co-opt it. How exactly 
co-option would be executed would depend on what the ODA could learn, 
how relationships developed, and what the situation permitted or suggested.
ODA 555 soon discovered that a signi(cant population of the Albu Nimr 
tribe resided in its AO. !e Albu Nimr are one of the largest tribes of the 
Dulami Tribal Confederation dominating al Anbar. William also discovered 
that one of the informants that ODA 555 inherited from the previous ODA 









Nubs was from the poor Shamal clan. By profession a (sherman, Nubs 
supplemented his income during Saddam’s reign by smuggling. According to 
Nubs and others who knew him, he had survived numerous regime attempts 
to arrest or kill him. According to one story, Nubs had mailed the hand of a 
would-be assassin back to the authorities. True or not, Nubs was exactly the 
type of individual William wanted to “gun up.” Nubs was competent, wily, 
and resourceful. He became William’s way into the Nimr.
Working with the direct support of the Combined Joint Special Operations 
Task Force (CJSOTF) and General James Mattis, William used Nubs to help 
create a provisional company of Shamal-Albu Nimr tribesmen from the 
town of Tal Aswad in the al Phurat area, Hit district.4 Over time this Nimr 
unit successfully conducted operations for the Marines in Rawah and other 
places. Most signi(cantly, the provisional Nimr company 
ensured that Route Uranium was cleared of improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs), allowing Marine reinforcements 
to 'ow from al Asad to Fallujah in support of Operation 
Vigilant Resolve (the First Battle of Fallujah) unimpeded. 
William solidi(ed his rapport with the Nimr provisionals 
by conducting small civil a"airs projects in Tal Aswad. 
!ese projects were never about winning hearts and 
minds. William knew that the ODA’s infusion of money 
and power into the Tal Aswad community would attract 
the attention of in'uential sheikhs, since Tal Aswad was 
a poor Shamal community consisting of farmers and 
(shermen. He understood that, because patronage was 
key to how sheikhs maintained power and in'uence 
over their tribal constituents, these sheikhs would not tolerate the residents of 
Tal Aswad prospering independently; this would undermine their authority. 
!us, William wasn’t at all surprised when Sheikh Reshad, the paramount 
sheikh of the Albu Nimr, called him and asked for an introductory meeting. 
William responded by inviting Sheikh Reshad to meet him at al Asad Airbase. 
In doing so, not only did William succeed in maneuvering Sheikh Reshad 
into making the initial approach—meeting William on William’s terms—but 
also into coming to a meeting on William’s ground. William thereby began 
their relationship from a position of dominance. 
&RQYHQWLRQDO)RLO
In hindsight, William’s approach may seem strikingly commonsensical, 
almost as if he did not think it through. Yet, William continuously assessed 
and reassessed the ODA’s plan. Worth noting is that this was well in advance 
of the Awakening and the development of the Sons of Iraq.
Listen, we didn’t start out to conduct counterinsurgency. We [ODA 
555] started out trying to (nd a way to get good guys to kill bad 
guys. !at meant that we could not waste our time looking for 
bad guys; we needed to (nd the good guys (rst. Find the good 
guys, help them secure their lives and prosper, and they will (nd 
















!ere are di"erent ways to go about this. We did it by organizing 
a provisional unit based on tribal and geographic cohesion. !at 
way, once guys committed to the unit, they had a stake in pro-
tecting each other and their town. We also didn’t assume that 
we had the right guys. We constantly looked for indicators that 
either con(rmed or denied that what we were doing was working. 
!reats and attacks against the Nimr were a very good sign that 
we were being successful. !e key event occurred in May 2004, 
when someone threw a bomb over the wall into Sheikh Reshad’s 
compound. !at not only was an indicator that our e"orts were 
a threat to AQI, it also pushed Sheikh Reshad further in line with 
the coalition.
We also listened to the Nimr’s concerns. !eir primary concern 
was safeguarding their families and property. !ey wanted to do 
it themselves. In that respect, it was no di"erent from colonial 
militias in our country before the Revolutionary War. !ey were 
not interested in serving in any other area in Anbar or chasing 
bad guys if it meant leaving their homes unguarded. We reached 
a compromise with them where one-third of the provisional com-
pany would conduct o"ensive operations for me as long as we left 
the other two-thirds to guard the home front. Our wasta went 
up by (nding a way to work within their concerns.5 In counter-
insurgency, you have to give in to the reasonable demands of the 
population, if you can, if you want to get their support. 
!e Marines, on the other hand, didn’t take this approach. !e 
Marines were technically correct in their approach, but intuitively 
wrong. !e (rst thing is that they [Marines] never worked with the 
right people while I was there. I will use Hit district as an example. 
2–7 Marines focused their engagement e"orts on the city council 
and police, who were controlled, in'uenced, and/or manipulated 
by the insurgents. !ere were plenty of indicators. One was that 
the police would call the Marines up within 30 minutes usually, 
after a mortar attack on Camp Hit where 2–7 was based, and say 
they knew who was responsible. But the police never, ever caught 
who was responsible. How’s that? !e police were just providing 
throwaway names to appease the Marines.
!e city council members were also not the right people to be 
dealing with. !ey were under insurgent control and were not the 
most powerful entity in the district to begin with. !e Nimr were. I 
remember some representatives from 2–7 Marines telling me about 
a Hit city council meeting they attended. !is meeting occurred 
two days after Sheikh Reshad’s family compound in Zuwayyah was 
bombed. !e Marines said that Sheikh Reshad strode in like he 
owned the place and told them [the council] that if any Nimr were 
hurt, he would level the city. !e Marines said that some of those 
council members shook in their boots. !is event told me two 
things. One, Sheikh Reshad knew that the council had extremist 
or AQI ties. !ey were someone’s puppets, through whom he was 












threat towards them. Two, being told of the visceral reaction of 
many of the council members, I knew they feared organized tribal 
retaliation by the Nimr. !ese two observations proved to me that 
I had chosen to back the right player. !at being said, 2–7 Marines 
continued trying to work through the police and city council.6
!e Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) were also a mess. !e reason 
was, again, they were not the right people, and they were not 
properly employed. !e name Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, or even 
the later name, Iraqi National Guard, suggests a local militia, 
which it was not. !e ICDC recruits were not vetted through 
the tribes. Neither were the police or the city council. !e tribal 
structures were the only ones available that could do three things 
we needed: 1) vet recruits; 2) provide leverage to keep recruits 
in line; and 3) provide community leaders who could be held 
accountable for the actions of the recruits. !e other major factor 
in the ICDC’s failure was that ICDC units were not employed in 
safeguarding their own tribal and community areas.
For example, ICDC recruits from Hit were used in Haditha. !is 
action also had a number of negative consequences. ICDC mem-
bers had no incentive to safeguard someone else’s hometown. 
Employing the ICDC outside of their communities also negated 
the tribe as a mechanism for maintaining accountability. It was 
thought that employing ICDC elsewhere would limit corruption 
and graft. !e truth was this action encouraged extortion and 
pilfering. We removed the Iraqis’ own system of social account-
ability by employing tribesmen in tribal areas other than their own. 
!ere was also another fundamental 'aw in employing Anbaris, 
who are tribesmen, in other tribesmen’s areas. !e local populace 
does not consider them legitimate. !ink of the Texas Rangers. 
!ey were Texans, working in Texas. !e Rangers didn’t hire men 
from Oklahoma, and they didn’t try to enforce the law outside of 
Texas. What is so hard to understand?
It’s funny, the Marines said that the ICDC were disbanded because 
they failed to meet expectations. Everyone blames the Iraqis. No 
one pays attention to the fact that the Marines were responsible 
for running the program, training and advising the ICDC. !e 
Marines failed because they made mistakes in how they recruited 
and employed the ICDC.
Figuring It Out
William spent an extraordinary amount of time just trying to understand 
exactly how AQI and other extremist elements were functioning within ODA 
555’s AO; he complained that almost every S2 (intelligence o*cer) he met 
with, or heard brief, only described the enemy’s actions.7 An S2, for example, 
might brief that the enemy was planting IEDs in a particular area or that 
the enemy was using violence and coercion to in'uence the population but 
never include speculations as to why that might be or for what purpose it 
was being done.
36






No S2 that William remembers ever presented a concept of what al Qaeda’s 
or the insurgents’ goals were, how they were trying to achieve those goals, and 
what resources they needed to achieve them. !is meant that conventional 
operations were mis-focused and, sometimes, operations simply had nothing 
to do with the enemy situation at all. William likened it to boxing. A boxer has 
to know what his opponent is doing before he can counter it. A good boxer 
does not keep trying to block the jab while right crosses are pounding him. 
William summarized this by recounting a brie(ng he sat in on with 2–7 
Marines:
I sat in on one brief in which the S2 said that the enemy was 
using violence and coercion to in'uence the population. !e S3 
[operations o*cer] then got up and explained how the unit was 
going to conduct a patrol in order to hand out soccer balls and 
demonstrate a presence. What part of the S2’s brief did he miss? 
How is handing out soccer balls going to defeat coercion? It can’t. 
At no time did anyone provide an explicit plan for how to defeat 
the enemy. 
In contrast, William very consciously avoided conducting operations simply 
for the sake of conducting operations. He avoided the operations–intelligence 
trap that many operational detachments and units fell into, when units 
conducted direct action operations to capture or kill insurgents. In theory, 
these operations were said to produce more intelligence that would lead to 
more operations, and so on, in a perpetual cycle. But this cycle can become a 
trap when not coordinated to support a greater end state. Instead of focusing 
on individuals, William concentrated on de(ning what it was that AQI was 
trying to achieve in ODA 555’s AO, and how it was trying to achieve it. Once he 
(gured that out, the ODA then sought to counter AQI’s e"orts.
William and the team’s assistant operations sergeant developed a model, 
depicted in Figure 3, to illustrate how AQI and other anti-coalition groups 
were operating in Anbar. First, AQI attempted to dominate or co-opt the 
tribes. Second, AQI used these groups to get civic leaders and civic institutions 
to support their operations and to misdirect coalition forces. 
For instance, the model reveals how AQI and others used Iraqi Police (IPs) 
in a counterintelligence role to impede coalition progress. William and ODA 
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supporters who simply ignored insurgent activity, and honest policemen. 
!e active insurgents in the police force collected valuable intelligence by 
observing and coordinating with coalition forces. !ese insurgent policemen 
conducted counterintelligence by providing disinformation to the coalition, 
to the population, and to honest cops with the aim of subverting coalition 
stabilization e"orts. !e active insurgents also used unwitting, honest po-
licemen to misdirect police e"orts in support of insurgent activity. 
As William’s model suggests, insurgents sought to control the coalition’s use 
of its preferred connective nodes—chie'y the police and city councils—in 
order to destroy coalition e"orts to gain the local population’s support and 
trust. !e insurgents could thereby completely control the tempo of the (ght 
in Anbar, and e"ectively parry coalition e"orts to contain it. As amorphous as 
the insurgency was, it had few di*culties shaping coalition perceptions and 
a"ecting coalition forces’ reactions to events.8 
By refusing to work with the IPs or the Hit city council, and by conducting 
tribal engagement, William disrupted AQI’s ability to control the tempo of 
the (ght in al Phurat and Hit district. Even though William started small, 
with just one Nimr tribesman from Tal Aswad, his in'uence grew. !e ODA 
developed excellent relations with Sheikhs Reshad, Bizea, and Faisal (governor 
of Anbar), and others, while simultaneously developing a loyal following 
among the many members of the general Nimr tribe. 
Dirty Tricks
!e ODA conducted other deliberate operations in support of William’s main 
e"ort with the Nimr and to disrupt AQI. It created events, either to shape the 
battle(eld, or just to see what would happen in order to test assumptions and 
improve its understanding of how the enemy was operating and in'uencing 
the locals.
While William did not consider Hit or other surrounding areas ripe for 
fruitful tribal engagement during his OIF II tour, he also did not ignore them. 
Because ODA 555 still had to react to intelligence leads on known insurgents 
and requests from “higher,” William always tried to ensure that he conducted 
operations in ways that helped shape the battle(eld toward facilitating accom-
plishment of his overall mission. He cleverly developed and executed concepts 
to in'uence insurgent decision cycles and insurgents’ perceptions. William 
largely did this by mirroring their tactics. 
ODA 555 conducted some operations in ways that masked its identity as the 
sponsor. !ese operations suggested to local insurgents that there were other, 
unknown Iraqis living around them in their communities who supported 
coalition objectives. When combined with overt operational displays by the 
Nimr provisional company, these operations heightened insurgents’ fears that 
the coalition and tribe were cooperating. ODA 555 also choreographed the dis-
semination of disinformation through informants to amplify the perception 
that Iraqis were rejecting AQI and the resistance. 
!ese operations e"ectively created doubt and uncertainty among the 
insurgents, and introduced something far more threatening to them than 















insurgents didn’t know and couldn’t identify or control, who were targeting 
AQI and elements of the local resistance. One of the by-products of this fear 
among the insurgents was an increase in reports to ODA 555 of intra-Iraqi 
violence—some between competing insurgent factions and some from local 
Iraqis defending themselves against AQI.
Sadly, despite ODA 555’s best e"orts, its OIF II tour did not end as expected. 
After the Transfer of Authority on 30 June 2004, ODA 555 lost its ability 
(authority, really) to continue to pay the Nimr provisional company. Conse-
quently, the Nimr were to be absorbed into the 503rd ICDC Battalion at Camp 
Hit. William knew the Nimr would reject this because the 503rd was corrupt; 
it had also been penetrated. !e Nimr realized that they would be forfeiting 
their tribal security net if they were integrated as Nimr individuals into 
extant platoons. ODA 555 protested the disbanding of the provisional unit, but 
to no avail. 
While William and his men had developed close enough bonds with the Nimr 
that they were beyond Nimr reproach, the disbandment of the provisionals 
unquestionably a"ected the Nimrs’ view of the coalition and the Shi’a-
dominated Interim Iraqi Government. It also cost the coalition rapport with a 
pro-coalition tribal community. Worse, the withdrawal of Special Forces from 
Anbar in the fall of 2004 cemented a sense of abandonment among the Tal 
Aswad Nimr.
The Interim: Putting It All Together
While William’s original mission had been to exploit (ssures in the insurgency 
in order to encourage Iraqis to reject AQI, he had, in e"ect, conducted coun-
terinsurgency. William himself acknowledges that he did not mentally make 
the paradigmatic shift to counterinsurgency until after the end of his OIF 
II tour. But all this really means is that he did not step back to analyze his 
approach at the time, so as to give it a label. It was only when he realized the 
magnitude of the loss of the Nimr provisional unit that he began reassessing 
what his team had done. Once home, William’s battalion commander asked 
him to activate and train a new ODA. Because William sincerely believed 
the key to defeating AQI and managing the national resistance lay in al Anbar, 
despite its relegation to an economy-of-force e"ort, he desperately wanted to 
return there. He wanted to take his new ODA with him. !at ODA included me.
In the course of activating ODA 545 (in August 2004), William and I had 
many long discussions. He described how he was drawing from his experi-
ences in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq to develop a tribal engagement–based 
counterinsurgency strategy should 545 go back to Anbar. William explained 
his approach using three simple models. 
Model I
William borrowed the framework for his (rst model directly from U.S. Army 
doctrine. !e Army utilizes the term Battle!eld Operating Systems (BOS) to 
refer to the physical means by which a force executes its concept of operations. 
The Army classifies these physical means into seven operating systems:  
intelligence, maneuver, (re support, air defense, mobility/countermobility/









U.S. Army uses these seven systems to target the enemy’s operations. Wil-
liam simply applied the BOS overlay to insurgent forces to identify what was 
targetable within their systems. 
Table 1 depicts what William determined to be AQI’s operating systems 
in Anbar and what he deemed targetable. !e (gure shows that William 
regarded AQI’s CSS as the only BOS worth targeting, one that could decisively 
lead to AQI’s defeat in Anbar. !e term combat service support refers to all of 
the essential activities necessary to sustain AQI and the insurgency.10 In Iraq, 
CSS came from the population in one of two ways, either freely or via coer-
cion and intimidation. 
Classic counterinsurgency theory maintains that isolating insurgents from 
the population is necessary to defeat the insurgency. William came to the 
same conclusion, but from an enemy-centric perspective. He was interested 
in how to defeat the enemy. !e remaining six systems could be targeted, but 
disrupting them would not be su*cient to in'ict lasting damage on AQI or 
the insurgency. 
Model II
William used his second model to explain to others how to target the popula-
tion. William says he borrowed this from something a State Department 
sta"er told him years earlier. According to this model, Arab identity begins 
with the immediate family and then proceeds along the following trajec-
tory: family, clan, tribe, Muslims-like-me, Muslims-not-like-me, national 
identity.
William used this model to point out that the most e"ective way to target 
Anbaris non-kinetically was through tribal engagement. Anbaris’ identities 
begin with the family and tribe. !at is why Anbaris often attach an adjectival 
form of their tribal name to their given name: to inform others about their 
familial lineage and tribe. From William’s point of view, because family and 
tribe were so central to Anbaris’ identities, tribal engagement would continue 









































Based on his prior experiences in Somalia and Afghanistan, William deter-
mined that there were three conditions al Qaeda needed if it was to succeed in 
establishing an Islamic state:
1. A predominantly Muslim population
2. Social chaos (breakdown of normal societal structures)
3. Economic failure or near failure
When these conditions persist, they create a climate that so wears down the 
populace that people will accept whatever form of government prevails, even 
a Taliban-like Islamic government, so long as it brings some form of stability. 
For traditional societal structures to break down to the point that AQI’s in'u-
ence prevails requires war or some other catastrophic event. 
To avoid this scenario, William considered it critical that Iraq not devolve 
into civil war. !at meant reinforcing existing tribal structures, which was 
also necessary to prevent AQI from undermining them for its own purposes. 
Otherwise, AQI could hijack local tribal structures to serve as mobilizing struc-
tures to support its goals, while undermining or destroying those structures it 
couldn’t hijack. From William’s perspective, AQI was doing both. For example, 
AQI used Kharbouli tribal structures to mobilize in al Qaim, but in Ramadi 
AQI assassinated senior sheikhs of the Albu Fahd in order to undermine tribal 
leaders and make the tribe more pliant. 
According to William’s models, if coalition forces could out-compete AQI to 
obtain the support of tribal structures, that would force AQI to rely on violent 
coercion and repression to force tribal acquiescence. As William put it, “You 
want AQ to become like a cancer and start attacking the body [the population, 
its own base of support, or CSS].” Basically, for William, AQI-inspired violence 
against the tribes implied three things. First, it indicated that coalition and 
government forces’ actions were threatening AQI. Second, it indicated that the 
population’s goals were divergent from AQI’s. And third, it signaled an oppor-
tunity to align tribal needs with coalition goals by helping those tribes secure 
themselves. 
The Model City Approach
William took his ideas and synthesized them into what he termed the 
“model city” approach, a variant of the famous inkblot or oil-slick approach 
to counterinsurgency. The basic premise is to gain access to a village or 
town by creating jobs, establishing a local security force, and using selective 
humanitarian or civil a"airs projects to improve residents’ quality of life. 
Once success is achieved in one location, that locality then serves as a model 
for surrounding tribal populations who can improve their own security and 
economic prospects by mimicking the model city and joining broader stabi-
lization e"orts. At the same time, any tribal leader who refuses to cooperate 
is denied economic and security bene(ts until he or his constituents choose 
to align themselves with the coalition and the host nation government on the 
side of stability.11
With this approach, it becomes possible to empower local leaders and 








provides leverage as their expanding status becomes ever more tied to support 
of coalition objectives. In order to sustain this over the long term, coalition 
forces must gradually tie support for local leaders back to the local, regional, 
or national government. Sometimes, however, local leaders can be indirectly 
pressured into aligning themselves with pro-government forces. 
William cites the western tribes as an example. Tribal leaders do not possess 
sovereign powers. !ey are largely “big men,” relying on prestige to in'uence 
their constituents.12 In William’s words:
Picture a sheikh as if he is sitting atop a pyramid. If the base of 
the pyramid moves, and the sheikh wants to remain on top, then 
he has to move with it. !is is a natural democratic aspect of the 
tribes that not all people understand. 
Because William did understand this, he spent a great deal of time developing 
relationships and in'uence among the general Nimr population. !is was his 
way of using them to manipulate the sheikhs.
One bene(t of William’s model city approach is that it requires very few re-
sources. In fact, gross overspending on civil a"airs projects or any welfare-like 
assistance immediately undermines the entire e"ort. !e key is to start small, 
spending little and under-promising on simple projects but over-performing 
in their completion. If the situation isn’t too far gone, William’s model city 
approach can also succeed with limited manpower. However, if the environ-
ment is as violent as al Qaim was in 2005, then external forces are needed to 
create and maintain stability until the local population is capable of doing this 
themselves. In areas where the violence is somewhat manageable, then even as 
small an element as an ODA can create security from within, working with the 
local inhabitants. Tal Aswad represents a prime example. 
OIF III
William and I were eager for ODA 545 to get to Anbar in June 2005 for our 
OIF  III rotation, which would be my (rst as a team leader. We (rst had to 
spend two months in Baghdad, however, waiting for the CJSOTF (composed 
of a 5th Group headquarters) to coordinate with Multi-National Corps–Iraq 
(MNC-I) and II Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF) to re-introduce Special 
Forces into Anbar. 
While waiting to get to al Anbar, I scoured intelligence reports and other 
documents for current information about the situation there. I was intrigued 
by reporting that indicated that nationalist groups such as Mohammed’s 
Army and the 1920th Revolutionary Brigade were (ghting with AQI and other 
jihadist Sala(st organizations. !is information substantiated what William 
discovered during his OIF II mission. In our view, the 1920th Revolutionary 
Brigade represented an entity that could be redirected against irreconcilable 
groups like AQI. William also met some Nimr soldiers from Tal Aswad serving 
in Baghdad. !ey told us that they would soon desert because AQI threatened 
to harm their family members back home as payback for their having joined 














When ODA 545 (nally made it to Anbar in August, we chose to establish our 
teamhouse at Camp Hit due to its proximity to al Phurat. Ideally, we would 
have established a teamhouse in al Phurat, but we did not know how recep-
tive the Nimr would be to our presence, given William’s absence and Sheikh 
Reshad’s death. Marines mistakenly killed Sheikh Reshad while he was 'eeing 
a kidnapping attempt in early 2005. Because we did not know exactly where 
we stood with the Nimr, and because we knew that if we had simply driven 
straight to Zuwayyah to meet with the sheikhs they would have presented 
us with a long list of grievances, William instead engineered a way to bring 
the sheikhs to us, working with the battlespace owners, 3–25 Marines. 3–25 
Marines, a Marine Reserve Battalion from Ohio, were responsible for the ERV 
from Hit to Haditha.
During a combat patrol shortly after we arrived in Hit, 3–25 Marines detained 
several members of the Burgess family.13 Members of the al Gaaoud family, 
including the late Sheikh Reshad’s brother, Sheikh Anis, came to Camp Hit 
to inquire about their cousins, the Burgesses. In an e"ort to re-cement cordial 
relations with the Nimr, William protested the Burgesses’ detainment on the 
al Gaaouds’ behalf. He worked this out in advance with 3–25 so that the 3–25 
operations o*cer would appear publicly to relent, but not without loudly 
protesting (rst. By securing the Burgesses’ release, William was able to reestab-
lish himself as an important advocate for the Nimr and a person of in'uence.
Ghost Patrols
Hit district was much more violent in August 2005 than it had been during 
OIF II. When we arrived, there were no police. !e 503rd ICDC/ING had 
disintegrated earlier that year, and several of 3–25’s combat patrols su"ered 
suicide vehicle born improvised explosive devices (SVBIED) attacks prior to 
our arrival.14 !e ODA received grim reports from multiple informants that 
the entire situation in al Anbar was rapidly deteriorating. AQI blew up the 
Telecom cell tower servicing Hit district and the surrounding areas in the 
latter part of August, and the Albu Nimr reported an increase in threats, 
night letters, and attacks against Nimr tribesmen.15 !e majority of the Albu 
Nimr tribe in the Hit district lived on the northeastern side of the Euphrates 
where there was no permanent coalition presence. It appeared that AQI was 
conducting shaping operations to isolate the Nimr side of the river.
On the morning of 4 September 2005, AQI conducted a multi-pronged SVBIED 
attack against a Marine (rm base in Hit.16 AQI also simultaneously detonated 
an SVBIED on the Hit bridge, the only tra*cable bridge over the Euphrates 
between Ramadi and Haditha. !e SVBIED rendered the bridge impassable to 
vehicle tra*c and e"ectively isolated the only pro-coalition tribal communi-
ties in the area, all of whom resided on the far side of the Euphrates from 
the Marine bases. E"ectively, the Nimr were now on their own. !e Nimr 
tribe’s last line of defense was a loosely organized home guard militia that 
patrolled the tribal area looking for outsiders. 
!e Hit bridge remained closed to vehicular tra*c for three months, and 
for three months coalition forces were absent from the Nimr tribal areas 
on the far side of the river. During this time, ODA 545 drove down through 
Ramadi where we could cross the Euphrates and drive back up the river to al 














between !ar !ar Lake and the Euphrates River to avoid IEDs and ambushes 
and to maximize the range of our weapons.17 We “ghosted” out of the jazeera 
at di"erent times and along di"erent vectors to visit villages and towns along 
the river and maintain relations with the Nimr tribe. Each time we did so, we 
traveled with elements of the IA battalion also stationed at Camp Hit. 
We also conducted numerous combat patrols north along the river to main-
tain some sort of presence. Communities outside of the Nimr tribal area in 
al Phurat were mostly small and tribally heterogeneous. !e people in these 
communities lacked a signi(cant tribal security net that could protect them 
and, as a result, they were very cautious when the ODA patrolled through. 
A school principal from Dulab (nally admitted to us that the coalition 
would never receive any cooperation without providing constant security to 
the villages. !e people, he said, would support the insurgents because the 
insurgents were there constantly, whereas coalition and Iraqi security forces 
only patrolled through occasionally. 
William modi(ed his model city approach based on this information and 
other observations. We concluded that the most important thing we could do 
was to establish a solid base of support among the Albu Nimr in al Phurat. Al 
Phurat was the largest, most powerful homogeneous tribal area between Ra-
madi and Haditha, and if we made it our base of support, we would prevent 
AQI from using it for the same purposes. After securing al Phurat, we planned 
to methodically spread our tentacles through the smaller, tribal communities 
surrounding Hit, thereby choking the area o" before (nally securing it with 
indigenous support. 
Typical western counterinsurgency practice often starts with the urban centers 
and spreads outward. !e situation in Hit district dictated the opposite. Hit 
became an alternate safe haven for insurgents 'eeing Fallujah in November 
2004, though it had actually been a sanctuary long before that.18 Hit’s tribally 
heterogeneous population made the city vulnerable to incursions by AQI. 
Outsiders could hide in Hit much more easily than they could in the rural 
tribal areas. Consequently, if we had begun our counterinsurgency e"ort in 
Hit, we would have been pitting our weaknesses against the enemy’s strengths. 
!e enemy had the informational advantage, was hidden among the popula-
tion, and had the strength of position. An under-resourced counterinsurgency 
e"ort in Hit would have resulted in coalition casualties, civilian casualties, 
and collateral damage that would only have contributed to AQI’s information 
operations (IO) since, as William noted, every coalition or Iraqi Security Force 
(ISF) casualty was an IO victory for the enemy. 
William’s plan to circumvent Hit and work through the tribes redounded to 
our credit. Once we were in the area, it was clear that starting the model city/
inkblot approach with Tal Aswad—not Hit—was the only way to proceed. 
!e model city approach let us control the tempo, use the desert to avoid 
casualties and collateral damage, target the enemy’s CSS, and gain the infor-
mational advantage. Perhaps not surprisingly, our biggest obstacle turned out 
to be not AQI, but the fact that the bridge remained closed for three months 
and the coalition persisted in neglecting the only tribal communities that 
were somewhat pro-coalition. 
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The Albu Nimr Desert Protectors
In October 2005, shortly after the Desert Protector (DP) program was initiated 
in al Qaim with the Albu Mahal, MNC-I and the Iraqi Ministry of Defense 
decided to stand up an Albu Nimr cohort in al Phurat. ODA 545 was tasked 
through command channels to support this initiative and recruit 200 Desert 
Protectors from the tribe. 2–114 Field Artillery of the Mississippi National 
Guard, the Hit battlespace owners at the time, were tasked to support the 
recruitment as well.19 But the situation near Hit di"ered considerably from 
the situation in al Qaim. Unlike the Mahal, the Albu Nimr were not su"ering 
a perceived existential threat from AQI. !e Nimr were also very cognizant of 
the implosion of the Iraqi National Guard and IPs along the upper Euphrates 
River Valley. In the fall of 2004, insurgents had overrun the IP station in 
Haditha, and many of the IPs who surrendered were taken out and murdered 
on the town’s soccer (eld.20 !e Nimr did not trust the coalition, and often 
cited this incident as proof that working with coalition and government forces 
didn’t pay.
What made matters worse was that the coalition and the Iraqi government, on 
the one hand, would not reopen the Hit bridge or station troops on the Albu 
Nimr side of the river. On the other hand, the government and the coalition 
wanted the Nimr to trust the state with their menfolk and send them o" for 
training. But what did they o"er in return? William and I were caught in 
the middle. We wanted to recruit a tribal force and use it as a means to build 
con(dence between the Nimr and the government, but were essentially being 
told to do so with no quid pro quo from the government or the coalition. 
Kasam, Sheikh Reshad’s 20-something-year-old son and heir, trusted us. But 
even he was reluctant to commit to the Desert Protectors.
It took some deft cajoling before ODA 545 eventually received Kasam’s support, 
along with 200 recruits. !e original MNC-I plan called for rotary-wing 
aircraft from the Marine Air Wing at al Asad to transport the recruits to 
Camp Fallujah for training.21 RCT 2 tasked 2–114 FA to establish the landing 
zones and provide security for both the landing zones and the recruits. As 
2–114 waited for the helicopters to arrive, it received word that the Marine 
Air Wing would not send aircraft until the following day, due to scheduled 
maintenance. !at night, insurgents operating on the far banks of the Eu-
phrates mortared several Nimr villages. In response, the Nimr decided that 
they could not a"ord to lose 200 able-bodied (ghting men to 30 days of basic 
training in Fallujah. In the end, they provided 30 men while the remainder 
returned to defend their villages. Unfortunately, the Marines and MNC-I 
viewed this as evidence that the sheikhs were unable to rally support for tribal 
units and that the people were unwilling to follow their sheikhs. 
Keeping It Together
In the wake of such setbacks, it amazes me that the people of al Phurat 
remained friendly to our ODA. !is was largely due to William’s e"orts 
and his legacy. He had established a remarkable reputation as a friend of 
the Nimr, a man of his word, and a warrior. William’s reputation further 
grew during our three trying months of living in the desert, out of trucks, 








commitment was vital to countering the Nimr’s growing sense of despair 
regarding the coalition. 
By September 2005, it appeared to the Nimr that the coalition was losing. 
!e Nimr were well aware of the situation in al Qaim where their Mahal 
cousins were being pummeled. !ey knew about the murder and intimida-
tion of the IPs and ICDC/ING along the ERV. And they had more than a 
passing familiarity with the growing levels of violence elsewhere in the 
province. Between the disbandment of the Nimr provisional company at 
the end of OIF II, the coalition’s inability to reopen the Hit bridge, the lack 
of coalition presence, and growing unemployment, events  seemed to belie 
whatever positive spin the coalition tried to put on its e"orts.
But then, in November, the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) tempo-
rarily reinforced RCT 2. RCT 2 tasked the MEU to secure Hit in preparation 
for the December 2005 parliamentary elections and to repair and reopen the 
Hit bridge to coalition vehicle tra*c. !e 13th MEU, following our recom-
mendation, sent some of its forces around through Ramadi and back up the 
river to clear the far side, instead of repairing and punching directly across 
the bridge.22 On 2 December, we led these clearing forces in, but did so 
by guiding them around the Nimr areas so that they could begin clearing 
operations in the town of Hai al Bekr (the local name for the town directly 
opposite Hit across the Euphrates). !e 13th MEU, fresh from al Qaim where 
(ghting had been house to house in some areas, took no chances. AQI had 
booby trapped some houses near al Qaim with IEDs and dug (ghting posi-
tions into others. !e MEU ordered residents to vacate their homes and to 
leave their doors open to facilitate the Marines’ clearing e"orts. Marines 
escorted citizens to holding areas until the town was cleared. 
William convinced Sheikh Kasam that it was only thanks to the ODA’s in'u-
ence that the Marines (nally reopened the bridge. We also told Sheikh Kasam 
the truth—that it was the ODA that determined that the MEU’s clearing 
operations would begin in Hai al Bekr, and that only his tribe’s friendly rela-
tions with us had spared the Nimr the inconvenience of being turned out of 
their homes. We designed the operation this way to deepen the trust between 
the ODA and the Nimr, as well as to communicate to the surrounding com-
munities that it was best to work with us and the coalition, and through their 
Desert Protectors. 
!e 30 Nimr DPs returned from their training in Fallujah a week before 
the 13th MEU’s operation to clear Hai al Bekr and reopen the bridge. All of 
the DPs knew William from his OIF II rotation; he had instant rapport with 
them, and it didn’t take long for the rest of the ODA to want to train and 
advise the DPs. 
William and I made every e"ort to use our in'uence to tie the Nimr to the 
national government in as many ways as possible. As William noted, the 
more we could do to align the Nimr with the government, the more fruitful 
our counterinsurgency e"orts would be. In this regard, we spent our last two 
months in Iraq pursuing three di"erent lines of approach.
First, we began soliciting Sheikh Kasam, Kasam’s in'uential family members, 











the Sunni community, aware that boycotting the January 2005 elections had 
been a grave misstep, and encouraged by the Association of Muslim Scholars 
and by Sunni nationalists, were enthusiastic to vote. Also, with the bridge 
open and the 22nd MEU providing security, the residents of Hit district 
felt much more secure going to the polls.23 Sheikh Kasam’s cousin, Hasan, 
arranged a convoy of approximately 20 vans at William’s behest to ferry 
rural Nimr voters to the Hit bridge so that they could walk across and vote. 
ODA 545 and the DPs provided security at the loading point in al Phurat and 
escorted numerous convoys carrying approximately 1,500 voters to Hit. 
Second, we attempted to capitalize on the popular goodwill that surged in 
the wake of the Nimr–DP connection, the enhanced security environment 
established by the MEUs, and Sunni participation in the 15 December elec-
tions. !e DPs were our information operations. !ey let it be known that they 
helped the ODA guide the 13th MEU around—instead of through—their home 
villages, which built instant credibility for the DP program and highlighted the 
bene(ts of working with the coalition and the Iraqi government. 
It was our intent that the Nimr community see the DPs acting unilaterally—
which they did. For instance, the night before the elections, the DPs engaged 
in a (re(ght with insurgents trying to make their way across the river from 
Mohammedi into al Phurat. In the eyes of the local Nimr, the Desert Protec-
tors lived up to their name. Together, all of this resulted in an outpouring of 
public support. In the weeks following the election, hundreds of young Nimr 
men clamoring to be DPs besieged the ODA whenever we went to al Phurat.24 
William negotiated intensely with Sheikh Kasam, his uncle Sheikh Anis, 
Sheikh Bizea, and others to (nd ways to channel the post-election goodwill. 
For instance, the Nimr and other tribes wanted to form an Army division 
consisting solely of Sunnis (and preferably of Anbaris) to operate in al Anbar. 
Sheikhs Kasam and Bizea reported to us that they, and a coalition of other 
sheikhs, approached the Iraqi government through Saadoun al-Dulaimi 
(spelled Sadun Dulaymi in William Knarr’s article), the Minister of Defense, 
on this matter. We all recognized, however, that the government would 
probably not be able to address local desires in a su*ciently timely manner. 
Consequently, we requested a mobile recruiting team, the same kind of team 
the Ministry of Defense had dispatched to al Phurat to recruit the Desert 
Protectors. !is time, however, no mobile recruiting team arrived. Worse, the 
sheikhs’ prediction that it was too dangerous for Nimr from al Phurat to travel 
to recruitment centers in Ramadi proved true when nine Nimr were killed on 
5 January 2006 during IP recruitment at the glass factory in Ramadi.25 
End of the Tour
William predicted that, given our election success, we would see increased 
threats, violence, and intimidation inspired by AQI and directed towards Iraqis 
working with us. One of the DPs who lived on the outer edges of Tal Aswad 
along a tribal border area quit because unknown insurgents, coming from 
outside the tribal area, threatened his family. Several night letters listing names 
of some of the DPs surfaced in Tal Aswad. Despite these threats, and despite 
being unpaid for the months of December and January, the DPs continued 












within the Ministry of Defense, or simply broke down thanks to ineptness 
and ine*ciency. 
Both the Nimr and the Mahal DP programs in al Qaim routinely su"ered 
from pay problems. Even so, in both locations, most DPs continued to serve 
with distinction. We did what we could, within our means, to help support 
our DPs. !e DPs, in turn, never publicly let on that they were not being paid. 
Several of the DPs approached William and explained that they had unani-
mously decided to not reveal the problem or other frustrations because they 
would have been ridiculed for working with coalition forces. !e DPs also 
indicated that their actions were guided by wanting to preserve the unit. !ey 
were proud to be Desert Protectors.26
William was the (rst to notice and comment on another trend that we 
believed signaled success in our e"orts to undermine AQI. Increased com-
munity support from the Nimr, and increased cooperation with the Gaaouds’ 
leaders during the months of December 2005 and January 2006, corresponded 
with increased negative reporting about certain individuals working with 
us. We had no doubt that some of the identi(ed individuals had direct links 
to segments of the resistance, and possibly indirect links to AQI through 
past associations, but that was the very reason we worked with them. Other 
individuals were simply our patrons among the Nimr who were indispensable 
to our tribal engagement activities. Our association with all of these indi-
viduals was by design. !e spikes in negative reporting against some of them 
seemed to indicate that AQI was waging a counterintelligence e"ort aimed at 
derailing our tribal engagement activities.
!e enemy was well aware of coalition forces’ practice of using informants. 
It is naïve to think that by late 2005 coalition information-gathering net-
works were intact and had not been compromised. Whether accusations were 
legitimate or not, we were often forced to redirect time and energy to protect 
some of our people from coalition targeting in response to the reports against 
them. We had to do this both to protect our sources of information and, even 
more important, to preserve our relationship with the tribe. !ough these 
events created headaches, they were, in accordance with William’s assessment, 
indicators that we had successfully targeted AQI’s CSS system and disrupted its 
operations.
!e last positive thing to come out of our deployment was the sanctioning 
of the Zuwayyah police department. We made a determined e"ort to get an 
unpaid police force that the Nimr maintained in Zuwayyah sanctioned by 
the government. !ere were multiple reasons we sought to do this. First was 
the simple fact that police, because of their relations with the locals, were the 
most appropriate force for conducting counterinsurgency, as opposed to the 
army. Second was to provide jobs. !e police were an economical way to 
tie a segment of the Nimr to the local, regional, and national governments. 
!ird, a tribally homogenous police force, if carefully developed, would be 
resistant to insurgent intimidation and in(ltration. At the time, we strongly 
believed that any attempt to recruit police in Hit, or any other location in 
Hit district, would fail. Lastly, a local police force would have legitimacy in 
the eyes of local communities, whereas the predominantly Shi’a Iraqi Army 










!e Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) was a subordinate 
command of the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq 
(MNSTC-I). CPATT was responsible for the development of civil police forces 
within Iraq, and we learned that the CPATT was going to open two new police 
departments in al Anbar. !ese would be the only departments outside of the 
coalition’s heavy concentrations of forces in Ramadi and al Qaim. My team’s 
warrant o*cer, Chief Pitt, formed a valuable relationship with the regional 
International Police Liaison O*cers’ (IPLO) o*ce in al Asad. !e IPLOs were 
policemen contracted by the U.S. State Department to work with CPATT. 
Chief Pitt identi(ed the IPLO administrator responsible for assessing prospec-
tive locations for the two new police departments and invited him to our 
teamhouse. We escorted the o*cer to Zuwayyah to observe ongoing security 
e"orts and to meet some of the sheikhs. Our e"orts resulted in al Zuwayyah 
being nominated as one of the two new departments in al Anbar. !is was 
good news because it ensured that the coalition forces, along with the ODA re-
placing us (ODA 182), would have to commit time and resources to Zuwayyah, 
al Phurat, and the Nimr, thus locking them into furthering William’s model 
city concept and diverting them from wasting all their resources on pursuing a 
losing strategy in Hit. 
Robert’s War27
Robert had 12 consecutive years serving in 2nd Battalion, 5th Special Forces 
Group, when he replaced William, who retired shortly after OIF III. Robert 
had not only visited every country within CENTCOM’s area of responsibility, 
but spoke excellent Arabic and had an unusually good sense of the Iraqi 
people.28 In fact, ODA 545 members often joked that he could “out-Iraqi” an 
Iraqi. He most likely acquired this ability during his previous three tours. 
Robert had spent much of OIF II and III conducting intelligence-gathering 
activities, which required him to live and work with a small group of trusted 
Iraqis. Both the battalion commander and the battalion operations o*cer, 
the same two individuals who had such high con(dence in William, speci(-
cally picked Robert to be William’s replacement as the team sergeant of 
ODA 545.
First impressions could suggest that Robert was William’s diametric opposite. 
William has a direct, in-your-face quality about him, whereas Robert is 
much more subtle. William taught the young guys on the team by example; 
Robert’s approach was more Socratic. William was brusque, confrontational, 
and always shot straight to the heart of an issue. He could instantly assess a 
situation, discard all irrelevant information, and then de(ne the problem and 
its solution in simple, irrefutable terms. Like William, Robert had a “third 
eye” that enabled him to mentally strip away the nonessentials and e"ectively 
solve problems, but their approaches with people were considerably di"erent. 
Rather than present people with an irrefutable answer, Robert would instead 
lead them in conversations, manipulating their own arguments and logic to 
help them arrive at conclusions he had already formed. In short, Robert was a 
master of “mental jujitsu.”
OIF IV
ODA 545 returned to Hit in August 2006 for our OIF IV rotation. Much to 












Army battalion, 1–36 Infantry—had continued to work with the al Zuwayyah 
police.29 When we left Iraq in January 2006, we had only a promise that 
CPATT would commit resources and IPLOs to open the Zuwayyah IP station. 
CPATT had not only ful(lled that promise, sanctioning the Zuwayyah IPs and 
providing the authorization and resources to activate the station, but ODA 182 
took ownership of the 'edgling force and acted as the Police Transition Team 
(PTT) until an o*cial PTT arrived to take 182’s place. !is coincided with our 
arrival.
PTTs were the police version of Military Transition Teams, or MiTTs. MiTTs 
consisted of 12–15 soldiers or Marines assigned to advise Iraqi Army units. 
PTTs did the same, but with the police. One di"erence was that PTTs usu-
ally worked with civilian counterparts. !ese civilians were law enforcement 
professionals from the United States working under contract for the State De-
partment’s IPLO program. !ey provided necessary real-world expertise about 
how to develop and run functioning police departments. Unfortunately, the 
relationship between MiTTs, PTTs, the Iraqi security units, and conventional 
forces was convoluted and bears explaining.
1–36 was the battlespace owner for Hit district. !is meant that 1–36 was 
responsible for managing all aspects of the war within that battlespace. Units 
such as ODAs 182 and 545, or Marine Force Recon, who were outside entities, 
were required to coordinate their activities in the battlespace with 1–36. 
This arrangement existed to harmonize units’ activities, synergize e"orts, and 
prevent fratricide. 1–36 was also responsible for supporting and partnering 
with Iraqi security forces operating within its AO, whether these were Iraqi 
Army (IA) or Iraqi Police—which is where it gets interesting. !e MiTTs and 
PTTs belonged to separate chains of command within MNSTC-I, which is who 
they reported to and took orders from. !e MiTTs and PTTs were responsible 
for coordinating their activities with 1–36, however, because 1–36 was respon-
sible for the Iraqi security forces as their coalition partners.
ODA 182 did well getting the al Phurat IPs started, but it was 1–36 that ag-
gressively expanded the IP program. 1–36 opened an IP station in Tal Aswad, 
another in Hai al Bekr, and a third in Kubaysa. 1–36 followed William’s tribal 
model for recruitment, using the Albu Nimr, and established stations in 
coalition-friendly tribal areas.30 Kubaysa was the weird exception.
Kubaysa is a small town that sits alone in the desert, about 20 kilometers 
west of Hit. It was long considered an insurgent haven but, unlike Hit, it 
wasn’t very violent. William and I intentionally neglected Kubaysa during OIF 
III because the people weren’t very friendly and we did not have adequate 
contacts through whom to facilitate building a meaningful relationship. !e 
IPs in Kubaysa were far less reliable than the Nimr IPs, but 1–36, like William, 
wanted to do everything possible to isolate Hit.
!e situation in Hit was grim. Parts of what had once been a small teeming 
city along the Euphrates were devastated. !e following passage, taken from 
a letter by Captain Robert Secher, a Marine advisor to the IA, paints the 
picture:
Hit is a lawless town with most of the (ght in the north (the insur-












high speeds thru the town (speed is the best defense against IEDs) 
you could clearly see the look on [sic] the eyes of the people: sick 
and tired. First, a generation of Saddam, now insurgents and 
occupiers. Everyone makes promises and no one keeps them.31
Captain Secher was killed by a sniper on 8 October 2006, while patrolling 
in Hit.
Route Mavericks was the main thoroughfare from the highway, known as 
Route Bronze, through the northern part of the city and across the Hit Bridge 
to Hai al Bekr village. Route Mavericks was anchored on one end at Tra*c 
Circle 1 (where it intersected Highway 12, a.k.a. Route Bronze) by a perma-
nent, company-size combat outpost, Firm Base 1. Mavericks was anchored on 
the other end, at the bridgehead, by a small combat outpost, COP 3, whose job 
it was to protect the approach to and from the bridge. !e road itself, once 
made of asphalt, was ground to dust by tracked vehicles and was constantly 
'ooded, creating sewage-(lled goo sometimes three feet deep. Insurgents 
repeatedly opened or blew up water mains to keep the street 'ooded in order 
to conceal IEDs and landmines. 
When we arrived in August 2006, convoys moving down Mavericks had to be 
escorted by armor because of the ever-present threat of attack or IEDs. Armor 
provided not only (repower to deter any attacks but also thermal imaging 
devices useful in detecting IEDs. All of the buildings and shops along Route 
Mavericks and the riverfront near COP 3 were abandoned, most of them 
damaged by (ghting, and some destroyed. !ese areas had once comprised 
the main commercial center of the city. As William knew it would, Hit 
represented an insu*cient counterinsurgency e"ort that ended in violence, 
destruction, and death, all reinforcing an image of strength for the insurgency 
and weakness for the coalition. To be fair, 1–36 did not create the situation so 
much as inherit it. Five di"erent units had been responsible for the Hit area of 
operations in just the six months prior to 1–36’s arrival.
However, things were bad not only in Hit. !e situation appeared bleak 
all across al Anbar. !e MEF G-2 released a now-famous intelligence report 
the month we arrived that declared the province lost to the insurgency. !e 


















headquarters at Camp Hit did not neces-
sarily echo or share this assessment. But it 
was evident to us by their demeanors that 
the situation in the AO wasn’t good, and 
that they were tired.
Like William, Robert had spent many 
nights before the tour mulling over the 
situation we would likely face in Hit. 
William had shared all of his thoughts 
and theories with Robert, and Robert 
conducted his own extensive preparation, 
studying reports about the individuals and 
personalities we would be dealing with 
and strategizing how best to counter the 
insurgents’ e"orts in Hit.
!is road (Figure 6) had been paved prior 
to our OIF IV tour. It was reduced to mud 
and rubble by the constant passage of 
coalition tracked vehicles and exploding 
IEDs. Sometimes the insurgents were 
patient enough to slowly drag land mines 
into place utilizing string or twine in 
order to avoid being identi(ed.
Robert’s Spin
Robert used William’s concept of targeting 
AQI’s combat service support. “!ird-
party neutral” was the term he used to 
describe segments of the population that 
were not ideologically committed to the 
insurgency. !ird-party neutrals consisted 
of tribal elites and common people alike 
who remained guarded and were fence 
sitters waiting to commit to the winning 
side—and who made their choices based 
on who seemed most able to ensure their 
survival. 
!e following diagram (Figure 7) is my attempt to graphically depict Robert’s 
thoughts and ideas at the time. Robert used this diagram to brief our bat-
talion commander about our concept for counterinsurgency in July 2006, 
prior to our August deployment.
Robert explained the diagram this way: 
Our bottom line is to in'uence the third-party neutral, the 
fence sitters. We believe, based on experience and conversations 
with Iraqis during the last tour, that the third-party neutral 
makes up the majority of the population, even in Anbar. We 
have to somehow mobilize these people to support our goals.
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Notice the bullet at the bottom center of the slide. It begins with 
the phrase, “…the destruction in a given area of the insurgent 
forces and their political organization…” Destruction isn’t neces-
sarily kinetic; it is by any means possible. Some insurgents will 
have to be killed, but most others have to be brought to the table. 
We have to redirect their energies towards something useful for 
us. A lot of these guys have legitimate grievances that we need to 
let them air out. If we do this and sway the third-party neutral, 
then we can isolate the irreconcilables. !e Iraqis will do it for us.
!e (rst row depicts the assets available to us. We have indigenous 
assets such as the di"erent security forces and our informants. !e 
diamond in the center represents an o*ce that doesn’t yet exist. 
It doesn’t really have a real name yet. OBC stands for “O*ce of 
Bitches and Complaints.” !is is an idea we have, to provide an 
opportunity for the reconcilables to address their grievances. 
In an ideal world, we get them to use litigation to pursue their goals 
as a peaceful process of contesting the government. But Iraq isn’t 
there yet. Instead, we want to open a local o*ce where people can 
formally declare their grievances and engage in an open dialogue. 
Realistically, this will start with us, the ODA, spending hours at 
a time sitting in the diwaniya [meeting house] hearing out the 
sheikhs and other mouthpieces for the insurgency. But eventually, 
we’d like to formalize the process. !e remaining third of the row 
depicts the assets available to us through the coalition.
!e second row depicts our ways or methods of engaging the popu-
lation. Simple and straightforward. We want to maximize use of 
all available ways. !e 
tribes named below 
are the tribes that we 
initially plan on en-
gaging, but, of course, 
as opportunities arise 
we will branch out to 
other tribes.
!e third row depicts 
our physical target en-
vironment, the towns 
and villages where 
these tribes predomi-
nantly live.
The bottom row re-
quires explanation. 
Gaining the support 
of the population, 
isolating insurgents, 
and killing the really 


























A COIN victory is the destruction in a given area of 
the insurgent forces and their political organization 
plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the 
population, an isolation not enforced upon the 



































unfold in a neat, linear way. It’s going to occur at di"erent times 
in di"erent places. Some populations, like the Nimr, will be an 
easier sell than other populations. !ese four circles represent 
some abstract goals that we seek to achieve that are both a part of 
the process and indicators that we are succeeding.
Gray Ghost refers to John Mosby.32 Mosby did his best to accord 
himself with honor. He built a tremendous reputation in the [U.S.] 
South, and when Union soldiers came looking for Mosby, he and 
his men just blended in among the people. No one turned them 
in. People respected him, but they also feared him because he was a 
man of action, a characteristic inseparable from his sense of honor. 
How does this translate to us? We will be like the Gray Ghost. We 
will treat people fairly and honestly. We want Iraqis everywhere, 
even in the most virulent anti-coalition communities, to know 
us, and to say, “You know what, I hate Americans, but those 
guys have always been fair and honest with us.” We want friendly 
communities to openly support us, and we want fence sitters to 
come to our side. However, it must be clear to all that we are 
men of action. We will resort to violence and kill people when 
the situation calls for it. We are dangerous.
Fort Apache.33 !ere may be places where we need to force the 
insurgents’ hand. We do this by establishing a security presence. 
We do it ourselves, in partnership with ISF, or through tribal sur-
rogates, but we emplace ourselves where it disrupts the insurgents. 
!ey now have to factor us into their calculations. No matter how 
bad it gets, if we do this, we have to stick it out. We stay, we win. 
If we leave, the insurgents win.
Samurai. We’ll do this through ISF, the tribes, or both. !e bottom 
line: We want Iraqis to start helping themselves and taking the 
(ght to AQI and other irreconcilables on their own. We are going 
to make our own samurai who do this. 
Waterloo. We want to create conditions and shape the battle(eld 
so that we cannot be defeated. We want to bring the reconcilables 
to our side and isolate the remainder of the insurgency so it can 
be defeated.34 
Probably the most important thing that Robert did, or did not do, was to 
not reject William’s ideas. Robert recognized the validity of William’s ideas, 
especially William’s model city approach. Robert also recognized that in spite 
of the “badness” all around al Phurat and Hai al Bekr, all the “goodness” in 
those areas could be attributed to consistency of e"ort over several years. 
Robert’s concepts weren’t new, nor did they change anything. Instead, they re-
'ected his way of relating to the situation and continuing the general scheme 
that William had outlined in 2004: We would continue utilizing tribal 
engagement to create secure and stable communities that could be expanded 














Some commanders are so caught up in what they are doing that 
they cannot see the situation for what it is. !ey rely on whatever 
they’ve been trained. !ey forget what makes them a human being 
and how they do everything else in their life. !ey don’t think 
problems through.
Enemy: 
AQI thought the Sunni population was ripe for exploiting against 
the Americans. !ey took them for granted and began violating or 
disregarding tribal and social norms and traditions, like in'uencing 
the young people against the sheikhs.
AQI didn’t believe creating chaos would bring the people to them, 
but creating chaos for the Americans, by hitting the Americans, 
they were bringing the people to them.
Robert is fond of reminding people that in the Army’s (ve-paragraph opera-
tions order, “situation” precedes “mission.” In Robert’s view, too many units 
determined a course of action, or mission statement, without fully grasping or 
understanding their situation or the operational environment, and, worse still, 
continued to execute the mission statement with complete disregard for the 
situation.
Robert did not presume that he or anyone on ODA 545 fully understood the 
situation in Hit district even though the team had operated there just six 
months prior, with many team members on their third and fourth tours in 
Iraq. Under Robert’s guidance, we therefore spent the (rst month reorienting. 
We drove all over the AO. Robert wanted to see every part of it and meet 
with and get a sense of the locals in each area. Robert and I spent hours 
reacquainting ourselves with the Nimr; talking to and getting advice from 
1–36’s commander, operations o*cer, and sta"; and observing 1–36’s activities. 
When we weren’t doing this, Robert and I dug through past reporting and 
made our team do the same.
Our honest appraisal of the situation was that the insurgents were winning in 
Hit. Coalition forces maintained a base of support in the Nimr tribal area of 
al Phurat, but everywhere else things were bad. 1–36 ended its tour with 24 
soldiers killed in action and a great many more wounded, not counting ISF or 
civilian casualties.35 1–36 was losing M1A1 Abrams and M2 Bradley Fighting 
Vehicles to huge IEDs. Civilians who cooperated with or provided information 
to coalition forces were killed. !e sniper threat was so dangerous that after 
Captain Secher was killed, 1–36 and the IA stopped conducting cordon and 
searches in daylight. 
When an insurgent sniper killed an American, an ISF member, or any Iraqi 
cooperating with the Americans, reporting often attributed it to insurgents’ 
intimidation e"orts or random violence directed against coalition and Iraqi 
forces. Robert’s assessment was that the insurgency had reached a point where 
insurgents were committing violent acts against the coalition not by design, 












engage Hit’s civic leaders. It was obvious to him that the insurgency owned 
Hit’s civic leaders. He questioned, why, after years of making no progress in 
Hit, coalition forces thought they should keep working with the same civic 
leaders. In Robert’s estimation, coalition forces were empowering the very 
people who had already been (ghting them far too long.
Robert’s most direct criticism of 1–36 was that the commander did not divide 
the insurgents into those who were reconcilable and those who were irrecon-
cilable. !e 1–36 commander’s failure to do so led him to continue talking 
with entities who were reportedly, and in some cases known to be, irrecon-
cilables like Sheikh Yassin who was consistently alleged to have Sala(st ties to 
Ansar al-Sunna.36 As Robert said, “You can’t be friends with everyone; that’s 
not how you win counterinsurgency.” 
In our experience, coalition commanders were too unwilling to cast unfa-
vorable characters aside, to treat irreconcilables as obstacles, or to bypass 
hard-core insurgent communities. We would run into this reluctance when 
we tried to cut the insurgent-controlled Hit city council out of the picture. 
Robert called people with such in'exible attitudes “Ameri-can’ts”; in Robert-
speak, there was nothing worse than being an Ameri-can’t.
In August 2006, the insurgency was de(nitely stronger than the counterin-
surgency in Hit. !e enemy owned the city and the city council. !e enemy 
owned the roads. Insurgents took away the coalition’s freedom of maneuver 
in town through the use of snipers and IEDs. And, thanks to IEDs, the enemy 
also took away the coalition’s freedom of maneuver on all the major lines of 
communication. !e police were not being properly funded and resourced by 
the Iraqi government. And the IA battalion in Hit was vastly under-strength.
Execution
I will tell Robert’s story within the framework of these three lines of operation, 
but it is necessary to bear in mind that the tour unfolded in a non-linear, 
sometimes circular manner as we navigated towards our end state.
So, what was our end state? Truth be told, William had always had a mental 
picture of something exactly like the Awakening happening. I can say this 
because I, along with everyone else on his teams, listened to him describe this 
during the latter half of 2004 and through all of 2005. It didn’t take much for 
William to transmit this same vision to Robert. For almost two years, we all 
thought in Awakening-like terms. We had come to believe in this even before 
we deployed for OIF III, after hearing William constantly preach it. It was 
this belief that helped us stay the course during OIF III. We put out of our 
minds the idea that we were in Iraq to chalk up statistics: raids conducted, 
enemy killed or captured, and so forth. Our goal was to facilitate a tribal 
awakening against the violent jihadists. If we didn’t fully accomplish this on 
that trip, then so be it. We would come back and try again, picking up where 
we left o". 
Getting into Their Decision Cycle
Get into their decision cycles by !nding places where you can make 
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from there. You don’t know exactly where you are going to maneuver 
to, but you know towards what. Keep doing this to maintain forward 
motion and stay ahead of the enemy. Disrupt them. Don’t develop 
such a grand plan that you constrain yourself. Free 'ow. Be like water. 
Maintain contact constantly and stay in their decision cycle. Make 
them react.37 
Robert already possessed his own version of William’s vision. One can see it 
outlined in Robert’s operational concepts, which we articulated when brie(ng 
our concept for the deployment. !ere were persons present at the brie(ng 
who thought we were being overly optimistic. But what they failed to under-
stand was that we weren’t being optimistic. Rather, based on our accumu-
lated experiences on the ground we recognized what was possible in al Anbar. 
Ironically, our conviction—that the situation in Anbar was recoverable—put 
us in good stead with RCT 7’s leaders when we met them for the (rst time. 
!e RCT 7 chain of command was tired of hearing bad news and pessimistic 
assessments.38
Very early on, Robert decided that William had initiated an appropriate 
course of action in bypassing Hit. Frustrated that coalition forces continued 
to engage the Hit city council and Sheikh Yassin, the local religious (gure 
with known ties to the violent jihadist group Ansar al-Sunna, we decided to 
cut the Hit city council out of the picture by no longer empowering them.39 
We also decided that Hasan, Sheikh Kasam’s cousin, should be mayor. He 
was not only close to us, but was intelligent, had the right political, business, 
and other connections, and also had the Nimr behind him. Hasan was not 
eager to (ll this role, however. Robert thus found himself spending countless 
hours with him and with his father Anis, talking, listening, and applying his 
mental jujitsu to shape their thoughts. Over time, both Hasan and Anis came 
to accept that Hasan was the best choice for mayor. Over time, too, Robert 
developed a close enough personal relationship with Hasan that Hasan prob-
ably would have honored Robert’s request no matter what. 
Once we had selected a mayor, we then had to (nd a legitimate way to put 
him in position. Our worry wasn’t that he would be rejected by the Iraqis, 
but that coalition forces would not accept his appointment. Over so many 
tours, no one bothered to question the legitimacy of those professing to be 
mayors or city council members and, in any event, it was virtually impossible 
to ascertain who had been what before the invasion. Yet, when we 'oated 
our idea of making Hasan mayor to coalition forces, they sco"ed. What we 
next did exempli(ed how we operated throughout our deployment. When we 
met an obstacle, we went around it. If there was something that we could not 
directly e"ect, we e"ected it through the Iraqis.
We made Hasan mayor by convening a council of sheikhs who were friendly 
to us and by encouraging them to establish a new mayor and city council, one 
that we could work with. And they did. Twenty-seven sheikhs and muktars 
nominated Hasan to be mayor and signed a declaration con(rming their 
decision. Coalition forces, particularly RCT 7 and 1–36, were slow to accept 
this change of representation, as we suspected they would be. However, after 
we persistently referred to Hasan as mayor at every opportunity and in every 












coordinating with the provincial government in Ramadi, coalition forces 
accepted Hasan as mayor. 
Zahid, a Nimr from the Shamal clan, had been hired as the district police 
chief during ODA 182’s tenure. Zahid was to become a vital, yet problematic 
(gure for us. Zahid hated the al Gaaouds. He claimed he hated them for their 
illicit relations with al Qaeda and other insurgents, but this was most likely 
exaggerated. We were told by older members of the tribe that the Shamal 
clan had once been a principal Nimr family, more important even than the 
Gaaouds, but that fortunes had changed and the Gaaouds supplanted them. 
Apparently this happened at least a century ago. But whatever the reason for 
Zahid’s enmity toward the Gaaouds, it constituted both his greatest weakness 
and his greatest strength. His desire to undermine the Gaaouds, combined 
with his desire to avenge the death of his eldest son at the hands of AQI, gave 
him the necessary willpower and fortitude to be a proactive police chief. 
!e intra-tribal rivalry this in turn spurred was di*cult to manage at times, 
especially since Hasan was an al Gaaoud. It wasn’t our design to have the two 
most powerful o*ces in Hit split between bickering clans, but we worked 
with what we had. Ironically, the overall situation ended up lending the ODA 
more leverage over both clans than it would have had otherwise.
Current doctrine, as per FM 3-24, recommends that forces be used to secure 
an area, facilitating the “clear, hold, build” approach, and that deterrent 
patrols be utilized to keep the enemy o" balance, disrupt enemy attempts to 
dislodge counterinsurgent forces, and reassure the population.40 “Clear, hold, 
and build” and subsequent deterrent patrols were not options available to us. 
We did not own battlespace or forces. It did not seem likely that coalition 
forces would be able to conduct adequate “clear, hold, and build” operations 
in Hit given the lack of resources and troops available, coupled with estab-
lished commitments to protect infrastructure, the IPs, and such. We instead 
guided our operations around these constraints, maintaining the model city 
approach. 
To continue to build situational awareness and to begin pressuring insurgents 
who were hiding and operating in rural areas, we began conducting combat 
patrols with the IA Scouts (formerly the DPs). Conventional forces often 
patrolled the roads, but we patrolled by dismounting, which enabled us to 
prowl around, talk with locals, and thoroughly investigate areas. Our patrols 
served several purposes. One was to initiate Robert’s Gray Ghost concept. We 
consistently strove to project the image that we were good, decent people, 
although a bit mischievous; we were not scared of anything; and we wanted 
to underscore that we believed in people. We also sought to emphasize our 
solidarity with the DPs. We integrated them into our guntruck crews and all 
aspects of our patrols. !e intent was to plant seeds in people’s minds that 
would make them more amenable to us as we strove to shift the balance with 
the insurgents.
Another calculated aspect of our patrols was to demonstrate strength. Our 
early patrols led to several direct-(re engagements and attempted IED strikes. 
!e combined ODA/DP force aggressively counterattacked or pursued our 
attackers and, in each instance, the insurgents 'ed, often abandoning vehicles 












conducted battle(eld recovery, taking weapons and ammunition left behind, 
and giving them to the police. Cars and other materials we destroyed. 
As these patrols continued, we also visited Colonel Sha’ban of the al Obeidi 
tribe, who was the police chief in Baghdadi. We wanted to establish a relation-
ship with Sha’ban because he and his police embodied our Fort Apache con-
cept, and because we hoped eventually to harmonize his e"orts with ours in 
Hit. Colonel Sha’ban and his police did not control Baghdadi. !ey lived in a 
stronghold of their own making at a military housing complex that formerly 
served the al Asad Airbase under Saddam Hussein. Insurgents nevertheless 
feared Colonel Sha’ban’s in'uence and targeted his police and their families 
for kidnapping or murder whenever they left the compound. !us, it only 
made sense for us to address Sha’ban’s immediate needs. 
At the time, insurgent bandits were operating illegal checkpoints on Route 
Bronze between Hit and Baghdadi. !e insurgents shook people down, 
stole goods and money, and also killed known coalition sympathizers—such 
as family members of Sha’ban’s IPs. Coalition forces never could catch the 
insurgents at their checkpoints because the insurgents established e"ective 
early warning nets. !ey would depart the area as soon as coalition vehicles 
were reported coming down the highway. We told Sha’ban that we could do 
something about this. We also conducted a three-day medical civic action 
program for Sha’ban’s community and ad hoc training for his IPs.
Sha’ban sent four of his most street-savvy IPs back to Hit to stay with us for 
a week. During this time ODA 545, Sha’ban’s IPs, and the Desert Protectors 
conducted numerous combat patrols in civilian vehicles to penetrate the 
insurgents’ early warning net. !e IPs and DPs shot up several checkpoints 
this way. !at stopped the insurgents for a period, but we had to be careful 
because we couldn’t keep replicating our Trojan horse tactic. 
Sha’ban’s IPs were some of the most situationally aware Iraqis we worked 
with. We took them on several other patrols. On one night patrol, one of 
our vehicles broke down. While we were repairing it, two men rode up on 
motorcycles with their headlights o", unaware we were there. Sha’ban’s IPs 
immediately identi(ed them as insurgents on the Marines’ target list. Sha’ban 
continued to help us throughout the tour. 
We likewise partnered with 1–36 and General Zahid to conduct larger clearing 
operations. Understandably, clearing operations have negative connotations 
in the COIN lexicon because they are associated with attrition-based strategies, 
but we found them useful when incorporated with our model city approach. 
Communities that both actively supported reinstatement of the IPs and 
suppressed violence were exempt. Clearing operations conducted at night, 
coupled with our daytime combat patrols, a"orded the insurgents little rest. 
!e e"ort that insurgents had to expend on early warning and continual 
relocation was e"ort that they could not devote to targeting coalition forces, 
ISF, or friendly populations. What we didn’t do was what Robert called 
“Cop Rock.” We didn’t raid for the sake of amassing statistics of enemy 














It’s about navigating people. Most guys forget that and ignore the 
human aspects that in'uence the plan. "ey try to concretely execute 
planning concepts regardless of what the will of the people involved 
is. You have to change their will or adjust to it.
We treated each area and the people in it di"erently, yet consistently. We were 
always considerate, spoke Arabic, and were thorough without being culturally 
invasive, even when using coercive methods. We did everything in conjunc-
tion with local Iraqis. Robert stayed consistent throughout the entire tour. He 
adhered to a speci(c set of talking points and made sure the team abided by 
them as well. He always told people that the situation in al Anbar was going 
to get better. Robert’s intent was to plant mental seeds so that once conditions 
did improve, continued improvement would become a self-ful(lling prophecy 
as people turned out to assist the coalition and ISF. 
!e only group Robert condemned was AQI. He did not condemn the resis-
tance, but he did oppose its use of violence. In keeping with the idea of an 
O*ce of Bitches and Complaints, Robert publicized our willingness to talk 
with members of the resistance at any time to hear their grievances, as well 
as forgive anyone willing to denounce continued participation in insurgent 
activity, so long as they did so in the presence of their local sheikh or imam. 
Even if we couldn’t prove it, we knew that many of the sheikhs and police we 
talked to were direct or indirect conduits to national resistance groups like the 
1920th Revolutionary Brigade. Robert crafted the following talking points not 
only to sway third-party neutral segments toward our side but to engage the 
resistance:
  !e situation will improve.
  AQI is out to destroy your way of life.
  More can be gained from political participation than violent 
contention.
  !e insurgency against the Iraqi government is strengthening Iran’s 
in'uence in Iraq.
  We are willing to sit down with any representatives of the resistance 
and hear them out.
  Acts of insurgent violence are criminal acts against the Iraqi people.
In time, several older tribal sheikhs and imams began to vent to us. !ey 
lamented the social wreckage that AQI was in'icting on traditional tribal 
society in Anbar. !e older sheikhs voiced concern that they had lost control 
over the younger men in their tribes, especially the young 20-somethings 
and teenagers. Sheikh Anis, for instance, told us that AQI manipulated young 
men by framing insurgent life as romantic and heroic and saying jihad would 
give meaning to their young lives. Robert instantly saw what was happening. 
Young men, dismayed by the lack of opportunity in their lives and, at a 
more basic level, needing to feel like men, were drawn in by AQI’s overtures. 
AQI was able to ful(ll certain psychological and physical needs in ways the 
sheikhs could not, and thus was unraveling traditional social structures and 
replacing traditional (gures of in'uence: sheikhs, imams, and parents. Robert 
recognized, however, that AQI was over-playing its hand, and this provided us 
with an opportunity. Robert used the sheikhs’ frustration over the erosion of 
their authority to build solidarity with them, and we used AQI’s own framing 
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devices to build internal support for the IPs with the sheikhs’ consent and 
partnership.
!ere was choreography to Robert’s deep discussions with tribal sheikhs and 
other local elites. Robert described this by using a tarot card analogy. He 
would lay out the general situation, then walk his audience through what 
would happen if nothing changed. After doing that, he would next lay out 
the second and third order e"ects and potential outcomes that would result 
from the positive actions and changes that could be undertaken by the person 
he was talking to. His approach combined war-gaming, counseling, listening, 
and honest dialogue. !e dialogue always evolved into a two-way discussion 
of potential issues, complaints, and solutions. In describing his method, 
Robert said, “It came down to a discussion of the future as we saw it together. 
I got them to troubleshoot solutions with me.”
A signi(cant turning point occurred for us around 10–12 October 2006.41 
We struggled to integrate the Nimr DPs into the local IA battalion as its scout 
platoon. Petty jealousies, the DPs’ unique relationship with the ODA, and 
the DPs’ own intransigence created animosity between the DPs and the IA 
battalion commander. !e situation required our constant attention. !e IA 
battalion commander, eager to demonstrate his authority over the DPs, insti-
gated confrontations through unfair treatment of them. !e DPs, in response, 
behaved 'ippantly and threatened to desert. 
At this time, the Marine MiTT  responsible for advising the IA battalion held 
a battalion formation to rehearse a memorial service for Captain Secher, 
the MiTT member who was killed on 9 October. !is formation was struck 
by three incoming mortar rounds, which killed (ve Iraqis, wounded 34, 
and wounded one of the Marine advisors.42 We heard the explosions of the 
incoming rounds from our compound adjacent to the Iraqi camp. Being 
mortared at Camp Hit was a regular occurrence, and we didn’t think anything 
of it until two wounded DPs came staggering into our compound. ODA 
members immediately jumped in trucks and rushed to the impact site in the 
Iraqi camp to begin treating the wounded. !e remaining ODA members went 
to 1–36’s battalion aid station where we knew the wounded would be triaged 
for medevac. Some of the wounded were screaming, and other DPs who were 
not wounded wandered around looking for their comrades. All of the mem-
bers of ODA 545 could speak at least passable Arabic. We helped the battalion 
surgeon and medics by interpreting, by comforting some of the more seriously 
wounded, and by calming the unwounded.43
!e attack happened just as night was falling. Of the 28 Nimr DPs in the 
scout platoon, two were killed and six wounded. Robert and I were quick to 
take control of the two dead Nimrs, so we could deliver them to their families 
for burial. Early the next morning, Robert, the ODA, and I escorted the bodies 
of the fallen Nimr to Tal Aswad, so that their families could bury them before 
sundown in keeping with Islamic tradition. !e surviving Nimr DPs remained 
outraged by the attack. !ey were upset not over the losses per se, but over 
the useless nature of them. Even illiterate farmers and (shermen recognized 
the stupidity of holding a large troop formation in a camp that was regularly 
















We knew word about the casualties would spread quickly, which is one reason 
Robert and I decided to leave the bodies at the Tal Aswad police station and 
ask the police chief, Chief Ghanim, to contact the families and escort them to 
the station to receive their dead. Family and friends quickly descended on the 
police station, openly grieving and railing at coalition and Iraqi forces because 
of the senseless nature of the deaths. !ere was no point in our trying to allay 
their grief. We had brought the surviving DPs with us. We released them on 
leave and made ready to leave Tal Aswad.
Before departing, we traveled to Sheikh Anis’s to pay our respects and person-
ally tell him what had happened before he heard a distorted version. We ex-
pressed our sympathies for the families and acknowledged that we understood 
their frustrations. Most important, we asked for his advice about how to 
handle the situation. Sheikh Anis, in a very grandfatherly manner, counseled 
us. !en, as we prepared to leave, he took me by the arm and whispered, “Do 
not worry. You will soon receive the help that you need.” 
One of our goals all along had been to form a Hit district SWAT using the 
DPs. We had repeatedly requested that RCT 7 work to get the DPs released 
from the Iraqi Army to serve as the foundation for SWAT. We cited the 
persistent poor treatment of the DPs by the IA battalion commander, ex-
plaining that he had alienated the DPs to the point that they would never be 
fully integrated into the predominantly Shi’a battalion. Our requests were 
continually denied. After the mortar attack, however, it was clear that the DPs 
would desert if something wasn’t done. We then tried to get the DPs who did 
quit the army hired into the local IPs. Some went to work as security for the 
al Gaaouds.
In the weeks that followed the attack, we spent more and more time in 
non-kinetic engagement. Robert dedicated hours to listening to and talking 
with sheikhs, with General Zahid, and with others. We often invited 
General Zahid, Hasan, and members of their inner circle to stay the night 
at our teamhouse. !e ODA members spent the evenings entertaining and 
conversing with our guests, always guided by Robert’s talking points. Robert 
also developed speci(c talking points for ODA members when we wanted to 
in'uence our guests in a particular direction. Robert had the endurance for 
marathon talking sessions that far surpassed what anyone else on the team was 
capable of, and would talk long into the night with our guests, without the 
aid of an interpreter.44 
Words nevertheless are meaningless without action. We thus sought to live 
General Mattis’s dictum: “No worse enemy, no better friend.” In terms of 
non-kinetic engagement with the sheikhs, with friendly populations, and with 
third-party neutrals, we, in Robert’s words, “… slowly delivered on everything 
like a girl dating a guy, and wanting to ensure the relationship ends in mar-
riage, not just a one-night stand—slowly.” In other words, we did not promise 
or quickly deliver on large civil a"airs contracts or other signi(cant projects 
because we did not want to reduce our leverage.45 But we also demonstrated 
that we would respond swiftly and decisively when engaged, and would just as 
quickly come to the defense of our Iraqi allies. 
In time, both the Shamal and Gaaoud acted as gateways through which we 











the tribes approached us. Sheikhs from Ramadi to Haditha began to request 
audiences with us, and Robert used these contacts to actualize his Waterloo 
concept—with the goal of facilitating cooperation among the tribes against 
AQI and, in the process, siphoning o" the reconcilable segments of the 
resistance.
We heard about the Awakening in its early days, as it coalesced under the 
banner of Sawar al Anbar (SAA). We followed events in Ramadi through 
reporting but also learned much from our Iraqi friends. In late summer and 
early fall 2006, the coalition believed the Awakening was a localized event 
in Ramadi. We assumed otherwise after noticing indicators that General 
Zahid was connected to "awar al Anbar (TAA), the militant action arm of 
the SAA, Sheikh Sattar’s Awakening movement. Robert handled this develop-
ment in much the same way he did when trying to reach out to the 1920th 
Revolutionary Brigade via certain sheikhs and other intermediaries. No Iraqi, 
save one contact, ever openly acknowledged that he had ties to the resistance. 
Conversations always tap-danced around the issue with insinuations like, “I 
know that you know that I know …” Nonetheless, our prodding did result in 
an invitation to meet with Sattar at his compound in Ramadi, an invitation 
brought to us by Zahid. 
Here is a bit more background about how our non-kinetic engagement 
bore this fruit: By December 2005 we had good rapport with several Nimr 
sheikhs from Barwanna, the Obeidi in Baghdadi, the Albu Soda from Abu 
Tiban and Ramadi, the Mahal, the Albu Risha, and a smattering of other 
tribes. Sheikh Kasam hosted periodic councils at his compound in Zuwayyah 
where we e"ected both the OBC and Waterloo concepts. Leadership from 
RCT 7 (later RCT 2) and the MEF attended several councils. !ese meetings 
were especially important to us because we provided the sheikhs with talking 
points beforehand so that they could engage the Marine leadership in order to 
further our counterinsurgency concepts.46 Several sheikhs, including Sattar on 
one occasion, asked us for advice in dealing with coalition forces. Robert and 
Chief Pitt skillfully used these opportunities, combined with assessments sent 
via our daily situation reports, to in'uence all sides toward common goals.
For example, Sheikh Bizea was one of a number of older sheikhs who had 
sought refuge in Jordan after the invasion. He and his sons, Talal and Jalal, 
along with other expatriate sheikhs and businessmen, maintained an on-again, 
o"-again dialogue with the coalition. Robert believed that Bizea and other 
expatriate sheikhs were maneuvering to stay relevant. Prior to the Awak-
ening, this group maintained power and in'uence from across the border 
and pro(ted from the war by playing all sides: the coalition, the resistance, 
and AQI. Coalition forces helped jeopardize this situation when the Coalition 
Provisional Authority rejected overtures from Bizea and his son Talal in 2004 
to create tribal security forces.47 !e Awakening, which was an emergent 
grassroots movement, threatened to marginalize expatriate sheikhs like Bizea 
as the balance of power and in'uence started to shift to the sheikhs who had 
remained in Iraq, and who now began aligning with the coalition. 
!e complexity of all of these relationships was amazing. Sheikh Bizea 
provided long-distance counsel to Sheikh Kasam, who was a relative, but 
at the same time Bizea sent an envoy to court General Zahid, whose hatred 










through the SAA, but then established a direct link to Sheikh Kasam in ac-
cordance with tribal conventions, and assuaged Kasam’s concerns about Zahid 
by promising to manage Zahid via SAA channels. !e web of interactions and 
duplicity went on and on. What they signi(ed was that even amidst the (ght 
for survival against AQI, there was intense inter- and intra-tribal maneuvering, 
all aimed at control of resources, coalition support, contracts, IPs, etc. 
Unlike many other Americans who would have simply picked a side, Robert 
worked all of them equally. He recognized the value of acting as a central 
node among competing entities. For instance, an astute Army Civil A"airs 
major working for 545’s AOB realized that his team could enjoin the Albu Sadi 
near Baghdadi to support coalition goals if their paramount sheikh, Sheikh 
Rad, so directed them. Unfortunately, Rad was incarcerated at Camp Bucca 
for allegedly participating in the killing of a Nimr man, although he most 
likely was the victim of an intra-tribal power play and had been set up. !e 
AOB recommended his release, which the Marines also supported. 
Even though we were able to substantiate that the charges were very likely 
false, we still had to make sure that the Nimr would be okay with Rad’s 
release. We also needed to make sure Sheikh Rad wouldn’t become hostile 
due to the fact that he had spent approximately two years in con(nement for 
a crime he didn’t commit. To accomplish both, we decided to take control of 
Rad upon his release and sequester him for three days with tribal allies, who 
would follow a prearranged repatriation program designed to bring Rad up to 
date on the status of the Awakening and secure his—and hence his tribe’s—
support. We initially approached Sheikh Sattar with our repatriation idea, 
then told Sheikhs Anis and Kasam that we were going to work through Sattar 
to avoid con'ict with the Nimr. Anis and Kasam responded by promising 
reconciliation between the tribes. !ey then requested the opportunity to 
repatriate Sheikh Rad themselves, which we happily agreed to. 
As mentioned earlier, we were also training and advising the DPs as IA Scouts 
and still sought to create a SWAT. With our goal of creating a local, legitimate 
band of samurai to go after AQI, and with 1–36 wanting the IPs to have a 
direct action capability, the ODA and 1–36 collaborated to create a SWAT 
for the district IPs. !is proved harder to execute than conceptualize. !e 
phenomenal expansion of the Hit district IPs meant that 1–36 and the Marine 
PTT assigned to the IPs could not adequately equip the IPs they were already 
overseeing, let alone provide the necessary tactical gear to out(t the SWAT. 
Consequently, Robert and Chief Pitt solicited support from Hasan al Gaaoud 
and the Gaaoud family, who helped purchase and donate uniforms, plate 
carriers, AK-47 chest rigs, and other items.48 In so doing, the clan publically 
signaled not only their support for local, legitimate security forces, but also 
their opposition to AQI.
We put our newly formed SWAT through a mini-selection and an intensive 
30-day training regimen beginning in October 2006. By December, we had 
two SWAT platoons capable of conducting autonomous operations. On one of 
their (rst forays, the SWAT uncovered an impressive arms cache that included 
two SA-14 man-portable surface-to-air missiles. !e SWAT routinely mobilized 
and conducted autonomous patrols or raids based on walk-in informants, 
such as capturing a Yemeni foreign (ghter transiting the desert routes that 
















Aswad IPs responded by mounting their own aggressive patrols. Led by Chief 
Ghanim, the Tal Aswad IPs captured several insurgents and foreign (ghters 
along these routes and drove others o" in running gun(ghts. 
!e SWAT’s success inspired emulation and jealousy within the rank-and-(le 
IPs. General Zahid, for instance, constantly tried to undermine the SWAT 
because we would not allow SWAT to become his dedicated praetorian guard. 
We conditioned the SWAT to serve the people and not cater to Zahid’s nepo-
tistic wishes. Unfortunately, this would later come back to bite us. 
By December 2006, Robert had realized all of his concepts to some degree. 
!e OBC existed, not formally but in concept, as we routinely held councils 
with sheikhs and other elites. !e Hit SWAT were our samurai, and there was 
evidence that TAA was beginning to actively target AQI in the Hit area, which 
also ful(lled our samurai concept.49 !e Fort Apache model existed in the 
communities that aligned with us, including Barwanna, Baghdadi, Hai al 
Bekr, al Phurat, and Abu Tiban.50 !e Gray Ghost concept was manifest in 
these communities and in areas in between, while the Waterloo plan also was 
beginning to materialize. Several individuals who began to attend our councils 
in Zuwayyah I recognized as having previously been on our target list, and we 
knew that every time we spoke with certain individuals our message would 
be carried to nationalist resistance groups like Mohammed’s Army, the 1920th 
Revolutionary Brigade, certain Ba’athist entities, and others.
We also saw signs that the fruits of Robert’s endeavors were negatively af-
fecting the enemy. AQI tried to disrupt our tribal alliances and target our tribal 
allies. For instance, Robert, Hasan, and I were targeted with an IED after 
leaving a Hit city council meeting; there was an attempted SVBIED strike on 
the Zuwayyah police station; a suicide bomber dressed in a burka attacked the 
IPs at the Hit bridge; and the IPs and their families were targeted for murder 
or kidnapping if they departed our base areas. Additionally, we had indica-
tions that we, along with the emergent Awakening movement, were swaying 
third-party neutrals. !e Albu Soda and other tribes living in Abu Tiban 
established an uno*cial tribal police force to protect their community, but 
respecting the legitimacy of the Hit district IPs, coordinated their actions with 
General Zahid. Perhaps most telling, tribal leaders from areas outside of Hit 
district came to us at various points to seek advice on how to achieve the same 
level of collaboration with coalition forces that we had in Hit district. 
Culmination
We were transparent to the people: “Here is what we believe is good 
and bad. We believe in your way of life.” We always made it clear 
that we worked with people; they did not work for us. We never built 
resentment, and we never made threats that we couldn’t keep.
Despite our progress among the tribes, Hit itself continued to be a cesspool 
of insurgent activity. !e only Iraqi civilian medical facility in the area was 
the Hit hospital, which lay deep in one of the insurgent-controlled neighbor-
hoods. Coalition forces routinely came under (re in that area. Pro-coalition 
civilians could not even contemplate going to the hospital. As a result, several 
people from the pro-coalition communities on the northeast side of the 










care began to weigh heavily on the minds of some of the IPs. In response, 
we worked with a Civil A"airs team to initiate the building of a clinic in al 
Phurat. Although the clinic was not (nished before our tour was completed, 
the psychological e"ect of responding to the immediate needs of our tribal 
allies was extremely positive. 
We bypassed doing anything ourselves in Hit for reasons previously de-
scribed, and because we did not want to be drawn into making Hit a battle-
(eld, which is something that the insurgents sought. However, starting in 
November 2006, we began making routine excursions into the city at night 
with the SWAT. Sometimes we did so based on targeted intelligence. Most 
of our informants had made their (nal break with the insurgency and had 
come over to our side. !rough them, we knew where the families of some 
of the hard-core insurgents lived. We treated these locations, along with 
their safe houses, like (shing holes, visiting them to put more pressure on 
the enemy. We also prowled around to prevent the emplacement of IEDs; 
we reported or cut the wires on IEDs that we found. On one occasion, the 
night before a planned 1–36 daylight operation, we discovered an IED fac-
tory with devices ready to go.
General Zahid also began sending nightly IP patrols through Hit. !e purpose 
of these patrols, besides making it more di*cult for the enemy to rest, was to 
boost the con(dence of the IPs and enhance their sense that they had control 
over the situation, and over the enemy. All of this was critical preparation for 
an eventual showdown and the “reconquest” of Hit.
Robert envisioned an operation in which the IPs, supported by coalition 
forces, would sweep through Hit, drive out AQI, and reclaim permanent 
control of the city. He had planted the idea in Hasan’s and Zahid’s minds very 
early in our tour and routinely revisited the subject, sometimes subtly, other 
times more directly. Robert played upon Zahid’s narcissism, manipulating his 
desire to be a revered public (gure, equal to the sheikhs in stature and respect. 
Hasan, because of his loyalty—or maybe his pragmatism, we will never truly 
know—was easier to work with. 
!e issue of when conditions would permit a successful reconquest was a 
topic of intense debate in the ODA. By November, we had developed su*-
cient contacts with access to the 1920th Revolutionary Brigade and even some 
other fringe elements that we thought we could ensure a successful operation. 
Without these contacts, the enemy owned the information, and without these 
contacts we wouldn’t be able to get the population in Hit to turn on addi-
tional spigots of information for us.
!e (rst break came in November when Zahid asked us to secure the release 
of a man named Ma’mun, who worked for Zahid as an informant and had 
been detained by coalition forces. We obtained Ma’mun’s release, and when 
he subsequently had a falling out with Zahid, he began providing informa-
tion directly to us. Ma’mun came from an established family in Hit and 
was a “former” member of the 1920th Revolutionary Brigade. !e second 
break came when Ma’mun introduced us to an imam whom we called Abu 
Abdullah. Abu Abdullah had extensive knowledge of the insurgency between 
Hit and Baghdadi. He had operated a rural mosque where insurgents rou-











the mosque because both coalition forces and the insurgents were after him. 
Each side suspected him of working for the other. He (nally came to us. !e 
Gaaouds provided Abu Abdullah with sanctuary, and he served as our go-
between with Ma’mun. !is led to an even deeper rift with Zahid, but it could 
not be helped.51
!e last break came when Robert met with a man named Ibrahim Medani. 
Medani was an in'uential sheikh who resided in what is called the Teacher’s 
District of Hit. Robert met Medani in December, while the ODA and SWAT 
were supporting a major 1–36 daylight operation along Cherry Street in Hit. 
We split the ODA into three cells, and each cell teamed up with a SWAT ele-
ment to patrol into the city and cover the 'anks of the main 1–36 e"ort. Since 
Robert was patrolling through Medani’s neighborhood, he decided to drop in 
on him. As Robert remembered:
Sheikh Medani was always portrayed as a sickly old man by the 
1–36 Cdr, but when I met him he was a vibrant, wise, and interest-
ingly intelligent older gentleman. His tribal area was the Teacher’s 
District, nearly a third of the town. It had a large number of 
personnel involved in JTJ [Jamaaat al-Tawhid Waal-Jihad, the 
predecessor to AQI], and that is why they had no problems con-
ducting attacks on Iraqis down by the hospital. It was interesting 
that no big players resided in the area of town by the hospital, but 
all of the carnage occurred there. !e main thing with Medani 
was that innocent people were getting hurt, and it was mainly the 
Americans doing the hurting after being shot [at]. He was the main 
venue for reconciliation prior to Shurta Nasir. Medani cooperated 
by keeping his word and pushing for a 1920th cease(re; he leveled 
the playing (eld for us. He was all grins when I visited him later, 
during Shurta Nasir.
Medani admitted that Robert impressed him by casually sitting with him 
and conversing in Arabic despite having an interpreter present. Medani told 
Robert that he had never met another American like him and wished they had 
met sooner. Up until this point, because we previously had only vague infor-
mation about him, Medani hadn’t really (gured into our planning. Robert 
realized how in'uential Medani was at this impromptu meeting and took the 
time to pull him in and obtain his cooperation.
We (nally agreed that by December 2006 conditions would be su*cient to 
retake the city, but the decision to do so was ultimately determined by forces 
beyond our control. 1–36 had su"ered a long, hard tour in Hit, with many 
casualties. It had built a 700-man district police force and opened four 
additional police stations, expanding far beyond the al Phurat police force in 
Zuwayyah. 1–36’s (nal major operation was to establish a permanent police 
station in Hit near Tra*c Circle 2, in the vicinity of the market and astride 
Route Mavericks. We would have liked to convince 1–36 to reconquer Hit 
with us, but we could sense that 1–36’s commander was unwilling. Given the 
circumstances of 1–36’s tour and the unit’s imminent redeployment, this 
was perfectly understandable. We began thinking about how to convince 









Task Force 2–7 assumed control of the battlespace from 1–36 in January 2007. 
We decided to try the same indirect approach with them that had served 
us so well throughout our tour. Because of Sheikh Sattar’s growing stature 
and the incipient Awakening, coalition forces were enamored with the idea 
of the Sunnis rising up against AQI. We took advantage of this (xation. We 
coached Hasan and Zahid to present a uni(ed plan to the 2–7 commander 
for reclaiming Hit, but it took considerable time and e"ort to bring these two 
together to make a coordinated pitch. 
Robert, Chief Pitt, and I sat with 2–7’s commander, Ma’mun, Hasan, and 
Zahid in Zahid’s o*ce at the district IP station, while Hasan and Zahid 
presented “their” idea. Zahid, due to his extreme self-regard or maybe his 
unshakeable con(dence, told the 2–7 commander that he could rid Hit of all 
“terrorists” in a two-day operation, but required coalition support for logistics 
and to cordon o" the city. !e 2–7 commander looked to us for con(rmation 
of Zahid’s ability to carry this out. We a*rmed that he could, but suggested 
four days might be better. !e resulting operation was named Shurta Nasir 
(Police Victory).
Two popular, abbreviated accounts of Operation Shurta Nasir are provided 
in Figures 8 and 9 on the following pages. One is the o*cial MNC-I press 
release, and the other is taken from Wikipedia. These accounts, while 
never complete or entirely accurate, nonetheless provide a sense of the 
scale of support that coalition forces provided the IPs. In short order, 2–7 
developed a plan to completely isolate Hit by cordoning it o", but 2–7’s most 
impressive action by far lay in the realm of logistical support. 2–7 built 
and pre-staged logistical packages and assets so that as soon as the IPs had 
secured template locations for the establishment of additional IP stations, 
forti(cation and reinforcement of these sites could begin.
Aside from the signi(cant logistical challenges, the most di*cult part of the 
operation proved to be maintaining solidarity among the key Iraqi players. 
Unbeknownst to most observers, General Zahid almost derailed the entire 
operation. !e day before the operation was to begin, Zahid decided to arrest 
Ma’mun for no valid reason but because Ma’mun had somewhat outshone 
Zahid during the planning for Operation Shurta Nasir. Ma’mun was our 
resident “insider” and provided crucial advice about how best to execute the 
operation without alienating Hit’s citizens. But Ma’mun had also made the 
“mistake” of developing a closer relationship with Hasan than with Zahid. 
More than anything, Zahid wanted to be thought of as the conquering hero, 
and in his typical dramatic fashion threatened to not participate. !e whole 
point of the operation was to support an Iraqi-led, Iraqi-executed plan with 
minimal numbers of Americans in the background, and with the ODA and the 
PTT advising the IPs. While it would have been possible to continue without 
Zahid, to do so would have undermined our e"orts to reinforce and utilize 
the Iraqi chain of command. Robert worked hard to keep Zahid on board. He 
invited Zahid to stay at the teamhouse and then stayed up all night talking 
Zahid in circles until Zahid convinced himself to be the “better man” and set 
aside his di"erences with Hasan for the good of the community.
Task Force 2–7 began sealing o" Hit on 15 February 2007. On the morning 
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to commence the main e"ort. !e operation was supposed to unfold in the 
following sequence: (rst, 2–7 would isolate the city, controlling all entry and 
exit points. Next, the SWAT would seize the main mosque in Hai al Bekr and 
the Green Mosque in Hit (located in the market 200 meters from the bridge). 
Zahid would then begin broadcasting instructions from both mosques. He 
was to declare a 72-hour curfew, instruct 
all civilians to remain in their homes, 
and announce that any vehicles seen 
moving on the streets would be con-
sidered hostile.53 After that, the SWAT 
would begin targeted raids in Hit and 
clear neighborhoods considered insur-
gent sanctuaries. Robert and an ODA cell 
would accompany the SWAT.54 Robert 
was also going to use this opportunity to 
meet with key tribal and religious (gures 
in the city, visiting them in their homes. 
Chief Pitt led one ODA cell, with some 
SWAT and IPs, and patrolled into Hit 
to establish a forward command post 
near the city center. !is provided direct 
over-watch along Cherry Street and Hit’s 
southernmost neighborhood. Cherry 
Street had been Hit’s most dangerous 
street and the southern neighborhood 
was an insurgent sanctuary. It was on 
Cherry Street and the approaches to this 
neighborhood that 1–36 had su"ered the 
most catastrophic IED strikes. !e plan 
was to put a police station midway along Cherry Street and another in the 
middle of the southern neighborhood. 
As this was unfolding, I was supposed to take General Zahid and a large force 
of IPs to patrol the area between Hit and Mohammedi. !is area consisted of 
palm groves, quarries, junkyards, and chicken farms that were commonly used 
by all manner of criminals and insurgents. We knew that, despite pained ef-
forts to maintain operational security, the insurgents in Hit would have sensed 
“something” going on and 'ed to these areas. 
Lastly, after the SWAT had cleared and secured the proposed IP station sites, 
Robert would call in the PTTs, who would arrive with IPs, logistical packages, 
and assets to begin building the IP stations. We gave ourselves four days to 
conclude the entire operation and begin restoring a controlled normalcy to 
the city.57
!at was the plan. 
Here is what happened: General Zahid was hours late marshaling his IPs, and 
then seemed to stall.58 We su"ered the delay as long as we could but (nally 
launched the SWAT to seize the mosques and begin announcing the curfew. 
!is inspired several aggressive younger o*cers who worked for Zahid. !ey 
rounded up IPs, manned IP pick-up trucks, and drove straight to all of the 
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western Iraq, which included nearly 100 recent graduates from the Jordanian 
International Police Training Academy.  A combined force of 1,000 soldiers 
from 1st Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 7th Iraqi Army Division and U.S. Army soldiers 
from 2nd Battalion, 7th Mechanized Infantry, also known as Task Force 2-7, 
cordoned off the area to assist the police during the operation.
Hit Police captured 13 known terrorists and one large weapons cache in raids 
and targeted searches through the city of roughly 100,000 inhabitants. It is 
believed that a number of terrorists went into hiding once the operation began. 
With the assistance of Police Transition Teams, the Iraqi Police also began 










insurgent-a*liated mosques in Hit. !ey 
cleared the mosques and began announcing 
the curfew. Robert, his cell, and the SWAT 
seized the building on Cherry Street that 
was to become the Cherry Street IP sta-
tion and turned it over to the IPs. After 
that, Robert and his gang spent 96 hours 
clearing and raiding throughout the entire 
city, acting on information provided by 
Ma’mun and citizens who began to come 
forward. 
Robert cleared the whole city without a 
shot being (red. It seemed evident that 
Medani had made good on his word, but 
we believed that Zahid also had something 
to do with the lack of insurgent resistance. 
!e 2–7 PTT commander (a young engi-
neer captain and someone who excelled at 
working with Iraqis) and I, as patiently as 
we could, worked on assembling enough 
IPs to perform our tasks.59 Zahid still 
stalled. It was apparent that he did not 
want to conduct his patrol outside of Hit. 
So instead, I redirected him to seize the 
IP station in the southern neighborhood, 
along with the hospital. I could have 
“played hardball” and forced Zahid to help 
us conduct the patrol between Hit and 
Mohammedi, but then I wouldn’t have had 
con(dence in him if we made contact with 
the enemy. It would have been me, two 
other members of 545, a Civil A"airs team, 
and a host of IPs whom we knew but had 
not trained. Zahid had handpicked many of 
these IPs for their loyalty to him. 
Robert and I have since discussed these events at length, and we strongly be-
lieve that Zahid cut a deal that allowed him to take the city unopposed so that 
he could play the part of conquering hero, while the insurgents were allowed 
to avoid capture or death. !is would explain why he was so cocksure about 
being able to clear the city in two days. Worth noting is that in a city that 
for months had been the nucleus of insurgent activity and violence—where 
1–36 lost Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles to IEDs and foot patrols 
usually ended in (re(ghts—we took the city without a single shot being (red. 
!en there were Zahid’s stalling tactics, which prevented him from having to 
patrol insurgent havens south of town. 
We didn’t believe that Zahid’s motives were nefarious so much as they were 
designed to protect his image. He had taken to carrying an ax handle and 
dispensing tough rhetoric, a caricature of Sheri" Buford Pusser as portrayed 
in the semi-biographic movie Walking Tall. Why risk spoiling his image by 
Almost  immediately  following  the  transfer  of  authority,  the  local  Iraqi  leaders  
pressed  the  TF  2-­7  IN  for  an  operation  to  clear  Hit  due  to  the  high  level  of  
insurgents  believed  to  be  in  the  city.  LTC  Crissman,  the  TF  commander,  agreed  
to  a  clearance  operation  and  OPERATION  SHURTA  NASIR  was  created.
2SHUDWLRQ6KXUWD1DVLU3ROLFH9LFWRU\ZDV7),1¶V¿UVW7DVN)RUFHOHYHO
operation  and  set  the  stage  for  stability  and  security  within  AO  Hit.  The  intent  
of  the  operation  was  to  clear  the  city  of  AIF  and  assist  the  Iraqi  Police  (IP’s)  in  
establishing  police  stations  within  the  city.  Before  the  operation  the  Hit  Police  
were  over  run  while  trying  to  establish  new  police  station  in  the  city.  TF  2-­7IN  
elements  provided  an  outer  cordon  (with  IA  assistance),  construction  assets,  
and  ground  and  air  QRF  support,  while  the  IP’s  conducted  clearing  operations  
and  occupied  new  police  stations.  The  operation  began  on  15  February,  2007  
ZLWKDVXSSRUWSDFNDJHFRQVLVWLQJRIVXVWDLQPHQWPHGLFDODQGFRQVWUXFWLRQ
assets  being  pushed  forward  to  FB4,  as  well  as  a  platoon-­sized  QRF  element.  
On  16  February,  the  TF  TAC  was  moved  to  FB1  as  a  forward  C2  element.  
6L[EORFNLQJSRVLWLRQVZHUHRFFXSLHGSUHYHQWLQJYHKLFOHDQGSHGHVWULDQ
WUDI¿FLQWRDQGRXWRIWKHFLW\DQGDFXUIHZZDVDQQRXQFHG5&7+HDY\
Engineers,  escorted  by  2nd  Plt  E/2-­7IN,  began  berming  operations  near  
WKHVRXWKHUQEORFNLQJSRVLWLRQVWRDVVLVWLQHQIRUFLQJWKHFRUGRQ2QFHWKH
cordon  was  set,  IP’s  established  TCP’s  within  the  city  to  enforce  the  curfew  




ultimately  resulting  in  over  twenty  detainees  and  shifting  the  power  in  favor  of  
the  newly  legitimized  police  force.  At  the  conclusion  of  the  four  day  operation,  
two  new  Iraqi  Police  stations  were  established;;  IP  Station  2  in  the  middle  of  Hit  
was  constructed  by  2nd  PLT  E/2-­7  IN,  led  by  1LT  William  C.  Murray  II  and  SSG  
5REHUW3XFNHWW,36WDWLRQLQWKHVRXWKHUQDUHDRIWKHFLW\ZDVFRQVWUXFWHGE\
WKH7DVN)RUFH¶V6FRXW3ODWRRQOHGE\/7$QGUHZ)OHPPLQJDQG&370DUN
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potentially getting his nose bloodied in a (ght with insurgents? Besides, even 
Zahid understood that the tide in Anbar was turning, and that by letting 
the insurgents run away he could still win. Of course, it could also be that 
he was able to win without (ghting because with his connections to TAA he 
constituted a credible threat in the insurgents’ eyes. Maybe he used this to his 
advantage to give the insurgents a way out, again because so long as they ran 
and he stayed, he won.
William had always said, “If we stay and they [insurgents] go, we win.” Robert 
and I repeated that again during planning to remind ourselves not to become 
too (xated on statistics.60 
After Operation Shurta Nasir, the coalition and ISF controlled Hit. We had 
three IP stations in town, checkpoints at key locations, a permanent outpost at 
the hospital, and permanent checkpoints controlling the major roads into Hit. 
We left the minor roads permanently blocked. General David Petraeus visited 
several weeks after the operation and he, 2–7’s commander, Zahid, and Hasan 
strolled down Cherry Street—something that was inconceivable just a month 
prior. In a (nal bit of irony, Zahid and Hasan used an ODA tactic on General 
Petraeus. !ey were supposed to be present at the Cherry Street IP station 
awaiting him and the 2–7 commander, but on the one and only occasion 
Zahid and Hasan willingly worked together, they slipped out and went for a 
walk. !ey deliberately returned late, after General Petraeus’ arrival, so that he 
would have to stand to greet them.
6R:KDW"7KRXJKWVDQG5HÁHFWLRQV
As I mentioned in the introduction, a lot of people have written about al Anbar 
and the Awakening. Some writers dissect the Awakening and the events there 
by taking an academic approach and applying concepts like social movement 
theory to better understand how the Awakening really happened. Others, 
through proximity to events and via interviews and research, have simply tried 
to capture the story because it seems so fantastic. Yet others have tried, and 
are trying still, to chronicle events so as to contribute to the popular narrative 
that the United States Marines and Army turned the tide through a culturally 
attuned counterinsurgency campaign. 
Putting this article together gave me time to pause and re'ect on my experi-
ences and what I wrote, especially in light of the accumulated literature about 
al Anbar and the Awakening. It also prompted me to reach out to several 
individuals who lived the story with William and Robert, to see if their 
perspectives had changed over time.  
Collectively, we agree: Successful COIN is the story of individuals—Dale 
Alford in al Qaim; Shaban in Baghdadi; William and Robert in Hit; Sean 
McFarland, Travis Patroquin, and Sheikh Sattar in Ramadi. At the same time, 
most of the written record is written clean, devoid of the inherently messy 
details. Anyone who has lived COIN knows, however, that counterinsurgency 
is never neat, never clean, and there is a lot of discovery and learning along 
the way, no matter how culturally attuned or well-read on counterinsurgency 














A second conclusion my former teammates and I would o"er, made clearer 
with the passage of time, has to do with the interrelatedness of events and 
the need to understand that everything is context-speci(c. !e previous 
article in this issue of CTX, “Al-Sahawa: An Awakening in Al Qaim,” 
illustrates both sides of this observation. !e Awakening movements in al 
Qaim, Baghdadi, Hit, and Ramadi were not independent events, and yet 
the ways the Awakening manifested itself in these locations di"ered a great 
deal. Regarding di"erences, the devil is in the details and nothing, absolutely 
nothing, takes place the same way in di"erent places. Across al Anbar, for in-
stance, the recruitment and development of the Desert Protectors and police 
was done very di"erently in al Qaim, Haditha, Hit, and Ramadi. Unfortu-
nately, some opportunities were lost because leaders and sta" expected e"orts 
in other locations to move as well and as fast as they had in al Qaim.
Our third conclusion is that most people look at the similarities between 
situations and do not spend enough time considering the di"erences. !e 
corollary to this is that most people take note of successes and look at what 
went right versus what went wrong. For instance, how many books and 
articles, inspired by John Nagl’s Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Coun-
terinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam,61 led people to try to poach 
successful methods from previous con'icts based on perceived similarities? 
How much institutional time and e"ort went into establishing lessons learned 
as the correct tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to apply, as if one can 
apply counterinsurgency solutions irrespective of local conditions? Or, how 
is it that so many people thought that the Anbar Awakening was replicable 
in Afghanistan simply based on the fact that the population in Afghanistan is 
also Muslim and tribal?
Our fourth conclusion is that we Americans didn’t win the COIN (ght. Too 
many give us—Americans—way too much credit for pacifying Anbar, when, 
at the root of the Awakening, the Sunni of al Anbar changed their minds and 













ODAs (nd that talking about the population as if it is the center of gravity, 
along with statements like “If you’ve secured the population, you’ve won the 
war,” are misguided. Population-centric COIN fundamentally assumes that 
the population already supports our side and that insurgents, corruption, 
and government incompetence are the only things standing in the way of our 
success. But, if population-centric COIN theories really worked, if the popula-
tion was certain to side with us once we proved able to separate them from 
the insurgents and introduce competent government, then there should be 
fewer problems in at least some parts of Afghanistan. Right? After all, Alford, 
McMaster, MacFarland, Petraeus, and others who seemingly mastered coun-
terinsurgency in Iraq also served in Afghanistan. !ey carried their lessons 
learned and TTPs to that theater. But, to what end? 
Finally, looking back, my former teammates would say that the large collec-
tive “we”—Special Forces, Marines, the U.S. Army, and other Americans in 
al Anbar—were more lucky than good, and the sooner everyone realizes that, 
the better. Despite the fact that those who served with William and Robert 
knew something like the Awakening was possible from the earliest days of 
the war, despite our familiarity with the tribes, and despite our optimism 
even during the darkest days of the war, we still recognize that serendipity 
accounted for a lot. At the same time, the entire time we were there, we 
continually tried to think through the problem, and strove to create and shape 
opportunities in order to make the most out of whatever opportunities were 
handed to us. 
Fortune favors not only the brave and the bold, but the prepared as well. Of 
course, there are times and places where the people are never going to come to 
your side and fortune is never going to give you a chance. But then, we would 
say, you have to be smart enough and su*ciently humble to recognize when 
that is the case, too.   
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The Maoist movement in India started in the late 1950s as a peas-
ant uprising in the wake of an independence struggle in Naxalbari, a small 
village on the Indo-Nepal border, hence the name Naxalism. !e Naxalites 
were a group of far-left radical communists who promoted Maoist political 
sentiment and ideology to (ght exploitation by landlords in India’s feudal 
postcolonial socioeconomic system. !e Naxal movement was quashed by 
force, only to resurface as a Maoist insurgency with the broader objective of 
ushering in a democratic revolution directed against imperialism, feudalism, 
and collusive bureaucratic capitalism. From its beginnings as a peasant revolt 
in the mid-1970s in the state of West Bengal, within a span of two decades 
Maoism quickly spread across many states. At present, nearly 15 states are 
a"ected to varying degrees. !e movement (nds broad appeal among people 
su"ering the ills of under-development, due to the fact that a people’s demo-
cratic revolution designed to (ght exploitation remains the selling point of 
Maoist ideology. Modern Maoism, patterned on Mao Zedong’s successful 
peasant revolt in post–World War II China, believes that political change 
must come through armed agrarian revolution (i.e., a protracted “people’s 
war”) with the forcible seizure of power as its central and principal task. Peas-
ant armies, according to this vision, will encircle cities from the countryside 
and thereby (nally capture them. Hence, the countryside remains the center 
of gravity for the movement. 
In the last two decades, most state governments have failed to understand 
the nuances of combating this Maoist type of insurgency and therefore have 
attempted piecemeal solutions that have brought partial and temporary 
results. Despite their success at quelling the secessionist movement in Punjab 
in the 1980s, o*cials have surprisingly developed practically no new strategic 
innovations for dealing with the Maoist insurgency in India. Government-
sponsored developmental policies and schemes have barely penetrated the 
disenchanted populations in the tribal belts of nearly 15 states.1 !e progress 
made by security agencies up to 2011 has hardly been encouraging either, and 
the Maoist area of in'uence, called the “Red Corridor,” is expanding into 
the northeastern states of India.2 !is may be attributed to poorly organized 
security forces and governmental mechanisms that are ill-equipped to execute 
development programs and projects. In contrast, the Maoists have held sway 
over these rural areas because they are better organized and focused, and 
because they deliver instant results to the disenchanted population. 
Recent developments, however, seem to indicate (ssures that may lead to 
critical vulnerabilities within the Maoist uprising. !ese include a growing 
aversion to continued violence among the rural population and the morphing 
of the Maoist organization into a centralized, hierarchical structure that is 
increasingly becoming susceptible to caste, class, and gender biases among the 
cadres. 
Maoist Insurgency in India:  Emerging Vulnerabilities















An insurgency’s in'uence over the local population and reliance on an orga-
nizational structure that is tuned to networked guerilla tactics are its critical 
strengths. !e dilution of popular support and an ill-suited organizational 
structure could, by the same token, prove to be an insurgency’s critical vulner-
abilities. India’s Maoists are no di"erent, and an analysis of certain recent 
developments seems to throw light on emerging vulnerabilities that could well 
spell the movement’s doom. 
Between 2004 and 2006, three major out(ts—the Maoist Communist Centre, 
the Communist Party of India (Marxist–Leninist), and the People’s War 
Group—merged into a single group 
calling itself the Communist Party of 
India (Maoist), or CPI (M). Although 
it remains an insurgent organization 
with no political representation, since 
2006 CPI (M) has consolidated as a 
centralized, hierarchical pan-Indian 
entity that is active in 15 Indian states 
and has its tentacles in the entire Red 
Corridor.3 !is is apparent from the 
scale of coordinated attacks carried out 
since 2008.4 While one might argue 
that these attacks are an indication 
of the group’s growing strength, the 
counter-view is that a centralized, 
hierarchical structure has never suited 
the kinds of operations undertaken by 
insurgents. !e question then arises:  
Does this present an opportunity for 
the state to capitalize on a critical 
vulnerability of the Maoists? !e 
answer is “yes.” Being less responsive 
and less adaptable to changes in the 
environment, a centralized hierarchical 
outlaw organization may not be very 
resilient under pressure and faces the 
long-term risk of extinction.5
!e major cause of the downfall of the 
Naxalbari movement, a forerunner to 
the Maoist insurgency, was the emer-
gence of feuds among its leaders at the 
highest level in the organization.6 !e 
split among the leadership was related to authority and how it percolated to 
the lower levels in the organizational structure. In other words, the split was 
over the choice of organizational structure: either a centralized hierarchy or a 
decentralized network. !e major part of the Naxalbari movement morphed 
into a centralized organization and was weakened by the resulting ideological 
confusion among the cadres.7
Interestingly, the now-centralized CPI (M) has also seen (ssures emerging 
within its cadres based on caste, gender, and religious biases. For example, 













CTX | Vol. 3, No. 2
State of Orissa, and his four associates. !is incident triggered communal riots 
in certain districts and caused a split in CPI (M) along religious lines, from 
which a new group of Hindu Maoists emerged.8 Furthermore, it has been well 
established that dalits (the weaker class in the caste system) and women are 
not adequately represented in the higher echelons of the Maoist organization, 
despite their being the main driving force for revolution at the grassroots 
level.9 In fact, the growth of Maoism in the state of Bihar is primarily attrib-
uted to the ability of the Maoists to exploit the caste-based divisions in Bihari 
society.10
One of the Maoists’ strengths has been a narrative that is based on an ideology 
separate from caste, gender, and religious biases.11 !e Maoists have so far 
called for a people’s war against class biases, without distinguishing among the 
other existing segregations in Indian society. Because being downtrodden was 
the singular binding force, Maoist ideology found automatic appeal among 
almost all sections of Indian society, with very little coaxing or e"ort needed 
from the Maoist leadership to (ll the cadres. !e above-mentioned incidents, 
however, seem to indicate that the appeal of the Maoist narrative is waning 
with local leaders who are trying to mobilize on the basis of existing caste and 
religious divisions in the society.12 !ere is thus an opportunity for the state 
to “drive the wedge” and apply counter-propaganda to weaken the Maoist 
organization and dilute its popular support.
A key factor in maintaining the relevance of an insurgency amidst a popula-
tion is the management of violence.13 Popular support for the insurgents’ 
cause will be lost when the population is subjected to acts of extreme violence 
perpetrated directly by the insurgents, or when people are caught in the cross-
(re between insurgency and counterinsurgency. In the state of Chhattisgarh, 
for example, a recent development has been the formation of “Salwa Judum,” 
an anti-Maoist out(t made up of victims of Maoist high-handedness. Salwa 
Judum, under state sponsorship, has been resorting to violence against Mao-
ists with a fair degree of impunity. !is is forcing the Maoists to respond with 
more violence. !e second-order e"ect of this development is that innocent 
people are being caught in the cross(re and are increasingly critical of the 
continual violence.14 !is organized vigilantism, despite being undemocratic 
and tricky to control, was backed by the state under pressure from higher 
echelons in an attempt to show quick results at the local level. Meanwhile, 
recognizing the fact that the state was promoting extrajudicial violence as a 
way to manipulate the population, India’s highest-level judiciary ruled against 
it. !e undemocratic ways of the state government attracted adverse com-
ments, and Salwa Judum was dismantled, albeit after its e"ects were already 
being felt. Notwithstanding the poor choice of strategies, the aftere"ect of 
deploying Salwa Judum gives the state an opportunity to present alternatives 
to the people of Chhattisgarh based on economic and social development, in 
contrast to violence. 
!e kinds of opportunities available to the state, as discussed above, call for 
a paradigm shift in the strategy to counter the Maoist menace. Following are 
some key aspects of this shift: 
1. Avoid large-scale kinetic actions against lower-cadre Maoist operatives 
and instead target the higher leadership in the centralized hierarchy. 








surgical, small-footprint strikes. Cease any overt state support to 
violent vigilante out(ts like Salwa Judum. Meanwhile, lower-cadre op-
eratives must be lured into surrendering their weapons and cooperating 
through state-sponsored schemes like Bihar’s “Shikaria Model.”15
2. Embark on a large-scale, mass media–driven propaganda campaign 
that highlights the caste, class, gender, and religious biases of the Mao-
ists to tarnish their narrative and create feuds within the organization.16 
!ese rifts can also be exploited for intelligence gathering and in(ltra-
tion into the organization.
3. Drawing on the experience of the British in Malaya, create manageable 
pockets of secure zones in the Red Corridor to receive focused develop-
ment aid. !ese pockets can then be projected as models and expanded 
outwards in an incremental and iterative manner. !e strategy of “clear, 
hold, and develop” has been adopted in spurts in the past by many 
state governments, but never as a sustained e"ort.
4. Because the Red Corridor spans 15 states, achieving coherence in plans 
and e*ciency in resource management requires a centralized approach 
from the Indian government. Individual state governments, if left to 
themselves, are likely to be driven by local politics and to treat the 
Maoist menace as a local law and order problem.
5. Considering that CPI (M) projects itself as the central organization for 
the insurgency, attempts need to be made to bring its leadership into 
mainstream politics.  
Maoist ideology has lost its relevance internationally, even in China, and 
is unlikely to survive in a vibrant democracy like India in the long run.17 
Large-scale media activism, greater penetration of mass media, and increasing 
levels of awareness and education are helping to deepen democratic norms in 
the country and are in'uencing political will. In the case of the Maoists, New 
Delhi’s political will to act is on the cusp of being swayed towards a multi-
pronged campaign. Under these circumstances, the insurgency’s vulnerabilities 
discussed above present that much-needed breakthrough opportunity for the 
(nal push to action. !is vital political will is nevertheless unlikely to reach 
decisive proportions due to the following constraints: 
1. Vote-bank politics are likely to prevent state governments from letting 
the central government handle the issue. After all, the Maoist insur-
gency is still considered a law and order problem, which unfortunately 
is under state jurisdiction. 
2. Even the central government is reluctant to deploy SOF (military or 
paramilitary) from fear of a political backlash due to likely civilian 
casualties. 
3. In a society where caste continues to play a major role in binding 
groups of people together, action against a particular group of Maoists 
can easily be distorted by the opposition in the parliament to insinuate 
government bias and drive away popular support. Such possibilities are 
major impediments to bolstering political will and decision-making, 
especially when coalition governments are the order of the day. 
4. Large-scale o*cial corruption and collusive bureaucratic capitalism are 
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Arguably the most important military component in the War 
on Terror is not the (ghting we do ourselves, but how well 
we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern 
themselves.
 — Secretary of Defense Robert Gates,  
 26 November 20071
After the bombing of the USS COLE in the Port of Aden on 12 
October 2000, the Republic of Yemen became a potential ally of the United 
States in U.S. counterterrorism campaigns. To ensure the Yemeni govern-
ment’s ability to combat terrorism on its own soil and prevent such attacks 
from occurring again, the United States provided the Yemeni Special Forces 
with light equipment and engaged in a series of joint exercises with them. 
Today, “U.S. security assistance to Yemen is aimed at restoring stability and 
security to Yemen while building the capacity of the Yemeni government to 
combat the common threat of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).”2 
People in both Yemen and the United States had very high expectations for 
the outcome of U.S.–Yemeni joint military training exercises. !ey assumed 
this training would both make the Yemeni SOF very e"ective at countering 
al Qaeda and help ensure the country’s stability and security. Despite the tre-
mendous e"ort and resources devoted to those exercises, however, the Yemeni 
SOF still lack the desired levels of pro(ciency and readiness for e"ective CT 
operations. 
!e SOF units, like the other Yemeni armed forces, still have no doctrine, 
no planning experience, and no real institutional structures in place. !e 
way they conduct operations is similar to the way regular forces do. !e 
training provided by the United States simply created a group of professional 
individuals commanded by a senior o*cer with a “general purpose” regular 
forces background. !e purported goal of the training, to develop e"ective, 
sustainable SOF for Yemen, appears to be far beyond reach for the near future. 
For example, the Houthi rebels3 in the northern part of the country were able 
to defeat the Yemeni government in six wars, while al Qaeda continues to get 
stronger in the south. Generally, those trained military units seem to vanish 
when they are needed for real missions. 
Under these circumstances, I wonder how long it will take U.S. forces to train 
the Yemeni counterterrorism units. What will it take for their e"orts to be 
successful? How can we measure the e"ectiveness of this training, and what is 
wrong with the current U.S. approach to training foreign militaries? 
I will not try to answer these questions in this article because they require 
extensive research. I will, however, describe my personal experience with the 
U.S. training program in Yemen that took place from 2001 to 2002. As a young 
lieutenant during this training, I went through a life-changing experience. 
The U.S.–Yemeni Joint Counterterrorism Exercises:   
The Other Side of the COIN
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Although the training was very e"ective and successful in my case, I think there 
is room for improvement if we look at it from the other side of the coin. 
Yemen’s Special Forces:  An Uncertain Beginning
After graduation from the Yemeni Military Academy in 2000, I was deployed 
to the Special Operations Forces unit along with 16 other o*cers. !e SOF 
was established in 1999 in reaction to the escalation of terrorist activities in 
Yemen. As a new graduate, I was an inexperienced o*cer in a young, inexpe-
rienced unit. For almost a year, we were assigned to train enlisted soldiers in 
the way special forces should (ght. I and my peers wondered what knowledge 
we could give those young men besides the troops’ parade march, physical 
training, some technical knowledge, and punishment techniques. We were 
not ready to admit our lack of experience, however, so we moved forward, 
claiming to have all the knowledge in the world.
Nearly a year after my deployment to the Yemeni SOF, an order came from 
the commander of the SOF and the Republican Guard to form what then 
was called a joint exercise battalion. !e unit chief of sta" announced, “!is 
battalion will receive training from American experts.”4 Because it was the 
(rst time the Yemeni special forces would be trained by experts from such 
a great, knowledgeable, and strong country, the commander observed the 
establishment of this battalion closely and was directly involved in the process 
of selecting the o*cers, calling for the best soldiers to be picked up. 
Of course, every o*cer wanted to be part of this training, but the decision 
was made to choose only the most expert, dedicated, and intelligent individuals 
from the two best battalions in the unit—the special forces battalion and the 
counterterrorism battalion. !ese two battalions alone, however, could not 
furnish the new battalion with the required number of o*cers and soldiers. 
To (ll the requirement for manpower, the commander directed the best o*cers 
and soldiers from other battalions to join, and that is how I was picked up. 
During the new battalion’s establishment process, negotiations and discus-
sions were going on between the Yemeni special forces command, the Yemeni 
national intelligence body, and the Americans. For us soldiers, everything was 
vague. All we knew was that we would be trained by American experts, which 
we hoped would give us some prestige for being part of it. All of the soldiers 
were eager either to get short leave or to resolve personal issues so that they 
could dedicate themselves fully to the training, which we understood would 
last a month or two, or maybe even three months.
!e joint exercise battalion consisted of two companies and a reconnaissance 
platoon, and each company was made up of three platoons. !e platoons 
each had 12 soldiers, excluding the platoon leader and deputy. I was assigned 
as the second platoon leader in the second company. !e deputy assigned to 
my platoon was one of my colleagues at the Yemeni Military Academy, a very 
smart and cooperative o*cer.
Training
!e (rst day of training was at the SOF training camp. Everybody was eager to 
see the American experts. How would they look? What would they say or do? 
What weapons would they show us? And more important, what could they 

















orders and so were the soldiers. !e battalion commander was very active that 
day. However, he was not ready to join the training. His chief of sta" was not 
ready to be trained either, so the training included only those at the company 
commander level and down. 
!e American experts utilized the (rst day of training to familiarize them-
selves with the Yemeni soldiers, and to test our level of training and our 
marksmanship. We were directed to start shooting at targets using di"erent 
kinds of weapons. After this initial assessment, the American team introduced 
themselves to the companies and started to show us a better way to manage 
the light arms. !e expert team never gave us any details about their plans 
for the type and length of these trainings, perhaps because this was not yet 
decided, or details were kept secret for security reasons, or the need for a 
schedule was just ignored. Whatever the reason, no one apparently considered 
the e"ect that keeping these details from us would have on our training if it 
took longer than we expected or planned for. 
!e training was set in phases. Phase one was movement techniques, patrol 
formations, and weapons alignment. Phase two included raids, ambush opera-
tions, and marksmanship. Phase three focused on building assault operations, 
night patrols, and hostage rescue. Phase four included air assault tactics in 
desert and mountain operations. !e training plan and the end goal had the 
potential for success, but they were not communicated to the participants, 
who began the training expecting to do phase four (rst instead of last. As a 
result, the Yemeni soldiers and o*cers didn’t accept the basic knowledge they 
were taught by the instructors in phase one. !ey wanted the type of knowl-
edge they didn’t already have. 
When the (rst phase began, the soldiers started to complain. Some of them 
challenged the instructors, saying, can you do this or can you do that? !ey 
started to ask questions, like, what if this happened and what if that didn’t 
happen? !e soldiers weren’t asking these questions because they wanted to 
know the answers, but because they wanted to prove that the Americans didn’t 
know. Soldiers started to question the real reason behind why those trainers 
came all the way to Yemen just to show them how to walk and (re the arms 
they used every day. At this point, the fancy mental picture of Americans was 
gone. !ey needed to give us something new—maybe knowledge, equipment, 
or weapons—to be accepted again. !e American team understood that they 
had to do something to raise the soldiers’ morale, and a new weapon was the 
solution they thought of.
Two months after the training started, the instructors and battalion com-
mander announced that our new weapons had been shipped and would arrive 
soon. !e soldiers started to imagine these weapons, picturing the American 
Hollywood movies that showed Rambo holding a gun with lasers that could 
destroy a building with one shot. When the new weapons arrived, the excited 
soldiers were sadly disappointed. The weapons we received were used 
AK–47s—Russian machine guns—and RPGs that had been recovered from 
Afghanistan and poorly repainted so they would look good. !e soldiers imag-
ined a Ferrari, but their gift was a salvage car that came from the insurance 
company. Instead of raising the soldiers’ morale, the arrival of the weapons 

















Getting these undesirable weapons was a great excuse 
for the soldiers to be lazy, late, or absent. So whenever 
we were asked to start training, we would point to the 
weapons. Even if we messed up a tactical mission, the 
instructors got the response: !e weapon is bad. !e 
battalion commander started to lose control of his men. 
His promise of new and great weapons turned out to 
be false. !e expert team faced this problem as well. 
Every morning before we started any training, as you 
can imagine, we would remind the American instruc-
tors that the weapons they had given us were bad and 
that we didn’t like them. Even when the translators 
avoided conveying those complaints, we would hold 
the weapon up and make a gesture showing how much 
we hated it. !e instructors did their best to help us 
align the weapon, adjust it, and make it work if it 
got stuck. !at, however, didn’t help them avoid our 
complaints. 
!e bottom line was this: To raise morale and make 
things work, new weapons or equipment had to come. !e exercise continued 
with the hope of receiving new weapons. As we were promised, just one month 
later, huge containers (lled with equipment arrived at the unit. !is new 
equipment consisted of almost everything we had hoped for—even more in 
some cases, although less in others. We were issued hand watches, night vision 
goggles, M16 assault ri'es, and body armor and helmets. But most important 
were the Glock 19 pistols, the (rst Glock pistols to enter Yemen. Everyone’s 
morale was now very high, and we were envied by those who hadn’t joined the 
training. A new team of American trainers had also arrived to replace the (rst 
team, so the (rst American team didn’t get to see our excitement. 
By the time the new weapons and equipment arrived, the training was in the 
advanced phases and had become more specialized. We were learning new 
techniques and utilizing new equipment and assets. During the later training 
phases, we learned how to be marksmen, how to raid and ambush, and how 
to (ght. We trained in air assaults, raids, ambushes, rural and urban assaults, 
jungle and mountain assaults, and techniques to breach buildings. !e more 
time that passed, the more advanced the training became. 
Although the advanced training was very useful, the joint exercise battalion 
was not now up to its full strength. Some o*cers and soldiers were absent or 
had deserted the training for personal reasons. Some soldiers were replaced by 
new soldiers who hadn’t attended the initial phases. So although the advanced 
training had arrived, it didn’t really seem that way in the eyes of the o*cers 
and soldiers. 
Lessons Learned and Where There’s Room for 
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In the foreword to the new U.S. Army (eld manual, FM 3-07.1, General Martin 
E. Dempsey, TRADOC commander, asserted that “security force assistance 
is no longer an ‘additional duty.’ It is now a core competency of our [U.S.] 
Army.”5 In other words, the training of foreign militaries is a core means of 













from previous experiences is key to the success of future training exercises. 
!e U.S.–Yemeni joint exercise had many successful features and overall was 
very good. !ere are some aspects, however, that could be changed to make 
the training more successful, to maintain the knowledge and experience the 
soldiers absorbed, and to better achieve the training’s goals.
Although the training was very successful at lifting the soldiers from a certain 
level of expertise to the next level, it didn’t even touch the commanders who 
would be leading those newly trained soldiers. As I mentioned previously, the 
battalion commander and his deputy were not included in the training. Why? 
Because when the soldiers conduct missions, our commanders only watch! Or 
because they lead their soldiers during times of peace, but when war comes, 
somebody else who has been well trained takes over! !e question of why the 
commanders weren’t trained only came to my mind when I received advanced 
training in the United States following my participation in the U.S.–Yemeni 
program. It was then that I learned that commanders also need to be trained. 
!ey should be even more highly trained than their subordinates, not only 
in corruption and how to manipulate roles, but also in leading in battle and 
bringing soldiers back safely.
!e U.S.–Yemeni training program was not set up for long-term success. After 
the training was completed, the (untrained) Yemeni commanders didn’t ap-
preciate the importance of this SOF battalion or respect its initial purpose. !e 
(rst thing they did was distribute those trained o*cers and soldiers back to 
their original battalions, e"ectively returning them to the condition they were 
in before the training. After a year or so, I learned that almost half of those 
soldiers who had participated in the training quit the service and went to be 
farmers or qat dealers.6 Other soldiers were very disappointed in the eventual 
outcome of the training. Everybody started to forget what they had learned. 
!e o*cers had one concrete bene(t from their participation in the joint 
training: the Glock pistols that they got to keep. But the knowledge turned 
out to be not that important. 
Unlike what we expected, the American instructors were very soft. !ey didn’t 
punish, yell, or report those who arrived late to training or even those who 
were absent. Instead, they observed, took a deep breath, and continued their 
program. Maybe they thought that the battalion and company commanders 
were capable of making great soldiers and were doing their job. !ey should 
have asked themselves, if those commanders are really capable of doing their 
jobs, why would they need us Americans here in the (rst place? !e American 
instructors seemed like politicians dealing with the soldiers. As a result, more 
soldiers were intentionally late and some started to question why they needed 
this type of training anyway. 
As uninformed consumers, we were just like people in the dark waiting for a 
door to open to see the light behind it. It wasn’t just the junior o*cers and 
soldiers who were confused. Everybody was confused. Even the Yemeni Army 
leadership was not expert in discussing issues with the Americans and plan-
ning ahead. I believe even they thought, the Americans know what to do, so 
why discuss it? It was rumored that US $50 million was given to the Yemeni 
government for this training, however, so we had expected a lot of new equip-
ment, modern weapons, and very advanced training.
We were not briefed by our commandant or by the American experts about 
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during the training, learn more, represent the country, and be on time. As I 
emphasized previously, the biggest concern of the Yemeni soldiers and o*cers 
was what type of weapons and equipment they would get out of the exercise 
and which ones they would get to keep.
!e training program was carefully planned by the American side. !ey knew 
what they needed to do to make a unit better. !ey knew how long it would 
take to do the training, how many soldiers could be trained, what type of 
training area was necessary, and what their assignment was. What they didn’t 
know, however, was exactly what type of soldiers they would (nd in the Ye-
meni trainees or what kinds of administrative issues the Yemeni soldiers faced. 
For example, they didn’t know how the Yemeni military organizes and imple-
ments leave for soldiers, or how it punishes absence from training camp. !e 
American experts also did not know how long most Yemeni soldiers expect to 
stay in one type of training without leave. 
For example, long trainings can be problematic for Yemeni soldiers because 
a soldier’s family does not come with him while he participates in training 
exercises. If a Yemeni soldier is from the southern part of the country but 
trains in the northern part of the country, then his family will stay in the 
south. Weekends are not long enough for him to visit his family. And even 
if they were, the salary a Yemeni soldier earns is not enough to cover visits 
home to his family more often than once every three to four months. And 
when a soldier is (nally able to travel home, the familial issues he faces when 
he arrives after a long absence can sometimes require several weeks to deal 
with. !e Yemeni government does not really take care of its soldiers and their 
families. If a Yemeni soldier or a member of his family is sick, they must go 
and su"er while waiting in the military hospital, begging military police dicta-
tors who guard the hospital to let them in so they can be seen by the doctor. 
For all these reasons, Yemeni commanders expect their soldiers to be late for 
training or even to desert a training assignment, especially if the exercise takes 
longer than soldiers expect.
!e American contractors also didn’t spend enough time learning to under-
stand the Yemeni administrative system. !e administrative system of any 
unit can determine either the success or failure of that unit in achieving the 
ultimate goal of the exercise. A Yemeni soldier or an o*cer has no future if 
the highest commander doesn’t personally know him or his abilities. Because 
of this, he has to do his best to be known, or simply die unknown. !ose 
soldiers who had been waiting for a chance to prove their e"ectiveness and 
their readiness to serve their country saw that chance arrive with the joint 
training exercise led by the American experts. Many of those Yemeni soldiers 
were working to demonstrate their e"ectiveness during training because they 
needed not only the American experts’ knowledge and support, but also a 
recommendation from the trainers to the highest commander. !is was how 
they could secure a future.
Repairing Yemen’s administrative and institutional systems is necessary for the 
success of any future joint training exercises. In Yemen, we don’t have  
FM 3-0—or any FM at all. Our doctrine is simply this: Do what I tell you. In 
Yemen, we don’t have institutional leadership; we have individual leaders. In 
other words, the leader in Yemen is the system, and the leader is the unit. If 
he is good, then the unit moves forward. But when a new commander comes 











shoot without training the decision-makers who command those soldiers is 
just like making genuine parts for a vehicle that doesn’t exist. Unfortunately, 
awareness of this reality was not in the American training experts’ manual.
!e training of foreign militaries would be more successful if the following 
guidelines were taken under consideration by the commands organizing such 
training programs:
1. Make it or break it. Either conduct a good, e"ective training program, 
or don’t show up.
2. Train the commanders (rst. Planning is key.
3. From the beginning, inform those being trained about the whole 
training process, including the purpose and the goals of the training.
4. Implement a good selection process for choosing which o*cers and 
soldiers should be assigned to participate in the training.
5. Study extensively the customs, roles, and administrative issues of the 
units being trained.
6. Be prepared to adapt the training process should administrative issues 
a"ect the training.
7. Make sure that good o*cers are nominated by their units.
8. Support the active soldiers with any means necessary, and report the 
bad and lazy soldiers.
9. Be aggressive when the training requires it. 
10. Be strict with those who are not obeying the rules. 
For the Yemeni special forces, the U.S.–Yemeni joint exercise was not their 
only training, but was the beginning of a series of trainings. Yet the Yemeni 
special forces seemed to be marching in double time while going nowhere. 
Maybe someday I will see more than training. Maybe someday I’ll see the 
training bring the desired outcomes.   
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MAJ Mohammed Garallah serves in the Yemeni SOF command.
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As Major Garallah points out, he is describing experiences from more than a 
decade ago. We at CTX like to think that sensibilities have changed—and will 
continue to change. Indeed, one aim of the Combating Terrorism Exchange, 
and of articles like Major Garallah’s, is to tilt against cross-cultural misunder-
standings before they occur, and to sensitize operators to better understand 
both themselves and those they are working with.
1 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Security Force Assistance 
(FM 3-07.1), May 2009: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/
new_pubs/jp3_22.pdf
2 U.S. Department of State, O*ce of the Spokesperson, “U.S. 
Government Assistance to Yemen,” posted 7 August 2012: http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/08/196136.htm
3 !e Houthi rebellion is made up of Shi’a insurgents who 
have been (ghting the central government in northern Yemen 
for nearly two decades. !ey take their name from Hussein 
Badreddin al-Houthi, who was their commander until he was 
killed in September 2004.
4 Yemeni SOF COS forces brie(ng, Special Forces Base, Yemen, 
2001.
5 Gary Sheftick, “New Field Manual Focuses on 
Training Foreign Force,” Army News Service, 6 
May 2009: http://www.army.mil/article/20660/
new-(eld-manual-focuses-on-training-foreign-forces/
6 Qat is a tree with leaves that people in Yemen, Ethiopia, 
Djibouti, and Somalia chew for its stimulant e"ect. Qat leaves 
are considered a drug in the United States, but not in other 
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This interview is taken from the collection of the Combating 
Terrorism Archive Project.1 LTC Mike Richardson spoke on 25 February 2013 
with MAJ Nils French, an Engineer o*cer in the Canadian Army, about 
some of his experiences while deployed in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, 
throughout most of 2009. During the interview, MAJ French provided several 
key insights on the topic of interoperability.
CTAP: Good afternoon. !is is LTC Mike Richardson for the 
Counter Terrorism Archive Project. I am interviewing Major Nils 
French, a Canadian Army Engineer. Major French, would you like 
to give a little bit of background on yourself?
FRENCH: Yes, like you said, I am a Canadian Army o*cer. I am 
right now at the Naval Postgraduate School completing a Master’s 
of Science [degree] in the Defense Analysis Program. I have been 
here for a couple of months [and am] really enjoying it. 
As far as my background, I went to the Royal Military College 
of Canada, [where I] studied [civil] engineering and graduated 
in 2002. I spent the next year doing training in New Brunswick, 
home of the Engineers, at Canadian Forces Base Gagetown. I went 
on to Valcartier, Quebec, where I served two years in an Engineer 
unit doing my troop command and squadron 2IC, or as you call 
it in the United States, company XO time. !en I went down to 
Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, [where] I was on an exchange as an 
instructor [at] the U.S. Army Engineer School. I was teaching both 
lieutenants and captains for the various courses that they took at 
Fort Leonard Wood. !at was from 2006 to 2008, so I spent two 
years in Fort Leonard Wood. 
CTAP: Can you relate a little about your exchange post in the 
United States?
FRENCH: Yes, I was teaching classes almost day in and day out. If 
you look back, 2006 to 2008 was the time when the United States 
was surging heavily in Iraq, [as the (ghting] reached its worst point. 
So it was a very, very busy time for the U.S. Army. Basically, any of-
(cer who was available back in the United States was being plucked 
out of whatever position they were in and sent o" to theater. 
So I was one of the very, very few o*cers—actually I was the only 
o*cer in my cell who could be counted on, not [for] any personal 
trait but just because I couldn’t be pulled up and sent o" to theater. 
I was there on exchange and that wouldn’t have been permissible. 
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So I was teaching a lot of classes, sometimes from 8:00 in the morning to 4:00 
or 5:00 at night, continuously. !ere was a lot of evolution going on in terms 
of how to deal with improvised explosive devices in particular. Route clearance 
was really a new concept and the route clearance package was new, so I was 
learning a lot of this. I was taking any course that was available—well, any 
course that was taught at Fort Leonard Wood was open and available to me at 
the time. If I wasn’t teaching, the policy of the [o*cer] I was working for was 
[that] I could go ahead and take [any] course because it would just make me a 
better instructor at the school. So it was a very busy time there. Engineers had 
a big role in terms of what the U.S. Army was doing [because of their roles 
in both IED mitigation and reconstruction]. !e U.S. Army was at the center 
of what the United States was doing [in Iraq] at the time, and Fort Leonard 
Wood was the center [for] the Engineers. It was an interesting place to be. I 
learned a heck of a lot [about] the U.S. Army, the U.S. Engineers, how they 
functioned—[it was] total immersion. 
CTAP: Was this your introduction to improvised explosive devices and the 
counter-improvised explosive device battle that had been going on since 
roughly the middle of 2003, 2004?
FRENCH: I wouldn’t say it was my introduction. I had covered 
some of the [basic material on the subject] in my earliest training. 
Canada [has] had some fairly close [military] ties to the UK for a 
long time, and a lot of the [lessons] that [were learned by British 
forces] in Northern Ireland [were], at least in part, coming into the 
Canadian training. [!is was happening] well before 9/11, so even 
when I was going through my training in Gagetown, I was seeing 
some of it. However, I did learn a fair bit more about IEDs when I 
was at Fort Leonard Wood. 
CTAP: How do the Canadian forces de(ne what the United States 
saw as this very unique experience on the battle(eld, which was 
this counter-IED (ght. Did Canadian forces see it di"erently?  
FRENCH: Not being an EOD [Explosive Ordinance Disposal] 
operator myself, I don’t really have the greatest detail on it, but for 
decades the Canadian Army had been sending combat engineers 
and some folks from our logistics side to the United Kingdom to 
do technical munitions courses and counter-IED–type courses. 
Probably because [the British] had expertise from Northern Ireland. As far 
as whether we were [seeing] this as a new thing, or we were looking at the 
United States, which was starting to grapple with it seemingly in a big way 
for the (rst time—I wouldn’t really say we were looking at the United States 
and saying, “Hey, this isn’t anything big.” !e Brits may have been doing 
that [more than us]. !ere were British exchange o*cers [at Fort Leonard 
Wood] as well, and they maybe felt a little more of that because [counter-IED 
operations were] de(nitely more second nature to them. For Canada, having 
not been in Northern Ireland, [despite the] many courses we may have taken 
with the British, I still don’t think it was second nature for us in any way. So 
it really came to the forefront for us in much the same way that it would have 
been coming to the forefront for the United States. We may have had a greater 
proportion of the force [trained], perhaps. But it wasn’t something that was 


















CTAP: In talking to international o*cers and from just looking at the 
American historical military record, I have recognized that it is not an unusual 
occurrence to have booby traps and landmines and other devices [set by 
opposing forces]. 
FRENCH: I know the Canadian Army had some solid experience with booby 
traps, for example, and landmines as well, in the former Yugoslavia, during 
[the years it spent] there. Again, some of that training came over. Now, when I 
talk about IEDs, I make a mental di"erentiation between a booby trap and an 
IED. You can argue it, and you really have to get into some details to discuss 
the di"erences. But we might have had more exposure force-wide in the 
Canadian Army than the U.S. forces [had] because a critical mass of the Ca-
nadian Army’s personnel, [especially on the engineering side], cycled through 
the Balkans and had that exposure to mines and booby traps. In the United 
States, I don’t think there was a critical mass that cycled through the former 
Yugoslavia. !ere were de(nitely [U.S.] troops deployed in great numbers, 
certainly greater numbers than what Canada sent over to the Balkans; how-
ever, as a proportion of the total force, probably not as great. 
CTAP: !at is a very interesting point. I hadn’t thought about that connec-
tion with the Balkans. 
FRENCH: Yes, it wasn’t IEDs in the sense of a roadside bomb, as we think 
of them today. It was de(nitely booby traps, not so much intended to cause 
casualties, more intended to deny [access to] certain structures. Not having 
been to the Balkans, I might very well be incorrect, but my understanding 
is that [the use of improvised explosives had] a di"erent intent, and maybe 
that is one of the things that di"erentiates [current con'icts from earlier ones 
involving the Canadian Army]. 
CTAP: !at is a very interesting methodology to analyze the di"erences. So I 
want to get you back towards the direction you were going. After you com-
pleted your tour at the United States Army Engineering School, I understand 
you subsequently deployed to Afghanistan? 
FRENCH: Yes.
CTAP: Would you talk a little bit about that experience, and what your role 
was during that deployment? 
FRENCH: Yes. From Missouri [I drove] to Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, 
which is [where] 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group is based. I was 
assigned to 1 Combat Engineer Regiment, then [was] promptly pulled out 
[to (ll a position with] the Brigade Headquarters that was standing up 
Task Force 5-09, as it was called at the time. [Task Force 5-09 was] standing 
up to go to Afghanistan to take over the role of what we called Task Force 
Kandahar, which was the Canadian Brigade Headquarters commanding 
all Canadian forces we had in theater. I think I rolled across the Canadian 
border in August, and by [about] the last week of August I was already in the 
work-up training. We deployed in February 2009, and I was [in Afghanistan] 
until November of 2009. My job was the Task Force Engineer planner. So 
I was resident in the plans shop with our G5, who was in charge of all the 













Surveillance, Target, Acquisition, and Reconnaissance) planner; an intelligence 
plans o*cer; and an artillery/targeting plans o*cer. So all the engineer aspects 
[on] the infrastructure side of things, that was coming into my lane. 
CTAP: So could you describe the situation in Kandahar when you completed 
all your training and arrived there in 2009?
FRENCH: In the orders that were provided to us from Canadian Expedi-
tionary Forces Command, CEFCOM, we knew that one of our major roles was 
going to be to transition parts of Kandahar Province, which is an absolutely 
massive province in which our forces were spread very thin, over to U.S. 
forces. So Canada had [what] I guess you could [call] a brigade-minus for the 
whole province, and by the time we left, there were probably three times that 
[many] forces present. [We had] the same number of Canadian forces, [but] 
a large addition of U.S. forces had come into theater. If you look at 2009 in 
general, that was [the start of ] the “surge” for Afghanistan. !at is when U.S. 
forces, in particular the Marines, started going heavily into Helmand Province 
and a lot of other locations, primarily in the south and southwest of Afghani-
stan. So RC South was getting most of the new troops. 
Up to that point, there were more U.S. forces working in and around the 
Kandahar battle space than ever before, and [we had to prepare for] handing 
over major portions of the battlespace to U.S. forces. [The U.S. forces 
brought] a lot of those enablers like [tactical] helicopters, medevac, [EOD 
teams, and] there was a route clearance battalion that [operated] across [our 
AO]. [U.S. forces] not only surged into Kandahar Province through Kandahar 
Air Field, [they] moved [through Kandahar] out to Helmand, to build up in 
Helmand Province. So it was a very, very busy place and time for U.S. forces 
across the board. 
CTAP: Who were the forces you worked with? Did you see any di"erences in 
the way they operated or the way you interacted with them? 
FRENCH: !ere was quite a mix. [I’ll try] to detail who was in the battlespace 
and who we were interacting with at the time. It is probably a very little 
known fact that Brigade Headquarters, Task Force Kandahar, which I was a 
part of, had [at one] point in time multiple U.S. units [subordinate to its] 
command. !e main one, if my memory serves me correctly, was the 2nd 
of the 2nd, an infantry battalion that (rst showed up and then transferred 
over to the 1st of the 12th [infantry battalion]. I don’t know much more of 
the background on forces right now in terms of what division they are a part 
of and so on, but there was an infantry battalion throughout the time that I 
was there, and we [Task Force Kandahar] were [issuing] orders and receiving 
reports from the (eld. [!at] U.S. infantry battalion [was] reporting back up 
to us and receiving orders from us just like the Canadian battalion. Towards 
the latter end of our deployment, the [U.S.] 97th Military Police Company 
[also] was there [under Task Force Kandahar]. !ey had taken over a portion 
of Kandahar City [as mentors to the Afghan police force], positioned out of 
Camp Nathan Smith in Kandahar City. 
Towards the end, there was the 4th of the 82nd, Task Force Fury, which was 
operating across the province. I wouldn’t say they [were] under [our] com-
mand—it was more of a coordinating-type relationship within the battlespace. 
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!ey were mentoring the Afghan National Army and I think, to a degree, 
some police as well. [!e] command structure of Task Force Kandahar [is 
something] very few people know, a lot of Canadians probably don’t even 
know [that Canadians commanded Americans]. I wouldn’t be surprised if it is 
the (rst time in history that ever happened, but I could be wrong.2 
!ere were a lot of [other U.S.] forces that were working in the battlespace, 
and from time to time [they] actually came under [our] command for cer-
tain operations, to facilitate what we were doing. Task Force !or, the 4th 
Engineer Battalion, was running route clearance patrols all over Kandahar 
Province, and we were giving them our priorities and working with them 
continuously. Our EOD teams were disposing of devices that they were (nding 
and again, [the relationship was] very, very close there. And of course, [Task 
Force Kandahar did much of ] the planning that made that happen. Task 
Force Saber, a combat aviation [group] out of the 82nd Airborne Division, 
was operating across Kandahar Province as well. So [we did] a lot of close 
work with them, particularly with the IED (ght and trying to detect devices 
and [interdict emplacers].  
!ere were also U.S. SOF who were operating in Kandahar Province, so there 
was all sorts of coordination there. !ere were U.S. EOD teams that came over 
to us from time to time for certain operations, so we would [make a] request if 
we needed some augmentation for a particularly demanding operation. !ere 
you would have the reverse [situation]: You would have a Canadian route-
clearance patrol (nding a device and a U.S. EOD team disposing [of it]. Later 
on, when we started the transition to U.S. forces as the surge came in, it was 
the 5th [Brigade] of the 2nd [Infantry Division], [a] Stryker Brigade Combat 
Team that came out of 
Fort Lewis, Washington. 
!ey came in with several 
battalions and took over 
the battlespace in the 
north and the south and 
in the west, bit by bit, as 
their forces reached suf-
(cient strength to move 
out [into the AO].
CTAP: Can you talk a 
little bit about what the 
relationship was like? In 
particular, how do you 
think your U.S. exchange 
experience might have 
contributed to the 
relationships that you 
had, and not necessarily 
just you, but also your 
command, with the other 












FRENCH: Right. Being in a headquarters, being a planner, [when] I think 
back, I think one of the big things on the Canadian side as Task Force Kan-
dahar [was just] trying to (gure out—I mean if you are talking about the 
handover—trying to (gure out what was going on, when they were going to 
come in, how things were going with their force deployment. [5-2] Stryker 
had to bring all their equipment. All their equipment had to be moved from 
the U.S. and then all their troops had to be moved from the U.S. to Afghani-
stan, which is fairly involved. It is the middle of the surge and there are all 
sorts of other things going on at the same time, so these things don’t always 
end up on schedule. So [we were] (guring out where they were in that pro-
gression, that sequence. Also, [we were] trying to (gure out what they had in 
mind, where they wanted [their bases]. If we had a certain forward operating 
base established somewhere or a patrol base established somewhere, were they 
going to take that over? Did they want to take that over? What were we going 
to leave behind [for them]? What did they want to purchase from us?3 It got 
pretty complicated in that sense, (guring out what they were going to do and 
how we were going to best support that, and how we could in'uence it so that 
it worked out best for everybody. 
[!e incoming U.S. forces] had a lot of RFIs [requests for information]. We 
were the force in theater; we knew what was going on. We could respond to 
[their requests], getting them geospatial data, even just the most basic of maps 
[and other data]—providing all that stu" to that incoming BCT was a big part 
of what was going on. A lot of those relationships [you asked about] existed 
for that. We [were] a Canadian headquarters, but this was a U.S. force coming 
in, so the mechanisms that they were going through, the terminology, the pro-
cedures, the funding brackets that they were talking about [were completely 
di"erent]. You know, just one slide [or talk] could have 20 di"erent acronyms, 
[and having] even just [an] acronym explained—it would be the same for 
us, but having just that acronym explained wouldn’t be su*cient [to under-
stand]. [!ey were] talking about “title whatever” funds4 and that had to be 
deciphered for it to be of any use to us. !at is where I ended up coming in. 
Because I had taken courses that told me what time-phase force deployment 
[data] is, I understood [most of ] that and I knew how it worked. I understood 
what a “Red Horse Unit” was,5 so I was able to make that translation. 
Even the simplest terms, you know, the kind of slang that goes around the 
table. Someone on the U.S. side could say “commo,” and maybe that wouldn’t 
be picked up in a loud meeting room and understood by the Canadian person 
who was there. Having been at Fort Leonard Wood I was able, for the most 












an interpreter, to a degree. So [at] these meetings at Regional Command 
South, all the di"erent forces, every branch of the U.S. Services, would brief 
to what was going on and where they were moving forces through and what 
was coming up. I was sitting in on those [brie(ngs] and bringing the informa-
tion back to Task Force Kandahar, and more or less making it make sense for 
us so that we could plan and adjust accordingly, and [then I would] go back 
[to] in'uence [U.S. plans] from time to time. So that was a big part of it. 
Especially from when 5-2 Stryker came in and took [portions of the AO] over 
from us, and also when we had other forces moving out further to points west 
in the battlespace. [!at] was also a very, very collaborative process. [For an 
example of the importance of this coordination] I knew pretty much every 
lieutenant who was in [the U.S.] 4th Engineering Battalion because I trained 
them [at Fort Leonard Wood]. So I was running into [and working with] 
these guys all the time.
CTAP: Oh, yes. 
FRENCH: I had so many students when I was at Fort Leonard Wood—I 
mean, [almost] 2,000 di"erent students came through [the courses I taught]. 
CTAP: Wow.
FRENCH: I really didn’t recognize them [when I ran into them], but they sat 
and listened to me [teach] sometimes [(ve to] eight hours a day, so they really 
had no di*culty recognizing who I was, and I de(nitely stood out when I 
was there because I was in a completely di"erent uniform. So I was running 
into [former students] fairly often, and just from knowing them and having 
a good background there [at Fort Leonard Wood], that [sense of familiarity] 
spread to that whole battalion, I would say. I was able to just kind of roll in 
any time and talk to that battalion commander [if something important came 
up]. Task Force !or, the [U.S.] 4th Engineer Battalion, was based out of 
Kandahar Air Field [and] we were in Kandahar Air Field, so that really helped 
[too]. But I think some of that familiarity in'uenced the e*ciencies, the degree 
to which we were able to work [closely with] them. [It was] the same thing 
with Task Force Saber. Again, a very close working relationship. [!ey were] 
able to make sure we were using the resources that came to us properly and 
requesting the right [capabilities] that were required for certain missions. !at 
was good in a lot of ways.
CTAP: Were there any complexities that cropped up? I’m just curious because 
I am a student of military culture. Were there any disconnects between the 
U.S. and the Canadian forces’ cultures? 
FRENCH: Ha, yes, there were. !ere was a tendency [on the part of in-
coming units to sometimes bypass Task Force Kandahar], the force in place. 
For example, [when] Task Force Fury [came] into our battlespace, it shouldn’t 
normally work this way, at least in my view, but we had to go actively seek 
them and constantly be on top of them for information in terms of what 
they [had planned]. I am sure [it was just] eagerness and “I just want to get 
the job done,” and, you know, managing a whole bunch of requirements all 
at once and not necessarily being able to check every box. But there were 
times when they would show up at one of our forward operating bases in a 















!ey were doing some kind of an infrastructure survey, picking out what bed 
spaces they were going to take. It caught [our] people completely by surprise. 
So rather than them coming to us and giving us the information in terms of 
[where they were going and when], we really had to keep on top of them and 
see what they were up to. !at was maybe the one cultural thing that was the 
most interesting. 
!en you can add on to that—[although] I don’t think it has anything to 
do with the U.S./Canada piece—when one force takes over from another, 
somebody [always] is going to say, “Oh, I don’t want the base there, I want it 
here. I am going to close that one and open this one.” !ere is always going to 
be a little bit of that. !ere was some of that, which is normal. It is just based 
on the di"erent tactical assessments and sometimes based on the changing 
situation on the ground. So there was some of that. You know, I do remember 
being asked [when the Black Hawk came in], “Did you know anything about 
this?” And I didn’t know anything about it. I didn’t know they 'ew into FOB 
whatever and were already picking out where they were going to sleep. Some 
of that happened. We rolled with it. 
CTAP: Well, being an alumnus of the 82nd Airborne Division, I was always 
taught that little groups of paratroopers or “LGOPs” as we like to call them, 
were what saves the day, so we made that a part of every moment of the time 
we were awake as paratroopers running around. 
FRENCH: Yes, LGOPs is actually one of the terms I learned during my time in 
theater. 
CTAP: Oh, excellent. Excellent.
FRENCH: Yes, I was actually producing [something] like a glossary. I had a 
whole bunch of U.S. terms on there, like a big glossary that [I] then translated 
into Canadian. I don’t even know how many copies of these things I gave 
out. When you are in a meeting and you start talking about “the Beltway” 
[around Washington, D.C.], you know, little terms [like] that are completely 
di"erent from one force to the next [and] can completely throw you o". So it 
is important to get those details. So pretty soon I had this glossary and I gave 
out tons of copies, and that kind of thing improves interoperability. It is a 
[di"erent] language. 
CTAP: Do you have any closing comments? Anything you would like to 
(nish up with?
FRENCH: I think the one thing that I want to highlight, and hopefully it 
has come out already, [is that] the exchange program doesn’t really cost extra 
[personnel], because for every Canadian o*cer who was sent down to the 
U.S. Army Engineers School, there was a U.S. o*cer who was sent up to 
the Canadian School of Military Engineering. Maybe the only cost is a little 
more complicated administration as you work out visas between the coun-
tries, and the [relocation is] maybe for a bit of a longer distance. But the cost 
is really minimal when you look at an exchange program like the one I did at 
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[!e exchange program is] a really valuable thing, because it wasn’t just myself 
who was in Task Force Kandahar Headquarters who had previously been 
[posted] to the United States. I don’t know if it was a coincidence, or if it 
was some genius on the part of the commander; it very well may have been. 
But there were, I think, three or four of us in the headquarters who had just 
come out of U.S. exchange programs. I had been doing the job I talked about, 
and these guys were doing liaison jobs. One guy was liaison with the Stryker 
Brigade Combat Team and another one was going out on operations with 
the [U.S.] infantry battalion reporting back up to Task Force Kandahar. You 
know, all very, very key positions making sure that interoperability was there, 
and truly it was an international brigade. We never called it that, but it really 
was. I think that having some people who have that kind of cross-cultural, if 
you will, that “bilingual” background can go a long way in enabling [interop-
erability]. Rather than worrying about little details and trying to (gure out 
what each other is thinking and doing, [you can just get] down to business and 
deal with the problems that you are sent there to deal with in the (rst place. 
CTAP: !at is a really valuable message. !anks very much.  
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1  !is interview has been edited for length and clarity. Every 
e"ort has been made to ensure that the meaning and intention 
of the participants has not been altered in any way. !e original 
interview is available on video to CTFP members at www.
globalecco.org/archives
2 MAJ French noted later that the First Special Service Force in 
World War II might be the only similar case.
3 In a subsequent discussion, MAJ French pointed out 
that Canadian governmental policy determined what 
could be given to the incoming U.S. forces, what had to 
be paid for by them, and what was absolutely essential 
for the Canadian forces to take back with them.
4 !is refers to the U.S. Code regulation and funding system. 
Speci(cally, the funds MAJ French refers to were Title 10–Armed 
Forces and Title 22–Foreign Relations and Intercourse.



















How Can Leaders Maintain Ethical Command Climates?
Dr. Rebecca J. Johnson The field grade officers I teach often ask how they can set and 
maintain ethical command climates in their specialized small units, especially 
when they are operating far from the 'agpole, and for long periods of time. 
Leaders can (nd this aspect of command di*cult even when they have eyes 
on their people daily and maintain good contact with “higher”; without these 
factors leaders can struggle, for predictable reasons.
What is “command climate”? General John Loh notes, “!e essence of com-
mand and leadership is to create a climate throughout the unit that inspires all 
to achieve extraordinary goals and levels of performance at all times and under 
all conditions, especially in the stress of combat.”1 Seen in this way, command 
climate is the ethos of a unit, set by its commander. 
When it is strong, command climate orients subordinates and enables them 
to excel in achieving their mission. When it is weak (and most people reading 
this column can think of at least one former leader who seemed “asleep at the 
switch” during most, if not all, of his command tour), the environment is ripe 
for the subordinate with the strongest personality to step up and in'uence the 
unit. If the informal leader is committed to the unit’s mission and understands 
higher’s intent, the unit may 'ourish. If the informal leader’s intent for the 
unit deviates from that of the command or higher, the unit can very quickly 
(nd itself on dangerous ground. Finally, when the command climate is toxic 
(and many of us have been there, too), it orients and prepares subordinates to 
fail by sti'ing initiative, communication, and accountability.
On this point, let me be clear: Command climate encompasses more than 
morale. !e commander’s ethos sets expectations about subordinates’ be-
havior. Does the commander enforce discipline? Demand integrity? Supervise? 
It is also more than command philosophy. If the de(nition of integrity is 
consistency in what a person says, does, and believes, then command climates 
stand or fall on integrity. A commander who articulates one set of expecta-
tions to the unit but then enforces di"erent expectations through his own 
actions is setting his unit up for failure. As span of control increases, so does 
the challenge of maintaining integrity throughout the chain of command, 
especially as units specialize.
If we think about ethics as being those ideas and actions that maintain the 
standards of a profession (here, the profession of arms), then we can see pretty 
quickly how command climates in'uence the ethical character of a unit. 
!rough their command climates, leaders can instill and enforce a unit-wide 
commitment to tactical pro(ciency, excellence, and growth while upholding 
professional standards, or they can undermine these commitments and, by 
doing so, undermine the standards of the profession. 
Dr. Rebecca J. Johnson is an 
associate professor of National 
Security A"airs in the Command 
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Paul Bartone, a researcher at National Defense University, has shown that 
“hardy” leaders—those individuals who model commitment to the unit and 
mission, a sense of control over their choices and actions, and who view 
adversity as a challenge on the road to growth—tend to have hardy subordi-
nates.2 Leaders who have low levels of commitment, control, and challenge 
(those commanders who are either asleep at the switch or toxic) tend to have 
subordinates who admit to feeling alienated, powerless, and threatened. Under 
such conditions, ethics erode and unit members have little motivation to “do 
the right thing,” especially when the right thing comes at a personal cost.
In small units, the dangers of a weak or toxic command climate are even 
higher. Two trends can combine at the small-unit level to erode e"ective and 
ethical command climates: 1) !e strength of small unit bonds can create a 
parallel set of ethical expectations that may not comport with those of the 
larger organization (unit cohesion goes too far); and 2) younger members of 
small units become disproportionately in'uenced by their peers, thus turning 
the unit into a moral and ethical echo chamber. !is may be acceptable in 
units with strong formal or informal leaders who set and maintain ethical 
command climates, but it can be disastrous in weak or toxic environments. 
It is important to note that while leaders are responsible for and have a high 
level of in'uence over the actions of their subordinates, they rarely possess 
complete control over what subordinates do. Ethical lapses in a unit may tie 
back to a poor command climate, or they may tie back to a strong command 
climate that happens to be home to one or more deadweights. !e existence 
of these ethical outliers underscores the importance of good command 
climates in units: strong commands can, if not change the behavior of dead-
weights, at least mitigate their e"ects; limit their in'uence on impressionable 
unit members; and hold them accountable more credibly than weak or toxic 
commands.
So what does all this mean for building an ethical command climate in small 
units that operate with high levels of autonomy? It means that the leaders of 
these units and their immediate superiors—o*cer, enlisted, and civilian—
have a particular set of responsibilities. Some of these are obvious, but bear 
repeating. Others may be intuitive for only the most natural leader.
First, clearly communicated expectations are key. !ere are any number of 
instances in which leaders’ failure to communicate clear expectations for their 
soldiers fed uncertainty, which led to a weak command climate in which 
soldiers felt alienated from higher, powerless to make e"ective decisions, and 
threatened by their situation. A weak command climate can motivate un-
ethical behavior when soldiers interpret leaders’ failure to stop such behavior 
as a tacit endorsement.3 
Everyone is familiar with the ampli(cation of Commanders’ Intent down 
the chain of command. !is natural desire to over-ful(ll expectations can 
bring humorous results (Sergeant Major said to report 15 minutes ahead of 
the Battalion Commander’s arrival, so the Gunny told his people to show 
up 30 minutes early. …Folks were on the parade (eld an hour ahead of the 
Commander) or dangerous misunderstandings. !e more consistently leaders 












units will be prepared to ful(ll higher’s intent, even when they are operating at 
a distance from the command.
Second, command climate is a living thing; it is either growing stronger or 
it is growing weaker. Leaders need to focus on building their subordinates’ 
ability to operate e"ectively and ethically under increasing distance, duration, 
and distraction. Some small units are intuitively more independent and can 
operate well far from base. !e key is to maintain strong cohesion within the 
unit, so that geographic or tactical isolation does not translate into alienation. 
Other units function well closer to home, but struggle when they are more 
remotely deployed. Here the key is to build con(dence and competence in 
unit members from the beginning, so they feel appropriately in control and 
capable (vice powerless or threatened) when facing more austere assignments. 
Likewise, some units can take one set of mission-type orders and operate 
and adapt for weeks, while others require more frequent contact to reinforce 
intent. Leaders can help grow the second kind of unit by allowing increasing 
time between battle(eld circulations (assuming the unit is operating e"ectively 
and ethically in the interim), rewarding initiative (even when it results in 
failure), and providing appropriate reachback so when the unit touches base, 
it receives the support it needs.
Finally, some units thrive on chaos, while others struggle to compartmentalize 
distractions. In these situations, reducing distance and duration to the extent 
possible can help refocus the unit. In addition, reachback is key to providing 
these units the support they need to focus on their mission, rather than on 
personal or other indirect concerns.
!e command climate is about setting, modeling, and enforcing expectations 
for e"ective, ethical behavior by developing units’ levels of commitment, con-
trol, and challenge over increasing distance, duration, and distraction. While 
these observations may seem obvious to the readers of Combating Terrorism 
Exchange, you may not have to travel too far down your chain of command to 
(nd leaders for whom this is not intuitive. Preparing them to build e"ective 
and ethical command climates all the way down to the smallest unit in your 
organization can’t guarantee unit or mission success, but it will substantially 





1 General John Michael Loh, “!e Responsibility of Leadership 
in Command,” 1:  http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/au-24/
loh.pdf
2 Paul T. Bartone, “Resilience Under Military Operational Stress: 
Can Leaders In'uence Hardiness?” Military Psychology 18 
Supplemental (2 July 2006): S131–S148: http://www.hardiness-
resilience.com/docs/Bartone.pdf 
3 An extreme example of this negative feedback loop is the abuse 
carried out by U.S. soldiers at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. See the 
Taguba Report: AR 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police 
Brigade, (declassi(ed 15 October 2004), 19.
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If you’re thinking about joining the Central f*&%#!@g Intelli-
gence Agency as a f*&%#!@g analyst, to make big f*&%#!@g things happen, 
take a few tips from the motion picture Zero Dark "irty. If stomping your 
feet and making pouty faces doesn’t get you what you want, threaten your 
boss with a congressional investigation—a sure route to promotion. Dabble in 
torture. Use your personal cell phone to share classi(ed information, and use 
secure communications to chit-chat with pals. Motivate yourself by seeking 
personal revenge; this provides more meaning and focus than the abstract 
notion of service to your country. Incidentally, Navy SEALs are quite willing to 
kill people for you, if you act angry-yet-con(dent. And especially remember 
to call yourself a motherf*&%#r when meeting the director of Central Intel-
ligence, and say f*&k a lot, so people will know you’re serious.
!e real Central Intelligence Agency is coolly mundane compared to the 
Zero Dark "irty version. Serving intelligence o*cers do not use profanity 
or raise their voices in formal meetings. Such outbursts would be considered 
indisciplined and unprofessional. Strict adherence to process and procedure is 
essential to maintain security, protect classi(ed information, and produce the 
best possible estimates and intelligence.
In fact, the sharpest criticism that can be made of an intelligence o*cer is 
to say that he or she is “emotional.” If their emotions are not in check, their 
reasoning could be distorted and their work become unreliable. Life-and-death 
decisions are made on the basis of intelligence produced by analysts. Any hint 
of unreliability cannot be allowed, which is to say, an emotional analyst cannot 
be tolerated.
None of this, however, makes for exciting on-screen drama. Zero Dark "irty 
scriptwriter Mark Boal and director Kathryn Bigelow therefore took full 
advantage of the (lm’s disclaimer that the events it portrays may be “(ction-
alized or invented for purposes of dramatization.” !e (lm begins with the 
classic action-movie tag, “based on actual events.” !is might lead the viewer 
to believe this is a docu-drama, like Black Hawk Down or Battle of Algiers. 
Yes, there is a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, and yes, there was a terrorist 
named Osama bin Laden. Not much else is documentary. Most of the events 
we see on-screen are, as the disclaimer admits, “invented” and the characters 
“(ctionalized.”
!e contradictions and misrepresentations “for purposes of dramatization” 
are numerous. One of the more painful has the CIA chief of station strolling 
through the lobby of the U.S. embassy in Islamabad with a poker-chip sized 
“CIA” pin on his lapel, but displaying chagrin when his “cover” is blown 
by Wikileaks. In another, the CIA torturer-interrogator amateurishly mixes 
techniques—“friendly approach” this moment, “futility” the next, with some 
THE MOVING IMAGE
Zero F*&%#!@G Thirty
by Kalev I. Sepp
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juvenile, Abu Ghraib–inspired sexual humiliation and dog-collaring thrown 
in. Then, he interviews his subject outdoors, where other prisoners can 
easily see and hear them. Finally, during the climactic raid on the bin Laden 
compound—which is a relief from the plodding mash of o*ce scenes—the 
actual SEAL raiders had cut the electricity to the compound. But during “site 
exploitation,” in order to carry away bin Laden’s computers and documents, a 
SEAL simply 'ips a wall switch and turns on the house lights. Even 007 movies 
usually pay more attention to continuity and realism.
!e two worst of these cinematic inventions, though, are the movie’s depic-
tions of the e"ort to (nd Osama bin Laden, and of the real CIA o*cer 
Jennifer Matthews. In the (lm, a visiting bureaucrat screams at the shame-
faced Islamabad station sta" that they are, indeed, the only ones searching for 
bin Laden, and they had better get about (nding him. !e storyline reveals 
that only the red-haired analyst “Maya” is actually pushing the sta" and 
her boss to take any meaningful action. If not for her pluck and courage, 
the screenplay implies, bin Laden would never be found … notwithstanding 
that the National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, 
Joint Special Operations Command, and an entire directorate at the CIA were 
wholly committed for almost a decade to the most extensive manhunt in U.S. 
history. !e success of this world-wide e"ort was a triumph of cooperation 
and coordination inside the American and allied intelligence communities, 
and credit goes to thousands—not to one.  
Jennifer Matthews was one of the most highly regarded 
and experienced CIA o*cers hunting bin Laden. Her 
killing, with seven others, by the suicide bomber and 
double-agent al-Balawi on 30 December 2009, was a se-
rious setback to the manhunt. Her portrayal in Zero Dark 
"irty as the gossipy and unserious “Jessica” is demeaning. 
Instead of the dedicated professional she was, Matthews 
(perhaps to enhance the Maya character) is cast as a soccer 
mom—baking a cake for her meeting with al-Balawi, 
bouncing on her toes when he arrives, and disregarding the 
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It’s dramatic. It’s emotive. It’s wrong. One wonders what her three children 
would think if they saw this.
Counterterror and military professionals will not be surprised at the distance 
between Zero Dark "irty and reality. In Hurt Locker, their earlier Oscar-
winning collaboration, Boal and Bigelow similarly created characters and 
situations unrecognizable to anyone who actually served in Explosive Ord-
nance Disposal units in the Iraq war. Further, the well-tried plot of “lone 
idealist perseveres against incompetent superiors to bring villain to justice” is 
unconvincing in this case, despite Boal’s imaginative scripting—or perhaps 
because of it.
Even in the credits at the end of the movie, the name of the commander of 
the raid, Admiral William McRaven, is misspelled (“McCraven”). But getting 
it right doesn’t really matter in Zero Dark "irty. Better to stay home and read 
Nicholas Schmidle’s “Getting Bin Laden,” in the 8 August 2011 New Yorker. 
!e whole story of the long hunt for Osama bin Laden is yet to be told, but 








Military historian Max Boot started and ended his presentation 
at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School by showing a widescreen image of the 
cover of his book, Invisible Armies.1 !e cover reproduces a colorful painting 
by the most famous painter of the Greek Revolution, !eodoros Vryzakis 
(1814–1878), titled “!e Destruction of Dramali at Dervenakia.” It depicts an 
epic battle in which a dozen men and women are shown (ghting courageously 
atop a hill, surrounded by enemies. !is battle occurred in 1822, a central 
year for the Greek revolutionary struggle for independence. Of course, the 
painting is a product of the imagination of Vryzakis, since at the age of eight 
he would have not been able to capture that image with his own eyes. But he 
had strong emotions about that period of time, having lost his father during 
the Revolution. !e painting is a (ne piece of art that makes the book look 
very handsome and interesting, but apart from aesthetics, what meaning does 
it have for a book that, according to the author, is about “telling the story of 
irregular warfare from its origins” (p. xxi)?
After listening to Dr. Boot’s presentation on the book, I argued with the 
author about the picture’s meaning, observing that to my knowledge it didn’t 
represent a story of true guerilla warfare. Of course, the author’s opinion on 
that is clear enough! In the end, both of us were wrong. !e reason lies in 
(nding a proper de(nition of the kind of warfare we were discussing. 
For my part, I was right because the story behind the painting, the real Battle 
of Dervenakia, cannot be considered a guerrilla, an irregular, or a non-conven-
tional battle. Boot, in the introduction to the book, tries but does not suc-
ceed in giving a proper de(nition of guerilla warfare. He writes that guerilla 
warfare is characterized by “the use of hit-and-run tactics by an armed group 
directed primarily against a government and its security forces for political or 
religious reasons” (p. xxii), while guerilla armies are distinguished from regular 
forces by their organizational structure (p. xxi). Also, according to the author, 
guerillas “rely on ambushes and rapid movements” (p. xxii), “undertake the 
strategy of attrition, trying to wear down the enemy’s will to (ght,” and “wage 
war from the shadows” (p. xxiv). 
If we analyze the Battle of Dervenakia, or the Greek Revolution, or any of the 
revolutions that aimed to obtain independence from the Ottoman Empire 
during its (ve centuries of dominance over the Balkans, it is hard to decide 
who is the guerilla. In the case of Dervenakia, Mahmud Dramali Pasha, the 
commander of the Ottoman forces, was himself sent with his troops to hit, 
destroy, or disband the Greek forces, who had started their anti-imperial 
struggle inspired by a former Ottoman governor. (!is man had risen against 
the sultan, only to then run back to his own safe possessions.) !e concept of 
government was very 'uid, and imperial governance was e"ective only in the 
cities and villages located in the plains of the Balkan Peninsula. !e counterrev-
olutionary practice of the Ottoman Empire was primarily an endeavor to (nd 
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the most capable subordinate, who would gather his most capable troops and 
march them wherever they were needed to suppress a rebellion. On their return 
route, the troops were then allowed to expropriate the goods of the defeated 
populations. Other than that, the suppressing force had no pre-established 
organization. Dramali himself “contracted” with 1000 local Muslims to support 
him during the (ghting or act as scouts to explore the trails. 
From the other side comes the same story. !eodoros Kolokotronis, the Greek 
commander, was largely independent from the “higher council of the war” 
and so were his “captains,” leaders of men who were paid with war booty. 
Given their organization and objectives, the opposing forces in this (ght, or 
at least the substantial part of them, did not di"er much from each other. 
!eir tactics also were similar. On his punitive 
adventure, Dramali moved fast enough to defeat 
any resisting enemies, and held territory only 
when he believed his opponents’ will to (ght 
was draining. !e same tactics were embraced by 
the Greek forces. Most important, none of the 
above strategies or ways to conduct warfare was 
considered non-conventional by the participants. 
Centuries of rebellions had made the Ottoman 
forces aware of the “shadows,” and they knew 
what the battles would look like, while the rebels 
had adopted those techniques as the most rational 
ones given the hard terrain and communication 
routes. Nor were the battles themselves “guerillas” 
in their Spanish meaning of small wars, as Boot 
explains in his book. !e Battle of Dervenakia, 
the one that brought the defeat of the Ottomans, lasted for three days (26–28 
July 1822). !e Greek revolution itself lasted six years, from 1821 to 1827.
But Boot was not wrong either, in de(ning the battle as an episode of guerilla 
warfare or even for characterizing the Greek Revolution as an example of a 
successful guerrilla campaign. !e problem here does not lie with the Battle 
of Dervenakia or the Greek Revolution, but with the lack of a clear and 
fully representative de(nition of guerilla warfare. Boot doesn’t provide the 
reader with that. His book o"ers an extensive collection of examples, each 
di"erent from the other and explained in an original way by the author. 
From this perspective, even Vryzakis’s picture makes sense. !e artist’s view 
of the battle is di"erent from the story behind it, but he chose to paint it 
as a short, decisive, and epic battle—an image quite attractive to Boot as 
well. What should have distinguished one from the other is precisely their 
approach to myth-making when presenting their works to the public: the 
epic painter may make his image ambiguous, while the historian cannot—
or should not. !is di"erence between the reality of the battle and the 
image of it o"ered on the book’s cover is what truly distinguishes guerilla 
warfare from traditional warfare.   
238)7
1 Max Boot, Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times 
to the Present (New York: Liveright, 2013). Dr. Boot spoke at the Naval Postgraduate 
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